Walden University

ScholarWorks
Walden Dissertations and Doctoral Studies

Walden Dissertations and Doctoral Studies
Collection

1-1-2011

Implications of Executive Succession Upon
Financial Risk and Performance
Susan F. Weiss
Walden University

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.waldenu.edu/dissertations
Part of the Accounting Commons, and the Finance and Financial Management Commons
This Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by the Walden Dissertations and Doctoral Studies Collection at ScholarWorks. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Walden Dissertations and Doctoral Studies by an authorized administrator of ScholarWorks. For more information, please
contact ScholarWorks@waldenu.edu.

Walden University
COLLEGE OF MANAGEMENT AND TECHNOLOGY

This is to certify that the doctoral dissertation by
Susan Weiss
has been found to be complete and satisfactory in all respects,
and that any and all revisions required by
the review committee have been made.
Review Committee
Dr. Lilburn Hoehn, Committee Chairperson,
Applied Management and Decision Sciences Faculty
Dr. William Brent, Committee Member,
Applied Management and Decision Sciences Faculty
Dr. Robert O’Reilly, Committee Member,
Applied Management and Decision Sciences Faculty
Dr. John Nirenberg, University Reviewer
Applied Management and Decision Sciences Faculty

Chief Academic Officer
Eric Riedel, Ph.D.

Walden University
2011

Abstract
Implications of Executive Succession Upon Financial Risk and Performance
by
Susan F. Weiss CMA CFM

C.A.G.S., Bryant University, 2005
M.B.A., Bryant University, 2004
B.S., Rhode Island College, 1988

Dissertation Submitted in Partial Fulfillment
of the Requirements for the Degree of
Doctor of Philosophy
Applied Management and Decision Sciences/Finance

Walden University
November, 2011

Abstract
Executive replacements have historically created fluctuations in the market value of a
company and precipitated inappropriate investor reaction. However, the direction and
statistical significance of relationships between executive turnover, market value,
financial risk, and investor reaction among a census of highly performing firms was
previously unexplored. The purpose of this study was to determine the extent of the
relationship between CEO turnover and indicators of company performance. Theoretical
foundation for this study was the efficient markets hypothesis. Hypotheses tests were
designed to support an ex-post facto research methodology for pre-post comparison of
volatility of financial metrics, which are indicators of market value (market value added),
investor reaction (Tobin’s q), risk (beta), executive performance (economic value added
and return on assets), and turnover frequency given CEO succession. Statistically
significant differences in firm risk emerged from comparisons of highly performing firms
exemplified in the foundational leadership text Good to Great. Approximately 45 % of
firms sampled did not experience volatility of financial metrics, which supported the
presence of a leadership legacy, or strategic management behavior which minimized
financial risk. Contrary to prior studies, financial metrics sampled within an interval
immediately surrounding the succession event were less indicative of significant financial
risk as compared to metrics sampled over the entire tenure of executives. Implications for
positive social change include reducing investor risk in selection of equity holdings;
capital fairly directed to entities results in benefits for society including job creation,
economic stimulus, safer retirement accounts, and corporate sustainability.
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Chapter 1: Introduction to the Study
Introduction
An entity’s competitive advantage is manifested through extraordinary financial
performance; informed decision-making, applied through the prowess of experienced
leadership, sustains strategic competition. An executive leader’s “ability, preferences,
operating policies, and ultimate decisions affect the firm through the projects the firm
selects, its financial policy, and the corporate culture...[since] decisions differ across
individuals, CEO changes can alter the course of the firm and its performance” (Clayton,
Hartzell, & Rosenberg, 2005, p. 1779). Therefore, a personnel change at the chief
executive level has an impact upon strategic operations, as discernable through the
analysis of accounting and financial metrics, as well as security market participant
reaction. Further, as fervent sales or purchase transactions occur in reaction to personnel
succession, stockholders’ perceptions of management turnover often gives rise to trading
activity, which may project unqualified volatility upon the corporation’s stock price,
affecting market values of equity during the interval circumscribing the event date.
Investors participating in the market environment may indecisively perceive the impact
of the personnel change contingent within the risk context, and react by altering demand
for equity in response. Accurate accounting metrics and financial analysis will eventually
countermand spurious valuation effects of a market anomaly characterized by investor
overreaction. Through information communicated within an entity’s official financial
disclosures, including the Securities and Exchange Commission’s required Forms 10K
and 10Q, preparers of financial statements portend information facilitating more accurate
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valuation of stock prices given a change in personnel, accompanied by a change in
strategy. As Graham, Harvey, and Rajgopal (2005) acknowledged, “voluntary disclosure
policies are integral to the earnings reporting process…disclosure beyond that mandated
in regulatory filings…shape[s] the perceptions of market participants and other
stakeholders” (p. 27).
Upon sampling more than 1000 succession events accompanied by changes in
financial performance, Cannella Jr. and Lubatkin (1993) said, “return and risk, however
defined, are not highly correlated, suggesting that each represents a separate performance
dimension” (p. 779). Whereas financial return is a manifestation of the outcome of
decision-making, financial risk is a reflection of the inherent quality of decision-making
within the endogenous and exogenous context of the entity. As distinguished inside
followers and outsiders receive new executive appointments, researchers have found
stockholder reaction to succession events to be statistically inconsistent (Friedman &
Singh, 1989; Gibson, 2003; Clayton, et al., 2005). Researchers have also differentiated
actual rather than perceived financial performance dynamics prior and subsequent to
succession events and revealed similar inconsistencies of statistical significance. Whereas
Kaplan (1994), Dahya, Lonie, and Power (1998), and Huson, Parrino, and Starks (2001),
disclosed a statistically significant relationship between poor financial performance and
executive turnover by type of successor, conversely, Friedman and Singh (1989) and
Puffer and Weintrop (1991) discovered no significant statistical relationship between
performance and turnover variables. These disparate results may have been attributable to
time-series sampling. This void within the literature was effectively bridged through
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purposive sampling entailing a novel approach: the analysis of entities characterized by
exceptional performance, and the observance of dynamics affecting sustained financial
and operational results given the occurrence of chief executive departure.
Since “traditional economic theory holds that the market for management control
acts as a disciplinary device on nonvalue maximizing management” (Kennedy &
Limmack, 1996, p. 267), the prevalence of executive removal is conjectured to increase
as earnings volatility and operational ineffectiveness are addressed by principals who
exercise their governance control. Researchers have statistically attested to the increased
incidence of executive turnover, given the presence of diminishing financial returns
(Friedman & Singh, 1989; Puffer & Weintrop, 1991; Cannella Jr. & Lubatkin, 1993;
Allgood & Farrell, 2000). Conversely, an analysis of chief executive turnover in the
presence of exceptional financial performance warranted review through the
administration of a substantive framework of evaluation, to determine whether an
individual’s distinct approach to the implementation of the objectives of the entity affect
risk dynamics, resulting in statistically significant variation of financial performance
metrics.
Statement of the Problem
Variations in equity market returns are often experienced by investors subsequent
to a change in an entity’s executive leadership. Researchers (Dahya et al., 1998; Clayton
et al., 2005) have revealed various degrees of statistical significance of changes in equity
returns as changes in leadership occur through analyses of samples ranked by financial
performance level.
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The problem is that executive replacements create a fluctuation in the market
value of a company and frequently precipitate inappropriate investor reaction. It is
integral to determine the direction and significance of the relationship between executive
turnover, market value, financial risk, and investor reaction to replacement events among
highly performing firms. Potential impacts were revealed through statistical comparison
of metrics that indicate market value (market value added), investor reaction (Tobin’s q),
risk (beta), executive performance (accounting metrics economic value added and return
on assets), and turnover frequency. A chief executive’s distinctive approach or style used
in the implementation of strategy as compared to a predecessor differentiated levels of
financial performance and risk for an organization.
Bower (2007) contemplated the implications of succession planning: “it occurred
to me toward the end of a decade’s research on the work of corporate leaders that CEO
succession had everything to do with a company’s ability to sustain high performance
over decades” (p. x). Identified within a comprehensive analysis conducted by Collins
(2001) was a sample of high performing entities led by outstanding executives. Analysis
of executive turnover, replacement, and succession applicable to this sample warrants
investigation, and thus satisfies the following research question: In the event of executive
departure, is the individual risk management style of the successor, as differentiated from
the predecessor, perceptible through a time-series financial analysis of highly performing
companies? As the introduction of new executive strategic decisions may be the source of
financial instability, investors often find that a different level of risk does not align with
their own specific risk tolerance. The investor may engage in buying or selling activity on
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the basis of the perceived implications of executive change when financial performance
may or may not result in statistically significant change. Economic resource allocations
within society are affected as a result.
As financial returns are variable for many firms experiencing a change in
leadership, fiscal performance may deteriorate or improve. Investors rely on continuity of
returns resulting from experienced leadership. As they seek sustainability of results for
their own benefit, investors are often sensitized to the fiscal implications of leadership
changes. Investors, at a minimum, are conjectured to respond appropriately given
financial results yielded as a result of personnel change, and any strategic endeavors
detected through the observation of financial metrics. The change in accounting results is
measurable through observation of return on assets and economic value added, while the
change in investor response is detectable through observation of Tobin's q, beta, and
market value added.
Inadequate financial performance is a relative term. Dahya et al. (1998) observed:
“the probability of a forced management change is in practice very small even when the
firm is in the lowest decile of performance or in imminent danger of liquidation” (p.
1091). These authors documented that, generally, financial performance must be abysmal
for an entity’s board to replace top management, thus indicating reticence of board
members and principals to supplant poorly performing executives. A selected set of
qualifying ratios and indicators which are utilized to detect results of expected versus
actual performance requisitely satisfies the research question regarding the financial
implications and relative risk of differing tactics in the achievement of strategic
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outcomes. These benchmarks of executive financial and operational performance,
optimally designated, are administered in practice and monitored for stakeholder
tolerance. All leaders must eventually be replaced, as a natural progression of firm
continuity; however, upon replacement, risk specific to firm performance as perceived by
investors and detectable through financial metrics may change in response. Deterioration
in financial performance is expected to be followed by an executive replacement event.
Tangentially, such an investigation is anticipated to reveal reticence to remove executives
despite the lucid presence of diminished performance sustainability, exposing
stakeholders to a manifested dearth of corporate governance and social responsibility.
Whether the problem of inconsistency of financial performance pursuant to a CEO
change remains pervasive among firms experiencing outstanding and sustained returns
regardless of the formidability of firm financial structure and operational policy is tested
within this analysis.
Background of the Problem
“Success in today’s competitive environment requires an organizational
commitment to compete over the long run” (Lee & Milne, 1988, p. 25). Strategic
continuity is essential for long-term operational and financial success; the implementation
of transformational initiatives often necessitates regimented adherence to planned
allocations of human, tangible, and financial resources. Conversely, economic changes
within the environment in which the firm operates may compel an executive response.
Contemporary global competition among entities further dimensionalizes risk. Bower
(2007) asserted: “more than two thirds of the top companies of 1990 were gone by
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2004…those hapless companies went bankrupt, were sold, or were broken up principally
because their management could not redeploy resources in productive ways” (p. 6).
Executives lagging in their discernment of factors challenging the future success of the
entity are often not able to formidably and appropriately react to “pervasive, framebreaking...and transmuting internal and external environmental conditions” (Gordon,
Stewart, Sweo, & Luker, 2000, p. 912).
Further, Bower (2007) observed:
…what we see, time and time again, are companies that fail to respond to
changing circumstances and that fail to look forward…the ability of
companies to adjust their capabilities and direction over the long term—to
meet the challenges of new markets and new competitors—grows directly
out of the quality of their leadership. (p. 7)
It is therefore imperative that a CEO serve as the strategic steward entrusted by
stakeholders to effectively command enterprise endeavors, to swiftly react to firmspecific opportunities, and to coordinate appropriate responses among executive team
members. Rappaport (2005) reflected: “to evaluate the sustainability and potential growth
of sales and cash flow, [shareholders] must weigh such factors as industry growth
potential, the company’s competitive position, the likely behavior of competitors,
technological change, and quality of management” (p. 66). As a majority of the entity’s
stakeholders typically do not have the skills, access, or time to accomplish these
assessments, agents are assigned to the task; it is the responsibility of the primary agent,
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the CEO, to engender the best demonstrated practice of augmented value creation, and
support the concept of capital maintenance.
Gray and Cannella, Jr. (1997) contemplated: “What happens, for example, when
the firm’s environment, and hence its strategy, changes dramatically?” (p. 537).
Exceptionally sustained operational and financial performance is an imposing objective
for any leader directing a team of diverse individuals, particularly in an economic
environment characterized by the presence of macro-level international hypercompetition in many sectors. Few top executives have the propensity to conjure such an
enduring legacy. Collins (2001) posited: “leadership…is equally about ferocious resolve,
an almost stoic determination to do whatever needs to be done to make the company
great” (p. 30), and further acknowledged: “Greatness is not a function of circumstance.
Greatness…is largely a matter of conscious choice” (p. 11). From these observations,
Collins exalted respective executives and their 11 entities (e.g., Abbott Laboratories,
Circuit City, Fannie Mae, Gillette, Kimberly Clark, Kroger Inc., Nucor Corporation,
Philip Morris (Altria), Pitney Bowes, Walgreens, and Wells Fargo) upon testing realized
results versus a designated litmus of 15 years of sustained exceptional financial
performance, or “cumulative returns at least three times the market over the next fifteen
years” (p. 6). Current stakeholders and future investors seeking stability of returns to
satisfy a portfolio objective of growth are acutely interested in the auspice of financial
outcomes. To the extent that exceptional financial performance may be sustained by
strategic continuity afforded through the applied talent of a particular executive officer,
uninterrupted tenure may augur mitigated risk and amplify value added.
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Eventually, a competent chief executive must conclude tenure due to obligatory
retirement or ailing health; alternatively, resignation may occur as the executive pursues
employment with another firm. The chief executive successor may offer strategic
continuity resulting in desirable operational or financial sustainability. The successor may
conversely introduce a culture of strategic and transformational change, inflicting
comparatively more business risk upon the entity than a predecessor. As financial risk is
borne by the entity, its stock price and accounting metric volatility is exhibited through
financial reporting, and is detectable through ratio analysis and event studies. Since entity
performance may vary with the acuity of leaders’ decision-making, there exists a
contingency that a momentous operational or environmental watershed may trigger
disruptive erosion of financial returns.
Following a review of executive change occurring from 1980 through 1993,
Allgood and Farrell (2000) observed, “the mean and standard deviation of the stock
return diminish with tenure” (p. 389). These results implied that, as an executive garners
longer tenure, stock prices exhibit less volatility and risk becomes tempered, while
returns contemporaneously decrease due to more pervasive agency effects, regardless of
the consistency of profitability ratios and other performance metrics. Allgood and Farrell
also conceded that “recent research suggests that accounting measures are better
predictors of management changes than are stock returns” (p. 390). Accordingly, it is
more empirically comprehensive to query the prevalence of risk in the context of market
reaction, and complement such an event study with the outcome of decision-making as
manifested through an examination of accounting performance within pertinent periods.
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Thus, Collins’s (2001) sample exemplifying exceptional leaders and performing
entities provided the litmus for examination of the succession event, while Bower (2007)
contended that deliberate succession planning directed toward a candidate selected from
an internal coterie provided the greatest assurance of strategic continuity. Combining
these two analyses, it is informative to reveal the results of financial performance and the
magnitude of entity risk in the event of CEO replacement, and conduct analysis based on
the origin of the successor—insider or outsider—to differentiate fiscal outcomes of
decision-making.
Purpose of the Study
The purpose of this study is to determine the extent of the relationship between
executive turnover and company performance. Substantive tests of financial risk and
accounting performance conducted upon a specific sample of highly performing entities
experiencing a change in leadership reveal the significance of these relationships.
Overarchingly, this research provides an intensive study of the volatility of a firm’s
equity, specifically changes in market value added, as well as financial risk observable
through the beta metrics, and investor reaction observable through the Tobin’s q metric.
It is conjectured that certain operational management behavior and decision-making in
practice is evocative of the existence of an operational management style, discernable
through consistency afforded by US Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP)
and pervasive within the presentation of the entity's financial statements. The eliciting of
such risk factors is of interest to investors, portfolio managers, employees, and executive
boards; the level of relative risk informationally affords the investor a more replete
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consideration of variability of financial return. Further, this exposition is of significant
interest to financial analysts seeking to measure and predict the manifestation of risk
within the stock price or beta metric, and potentially enhances the accuracy of analysts’
forecasting.
Since samples subjected to previous scrutiny were often drawn from larger
populations of principally US publicly-owned, exchange-listed companies, prior analysis
is deficient of samples of US entities dichotomized by performance; thus, there exists a
gap in the literature. Samples stratified by deciles exist, but entities achieving
performance levels exclusively deemed exceptional have not previously been reviewed
for effects of CEO change with respect to risk.
Adapted from Collins’s (2001) study of exceptionally performing companies, the
purpose of this analysis thus differs from the research inquiry of other authors with
respect to sample. Differing samples were analyzed by Conyon and Florou (2002), who
selected a UK sample which they documented as “[not biased] towards good performers”
(p. 212). Clayton et al.(2005) sampled the entire range of US firms experiencing turnover
during the 1979-1995 period, as documented in Forbes Executive Compensation Surveys
(p. 1788). Stathopoulos, Espenlaub, and Walker (2005) stratified a sample of financial
results of UK companies into poorly, average, and highly performing subsamples;
however, this approach is yet to be utilized for a sample of US entities. A research
approach to sampling applicable CEO turnover occurrences which fails to dichotomize
entities’ polarized financial results may not prove to be generalizable to entities in highly
performing strata subsamples. This deficiency in research literature for US entities, the
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subject of Collins’s sample, is the source of this research inquiry and analysis. A study
focalized upon the relative unsystematic change in risk to which highly effective firms
are subject due to a change in leadership may provide insight upon the implications of
turnover for succession planning, strategic continuity, and equity valuation. Revelations
derived from this conceptual distinction may also be utilized to develop a strategic
approach to succession planning, which Bower (2007) termed as a “process [which]
reflects the discipline with which a company is managed and its culture” (p. xi)
ultimately intended to sustain an entity’s competitive advantage, and hence, financial
performance.
Conceptual Support for the Study
Puffer and Weintrop (1991) conveyed the paramount importance of gauging
financial performance under successive executive command:
…agency theory suggests that an important function of the compensation
contract is to align the interests of the manager with those of the
shareholder’s representatives…Since the board of directors cannot observe
all of the CEO’s actions, the board must rely on various outcomes of
corporate performance to evaluate the CEO’s effectiveness in what is a
complex process. Further study of this process could make sense of the
disparate findings from past studies of the performance-turnover
relationship and clarify the board of directors’ expectations for the CEO’s
role in firm performance. (p. 17)
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The performance/turnover relationship is equally worthy of examination from a
number of other financial perspectives. Shareholder and investor expectations may be
manifested as a result of anticipated performance or unrealized as a result of sudden
volatility. Operational and financial risk variation resulting from strategic realignment
may signal the need for portfolio reconstruction, or inclusion or exclusion of an entity’s
stock given an investor’s policy statement and designated risk tolerance. Risk variation
may also diminish the firm’s future ability to augment leverage within the capital
structure; “increased volatility could alter the firm’s investment policy going forward via
an increased cost of capital or by a reduction in the attractiveness of the firm’s equity as a
medium for acquisitions or compensation” (Clayton et al., 2005, p. 1780). Increased cost
of capital also curtails the firm’s future prospects with respect to expansion projects.
Continuity of financial performance is also a theoretically pervasive construct underlying
equity valuation; veracity in forecasting may be compromised in the presence of
unpredictable returns.
Forced CEO departures have been precipitated in practice by declining stock
prices, indicating market participants’ evaluation of the entity’s future prospects. Since
“the data indicate…that turnover tends to occur when…stock returns have recently been
negative” (Huson et al. 2001, p. 2280), incidence of executive removal is inversely
related to stock price. Agency theory, advocating discipline in the event of
nonperformance, is evidently applied through the actions of the entity’s principals,
particularly the board of directors.
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Assumptions
One underlying assumption of this analysis is that directors, executives, and
shareholders prefer favorable rather than unfavorable performance. To be sure, Collins’s
(2001) intent in commending subject firms within his composition was predicated upon
this assumption. Cannella Jr. and Lubatkin (1993) posited that “a relationship between
risk and outsider selection can be drawn from some of the arguments concerning return,
as low levels of return and high levels of risk can each be interpreted as unsatisfactory
outcomes” (p. 773). They further indicated that a single “benchmark of expected, or
normal, performance…may lack construct validity in that [it does] not adequately capture
directors’ perceptions of good and bad performance” (Puffer & Weintrop, as cited in
Cannella Jr. & Lubatkin, 1993, p. 773). Thus, an established benchmark utilized to
determine performance within the entity, such as a budget or forecast, may be the
comparative established to determine performance; such benchmarks are typically not
publicly available. Analysts’ forecasts or industry benchmarks are often instituted as
proxies for established performance comparatives. The propriety of utilizing analysts’
forecasts as a surrogate for firms experiencing turnover was attested by Sheikholeslami,
Wilson, and Selin (1998): “financial analysts might do better than statistical forecasting
techniques because they might be able to integrate outside (i.e., non-time-series)
information into the forecasting process. Often this information can indicate that the
time-series pattern is changing” (p. 72). This precept supports the infusion of news
announcement implications of succession events into security market prices following
dissemination, and theoretically aligns with the semi-strong form of the efficient markets
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hypothesis. Thus, “CEO changes may cause operational (“real”) change in the earnings
stream” (p. 72); it is the sensitivity to these dynamics which is sought via the research
hypotheses presented. “To the extent the announcement of CEO change calls attention to
the announcing firm (‘Attention Directing Hypothesis‘), it may result in reassessment of
future performance by market analysts” (p. 72).
Accordingly, Leibowitz (2005) indicated: “in perfectly efficient markets, all
information would be immediately embedded in prices” (p. 33). Similarly, CEO
succession is an important event in firm life, and the market price reflects changes in the
value proposition of the firm’s strategy as perceived by investors; these changes are
perceptible through the observation of a time-series of financial metrics about the
succession event. Offering additional support for the impounding of changes in the stock
price, Friedman and Singh (1989) concurred: “stock returns associated with successions,
measured as deviations from the pattern of expected returns of a firm’s stock, reflect
stockholder evaluations of a new CEO’s differential influence on the future viability of a
firm” (p. 728). Hence, effectively applying the concept of the efficient markets
hypothesis, they clarified: “the movement of returns on a firm’s stock around the time of
a succession effectively captures the response of stockholders to information about the
event” (p. 728). However, not all publicly announced events result in appropriate
responses of investors to equity prices; within a study of firms experiencing earnings
restatements, Marciukaityte and Varma (2007) elicited: “industry related news does not
have a significant effect on the market reaction to restatement announcements and on the
loss in equity value associated with restatements” (p. 15). This suggested the presence of
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some inefficiency within the market and concomitant lack of perception among market
participants of the potential impact of news events upon equity pricing, resulting in
overvaluation or undervaluation. Investor expertise in evaluating the potential financial
effect of any news event somewhat delimits the market price response within the efficient
markets context. Resultantly, an assumption applicable to this analysis is that investors
engage in rational behavior according to their perception of the informational content of
news events, germane to the semi-strong form of the efficient markets hypothesis and
demonstrative of the outcome of investor decision-making. Although widely accepted as
a valuation input variable, one of the related assumptions underlying the application of
the metric is that returns in the future will mirror those of the past.
Since this study uses audited financial statements of large public corporations, the
relevant qualities of transparency and veracity of financial disclosures are assumed to be
present in the unqualified financial statements issued within the time intervals under
examination. Indeed, although financial disclosures of certain entities issued during the
first decade of the 21st century have been characterized by material misstatements, there
was an incident of restatements of financial data among the companies under study. On a
theoretical accounting basis, this sample offers relative validity; comparatively, previous
studies have included more material entities now defunct due to a lack of verifiability of
obligatory financial disclosures.
Scope and Delimitations
The scope of this study is circumscribed by the sample of highly effective entities
identified within Collins’s (2001) analysis, Good to Great. As Collins identified 11
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publicly traded US firms exhibiting 15 years of performance meeting or exceeding treble
returns on the US stock market, he extolled the leadership qualities of these entities’ chief
executives. Collins qualitatively analyzed firms experiencing a succession event within
the time interval under study for strategic conformance or incongruity; however, he did
not document changes in financial outcomes and risk consequent to executive succession.
The time interval under examination for the subject firms commences in accordance with
Collins’s initially identified interval of returns, and concludes with each entity’s publicly
disseminated financial reporting of fiscal 2008. As certain of these entities did not
experience a change of chief executive within the interval identified by Collins, it is
necessary to extend the relevant range of the time-series to examine a turnover event.
Information pertaining to any delisted company for which data could not be obtained
throughout the continuum delineated above due to access issues subsequent to merger
and acquisition activity is limited to data publicly available in print within qualified
investor resources, e.g., Moody’s Industrial Manual. For this reason, an element of
survivorship bias, or the influence of the inclusion of only firms which are currently
going concerns, affects outcomes of this analysis to a minor extent since such
characteristics affect only one entity within the sample.
Within much of the literature on event studies and the examination of executive
turnover, designation of the successor source is often delimited by examination of the
prior enumeration of executives present in publicly disseminated news events and
obligatory quarterly and annual financial reporting. The classification of a successor as an
insider or outsider is thus identifiable; financial performance based on source of
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successor has been extensively documented, primarily by Shen and Cannella, Jr. (2002).
Bower (2007) espoused that an inside outsider, or a capable successor not necessarily
predisposed to assume the chief executive position, may offer viable candidacy due to
diffused political loyalty within the executive hierarchy. However, such successors, upon
examination, or for that matter, polling, are difficult to exact; such designations may be
based on internally biased observation. Therefore, via exemplification of available data,
the analytical technique of Shen and Cannella Jr. (2002) is used: Turnover of an
executive under the age of 64 is considered a forced replacement, and turnover of an
executive at the age of 64 or over is considered a retirement. The subsequent endeavors
of the CEO upon conclusion of tenure are researched to verify this assertion. If the
successor hailed from within the company, the new executive is considered an insider; if
the successor was sourced externally, the new executive is considered an outsider.
Succession planning and successor source have been determined to be of paramount
importance with respect to strategic continuity (Gordon et al., 2000; Bower, 2007). The
extent to which succession planning exists within each organization under scrutiny is not
specifically examined through the course of this analysis.
Limitations
The primary limitation of this study is generalizability. Since firms within the
selected sample are characterized by exceptional financial and operational performance
within their industry or sector, the application of theoretical constructs derived herein
may be limited by the comparability of performance among the entities within the sample
itself, as these entities hail from divergent sectors. Additionally, the extrapolation of these
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results to firms not characterized by highly effective performance is surmised to be
limited.
The comparability and interpretation of financial cross-sectional analysis among
differing entities is limited to an extent by the selection of accounting methodologies and
the application of generally accepted accounting principles. A time-series analysis of a
single company’s financial results may also be subject to such limitations of
comparability due to updates in accounting principles, conscious revisions in
methodologies, and changes in the exogenous economic environment. The presence of
nonrecurring, extraordinary, restructuring charges in particular within a company’s
income statement indicate a strategic revision of planned future operations; a review for
the presence of these elements often provides qualitative support to quantitative financial
analysis dynamics.
Additionally, the predictive value of the beta metric, or the covariance of the
return on the market and the return on the firm’s equity market price divided by the
variance of the market, is limited, as it is a historical metric of the variability of returns.
In practice, endogenous and exogenous factors impact the variability of the stock price;
the outcome of the event study to be conducted herein may be indicative of the utility of
beta to predict the entity’s equity risk given a change in chief executive. The utilization of
accounting metrics which allow further interpretation and analysis of results were chosen
to provide more comprehensive basis for this study than financial risk factors alone.

20
Research Design
An ex-post facto research design is employed to document and statistically
analyze prior-issued financial statements and resultant metrics as a chief executive
replacement event transpired. As the executive turnover event is typically anticipated in
the event of a retirement, but not in other instances, dynamics due to forced replacements,
expiration, or catastrophic illness (i.e., generally nonretirement related) prompt
organizational consequences typically not observable prior to transpiration. Primarily,
statistical analysis of financial event studies is conducted ex-post facto. Considering this
type of design, “the researcher identifies events that have already occurred or conditions
that are already present, and then collects data to investigate a possible relationship
between these factors and subsequent characteristics” (Leedy & Ormrod, 2005, p. 232).
Observations are limited to experiences rather than treatments (p. 232-233).
Conditionally, the outcome of this analysis is the statistical prevalence of “characteristics
[that] tend to be associated with certain preexisting conditions” (p. 233); statistical
observations of existing relationships will not prove the existence of a causal relationship
between financial performance and chief executive turnover.
Definition of Terms
Beta: the covariance of the return on the entity's stock price and the return on the
market divided by the variance of the market; ultimately, a measure of volatility of the
market price of firm equity (Downes & Goodman, 1995, p. 47).
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Contenders: executives who, “following a CEO’s dismissal…[win] the support
and approval of the board of directors…likely to be charged with a mandate to initiate
strategic change” (Shen & Cannella, Jr., 2002, p. 719).
Economic Value Added: “the excess of the dollar amount of net operating profit
after tax (NOPAT) over the dollar charge for capital (both debt and equity) obtained by
multiplying the percentage weighted-average cost of capital (WACC)” (Cordeiro & Kent,
Jr., 2001, p. 57). This serves as a measure of shareholder value created during the
measurement period through the employment of financed assets to generate operating
earnings.
Efficient Markets Hypothesis: the hypothesis “states that market prices fully
reflect all available information” (Xiong, 2006, p. 214); the semi-strong form, prevalent
in US market analyses, confers that “knowledge of information does not allow investors
to earn excess profits because prices already incorporate the information” (p. 214).
Followers: “inside executives who are promoted to CEO positions following the
ordinary retirements of their predecessors” (Shen & Cannella, Jr., 2002, p. 719).
Market Value Added: “calculated as (Number of shares outstanding x Stock price)
+ Market value of preferred stock + Market value of debt – Total capital” (Ramezani,
Soenen, & Jung, 2002, p. 57). While the primary measurement of EVA® is the level of
stockholder returns generated from internal sources, the primary measurement of MVA is
the level of stockholder and debtholder returns generated from external sources,
predicated by changes in market valuation. MVA is resultantly a measure of the market
perception of the value of the firm (p. 57).
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Outsiders: executives who “come to new CEO positions from other
organizations” (Shen & Cannella, Jr., 2002, p. 719).
Return on Assets: accounting net income divided by total assets; a measure of
asset utilization undertaken by the firm.
Tobin’s q: total assets minus the book value of common equity plus the market
value of common equity divided by total assets (Marciukaityte & Varma, 2007, p. 18).
Volatility: “characteristic of security…to rise or fall sharply in price within a
short-term period” (Downes & Goodman, 1995, p. 647). Beta encapsulates the volatility
of the stock price of the entity relative to the stock market.
Hypotheses
Seven hypotheses are tested. Specifically,
Hypothesis 1 entails the measurement of CEO replacement rate within Collins’s
sample, an indicator of the stability of firms within the sample:
There is a significant difference in the rate of CEO change evident in the timeseries analysis of the entities within Collins’s sample for the period t=15, as compared to
a multiyear sample within the literature spanning a time frame representative of Collins’s
entities.
A comparison of the rate of CEO turnover of the firms in Collins’s (2001) study is
compared to the analysis of Comte and Mihal (1990), which is a comprehensive study of
turnover frequency which appropriately aligns with the time-series under investigation.
As Defond and Hung (2004) defined the “[classification] of a firm-year as a turnover year
of the name of the CEO changes between successive fiscal years” (p. 280); the same
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definitional basis is applied to events analyzed within the study. Since “large
organizations tend to choose inside successors” (Friedman & Singh, 1989, p. 728), the
expected outcome of a statistical significance test of Collins’s (2001) sample is that most
successors are insiders and thus, there is limited stockholder reaction to CEO change, as a
result; see also Hypothesis 2.
Hypothesis 2 entails the measurement of stockholder reaction to CEO change,
intrafirm:
There is a significant stockholder reaction to CEO change evident in the timeseries analysis of the Tobin’s q metric for entities within Collins’s sample for the period
t-2 and the period t+3, where t represents the year of CEO change.
It is expected that a significant statistical difference in the time-series of the
Tobin’s q metric is discernable if stockholder perception of a change in chief executive
officer precipitates a forward-looking negative financial impact.
Hypothesis 3 entails the measurement of financial market risk relative to CEO
change, intrafirm, as a proxy for volatility:
There is a significant change in the magnitude of financial risk relative to CEO
change evident in the time-series analysis of beta for entities within Collins’s sample for
the period t-2 and the period t+3, where t represents the year of CEO change.
Defond and Hung (2004) measured the “extent to which stock prices are likely to
impound information about firm performance (as opposed to noise)…the propensity for
stock prices in a country to move in the same direction—termed synchronicity” (p. 280).
Hence, the level of synchronicity indicates the prevalence of the efficient markets
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hypothesis informational infusion of equities and is, in effect, a proxy for the reliance of
risk calculated from historical prices, or beta, within a relevant market. Indeed, it must be
predicated that the informational power of beta to portend an entity’s equity value is
reliant upon and limited by the assumption that past experience is an indicator of future
returns. To the extent that strategic transformation is present, presumably, stock prices
will respond dynamically to the perception of risk ascertained by market participants.
Since “the firm’s market price aggregates signals received by the market and the
firm’s accounting system” (Dutta & Richelstein, 2005, p. 1071), the extent of sensitivity
to a change in stratagem perceptible through market price kinetics may be proxied
through an analysis of financial fundamentals. However, “the market sometimes
misinterprets or overreacts to earnings and disclosure announcements; therefore
[executives] work hard to meet market expectations so as not to raise investor suspicions
or doubts about their firms’ underlying strength” (Graham et al., 2005, p. 4).
“In high beta firms, stock price movements are strongly associated with economywide influences such as economic cycles, interest rates, and government policies.
Management exerts little or no control on these macroeconomic variables” (Gray &
Cannella, Jr., 1997, p. 523). The extent to which the implications of transformational
strategy materialize into changes in market risk and pricing of equity is tested through
this hypothesis.
Friedman and Singh (1989) formulated a hypothesis regarding the change in
market response relevant to their sample: “the lower the presuccession performance, the
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more positive the stock market reaction to a CEO succession” (p. 723). The outcome of
the hypothesis test relative to Collins’s (2001) sample of entities yields a similar result.
Hypothesis 4 entails the measurement of differences in accounting ratio analysis
(return on assets) relative to CEO change, intrafirm, as a proxy for execution of strategic
change:
There is a significant change in the magnitude of accounting performance relative
to CEO change evident in the time-series analysis of return on assets, or ROA, for entities
within Collins’s sample for the period t-2 and the period t+3, where t represents the year
of CEO change.
Hypothesis 5 entails the measurement of differences in accounting performance
analysis (economic value added) relative to CEO change, intrafirm, as a proxy for
execution of strategic change:
There is a significant change in the magnitude of accounting performance relative
to CEO change evident in the time-series analysis of economic value added, EVA®, for
entities within Collins’s sample for the period t-2 and the period t+3, where t represents
the year of CEO change.
Hypothesis 6, represented through the measurement of differences in accounting
ratio analysis (market value added) relative to CEO change, intrafirm, as a proxy for
increases in stockholder value, is entailed thus:
There is a significant change in the magnitude of accounting performance relative
to CEO change evident in the time-series analysis of market value added, or MVA, for
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entities within Collins’s sample for the period t-2 and the period t+3, where t represents
the year of CEO change.
With respect to managerial incentives awarded upon successful execution of
stratagem under the aegis of the agency relationship and existing informational
asymmetry, “optimal incentive provisions must combine ‘forward-looking’ market
information with ‘backward-looking’ accounting information…optimal performance
measures can be expressed as a weighted average of economic value added (residual
income) and market value added” (Dutta & Richelstein, 2005, p. 1069). The utilization of
multiple accounting-based metrics demonstrates a comprehensive approach to evaluation
of dynamic and strategic outcomes.
Hypothesis 7 entails measurement of interactions between variables relative to
CEO change:
There are significant interactions between the variables listed above relative to
CEO change evident in a time-series analysis of terms for entities within Collins’s sample
for the period t-2 and the period t+3, where t represents the year of CEO change.
Instruments chosen reflect those utilized in prior research, particularly with
respect to applicable intervals for time-series event studies, as external validity and tests
of robustness have been performed previously (Freidman & Singh, 1989; Defond &
Hung, 2004).
As Doran (2000) acceded, “studies where scrutiny of earnings divergence (e.g.,
forecast error, earnings performance, forecast bias, etc.) is of primary importance should
closely examine the distributional properties of the sample data” (p. 32). Thus, graphical
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representations of relevant data distribution are presented as supporting evidential matter
for conjectures purported herein.
Significance of the Study
This research endeavor promotes positive social change through enhanced
investor education. As the propriety of reaction to changes in market value added and risk
are revealed, investors may align their market behavior and equity holdings with
expectations of continued investment returns as leadership succession transpires.
Investors may thus protect their assets more effectively and adjust their portfolios
according to the outcomes of informed risk analysis. As the relationship between
leadership change and equity return variability among highly performing firms is
understood, society as a whole may more effectively assess the basis of financial resource
allocations.
As a primary impetus for this study is the observation of stockholder reaction and
market value fluctuations, it is informative to conduct a comparison of dynamics in
accounting metrics which are contemporaneous to the actions of investors. The
interpretation of these statistical outcomes may be indicative of or dispute the application
of rational investor decision-making. “Collective assessments made by the investment
community, a salient constituency for corporate managers, can be measured by
examining how stock prices move in response to announcements of CEO changes”
(Friedman & Singh, 1989, p. 719). However, the extent to which stockholder reaction is
appropriate may be demonstrated by the observation of financial outcomes, which
ultimately support equity valuation. Such metrics are not justified by investor perception,
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but by financial reporting summarization through the observation of ratio analysis. “The
market reacts to how well, compared to their predecessors, new CEOs are suited for the
demands of their roles, and to the potential for disruption in organizational performance
attending leadership transitions” (p. 719). The investor reaction to chief executive change
and other news events, as espoused through the efficient markets hypothesis, generally
may or may not be appropriate given their investment risk and return objective. An
indication of potential investor loss sensitizes market participants’ risk perception.
Investor sensitivity to risk dynamics may or may not be appropriate in the event of CEO
replacement. Hence, investor response to CEO change through observation of financial
metrics, and the alignment of investor response to accounting performance of highly
performing firms, are analyzed.
Depending on the significance of the volatility, “a forced turnover increases a
firm’s hurdle rate by [two] percentage points, which could change the optimal/accept
reject decision for a given project” (Clayton et al., 2005, p. 1779). Given this salient level
of sensitivity, upcoming or in-progress strategic initiatives may have to be re-evaluated
for financial feasibility. To this end, statistical tests of the beta metric, ultimately used in
the derivation of the weighted average cost of capital applied to project evaluation for
public firms, may provide further validity to the utilization or adjustment of this risk
factor in the practice of financial analysis. Inquiry into the risk element of CEO turnover
further clarifies investor perception of forced personnel change in the case of exceptional
financial performance. As the dissemination of information leads ultimately to greater
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transparency, positive social change is realized as investors are able to fully discern the
financial implications of chief executive turnover and adjust market reaction accordingly.
Statistical outcomes of this analysis may potentially guide newly appointed
executives to initially align strategic objectives with the current direction of the firm, in
the event of outstanding performance. Shen and Cannella Jr. (2002) offered the following
caveats: “we advise newly appointed outsider CEOs to be prudent when making
executive replacement decisions and to strive for some executive leadership stability in
their firms…boards may also need to consider giving outside successors more time to
smooth the transition” (p. 730). An analytical outcome which indicates positive
stockholder reaction throughout the transition period and maintenance of accounting
metrics subsequent to executive change supports the advisement of Shen and Cannella,
Jr.
Acknowledging the social change impact, there is also a demonstration of the
application of agency theory. “What has become clear is that troubled companies and
concerned boards are no longer waiting around to replace poor or marginal
performers...[since] a convergence of economic, historical, and political forces has
produced a unique, new business climate” (Korn, 1985, p. 30). Thus, principals must not
be reticent to address the actions of chief executive agents who do not enable and
materialize the strategic plans of their firms.
This study lends further validity to financial assessment techniques which serve to
facilitate the institution of “governance mechanisms that will provide for the most
effective decision-making on the part of top managers, particularly CEOs…how to
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appropriately structure the organization” (Coles, McWilliams, & Sen, 2001, p. 24).
Particularly, utilization of ratio analyses which facilitate the discernment of agency
effects among entities experiencing CEO turnover will reveal the degree of executive
alignment with firm performance hence affecting positive social change, both
endogenously relative to the organization and exogenously relative to financial market
volatility.
Summary
Although analyses of the financial risk and return implications resulting from
executive change have been previously studied, a gap in the literature exists for
implications given exceptionally performing firms experiencing executive succession
events. Additionally, Collins’s (2001) endeavor provided a formidable exploration of
highly performing entities as well as a robust examination of leadership characteristics of
prominent and successful executives. However, his analysis is deficient of observation of
the financial risk and return outcomes given executive turnover, and may be improved
through additional analysis which features indicators of market declines and corrections
experienced in fiscal 2008.
The statistical analysis impacting an array of accounting and financial metrics in
the event of executive change is tested within this study. Potential limitations include
generalizability to poorly performing entities, inter-industry comparability of accounting
metrics among entities, and potential misstatements of financial data by a firm despite
granting of an unqualified opinion by an auditor, all of which may bias results.
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Ultimately, favorable social impact may be realized as investors refrain from
irrational selling (or purchasing) reactions to news events of chief executive turnover.
Preservation or imperilment of invested shareholder capital affected by the turnover event
will serve as an indicator of the entity’s strategic continuity. If robust statistical results
are derived which indicate that internally-sourced followers provide strategic continuity
in the event of succession, the propriety of chief executive succession planning
characterized by internal candidate sourcing for highly performing firms may be
supported by this analysis.
Correspondingly, chapter 2 includes a review of relevant literature. Chapter 3
contains an explanation of the research methodology utilized in this analysis. Chapter 4
contains the results of data analysis. Chapter 5 contains a summarization of the outcomes
of the research endeavor, including recommendations for future research, as well as
implications for social change.
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Chapter 2: Literature Review
Introduction
Financial event studies are “based on a comparison of the variability of equity
price changes before and after the event to determine the volatility impact of the event”
(Clayton et al., 2005, p. 1793). In garnering evidence to develop hypotheses for an expost facto research study of highly performing firms, an observation regarding the
population from which samples of prior studies are derived is required. As field literature
is bereft of a sample of entities characterized solely by exceptional financial results in the
presence of CEO turnover, “the consequences of turnover for equity volatility have been
previously unexplored” (p. 1780) for this characteristic sample in context. Chang and
Wong (2005) echoed this observation: “existing empirical studies focus primarily on
corporate control exercised by private shareholders in U.S. and Japanese publicly listed
companies” (p. 2). In prior research, these experiments were sampled from entities
representing the entire spectrum of financial performance levels.
Collins (2001) identified a sample of entities exemplifying exceptional financial
performance through an extensive time-series review of US market-listed firms.
However, researchers contributing to his analysis did not test the interaction of beta nor
other factors as sources of risk under the premise of executive replacements among the
entities researched; the contributors merely documented the sample entities’ financial
performance for a 15 year time-series interval. Herein, an investigation of literature is
conducted to garner evidence applicable to potential financial and leadership dynamics
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affecting firms within Collins’ specific sample, in order to develop a framework of
evaluation for risk orientation under circumstances of leadership succession.
Although Cannella, Jr. and Lubatkin (1993) revealed that “succession events are
generally smooth and predictable transitions that imply few changes in strategy” (p. 768)
many prior analyses relating leadership change to equity risk do not yield consistent
results which support their assertion. However, succession events generally “have
provided a means for assessing the efficacy of leaders in shaping organizational fortunes
by demarcating areas of stewardship” (Friedman & Singh, 1993, p. 718). Perpetuating
strategic intent of the predecessor theoretically should offer continuity of acceptable
operating results, ceteris paribus. To the extent that market participants are appropriately
sensitive to potential risk volatility at the nascence of an executive’s term, abnormal
returns may temporarily accrue to or detract from shareholder value. The identification of
such opportunities is of interest to institutional and private investors alike.
An integral approach used in the compilation of research for the review was the
requirement of primarily quantitative data indicating frequency of turnover among firms
given diminished performance. Essentially, many different financial and accounting
metrics are employed in academic research as litmus for determining significant changes
in financial performance; often executives are compensated and incentivized based on
changes in the selected metrics. Given the dichotomy of outcomes present within the
results of prior studies, it is critical to note that similar variability of results may emerge
from an empirical analysis of Collins’s (2001) sample. This literature review thus serves
as documentation of instruments utilized in prior studies which have revealed high
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incidences of external validity. As Collins commented extensively on the qualitative
personal characteristics of the leaders of the firms within his designated sample, research
addressing qualitative aspects of CEO type and characteristic are also presented.
The chapter is organized into four segments. Certain aspects of leadership change
and selection greatly influence financial outcomes and command study relevant to this
analysis. Within motivations for executive change, aspects of entity ownership and
capital structure, operational performance, and external influence that affect executive
turnover are enumerated. Within differing successions of executive change, the sources
of replacement personnel as well as the preparation methods for succession which
influence financial outcomes are outlined. Within consequences of executive change,
agency effects, political and director influence, and governance dynamics which affect
financial outcomes are reviewed. Within financial performance and risk indicators of
executive change, the risk environment including the firm’s exposure to external and
internal risk, as well as the suitability of finance and accounting performance
benchmarks, are linked to executive change events, as prior researchers (e.g., Clayton et
al, 2005; Shen and Cannella, Jr., 2002) have entailed. Qualitative aspects of the firm and
its executive influence the incidence of CEO replacement are also appraised; although
certain of these qualitative aspects are not hypothetically tested within this body of
research, reviews of the tested outcomes of other authors which may lend qualitative
explanation to emergent outcomes of data analysis herein are included.
To obtain relevant literature for inclusion, a keyword search was conducted for
CEO turnover through an online academic journal research database. As seminal articles
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were discovered, references within those bodies of research were analyzed for content;
the content of the original articles most relevant to the subject matter was then sourced
from an online academic journal database. Collins’s (2001) volume served as the sample
source; Bower’s (2007) more recent exposition was utilized as an updated volume
providing recent reflections and statistics on sources of successors, which complements
and updates the prior research of Cannella, Jr. and Lubatkin (1993), as well as other
researchers.
Motivations for Executive Change
The incidence of CEO turnover has been extensively acknowledged within
analyses of time-series samples throughout research literature. “CEO succession events
are of central concern in organization theory. They are universal—if organizations
survive long enough, they must experience succession” (Freidman & Singh, 1989, p.
718). Despite the realization that executive change is inevitable, many firms do not give
adequate priority to succession planning. Bower (2007) summarized the results of an
internet poll through which 60 % of human resource managers acknowledged that there
was no “CEO succession plan in place” within their firm (p. 14). Succession events are
ordinarily precipitated by “resignations for ‘early retirement,’ for policy differences, for
differences in style and strategy, resignations amid reports of continuing problems,
losses, and poor or lackluster performance” (Korn, 1985, p. 30). The impetus for turnover
may thus be ownership and size influenced, operational performance-dependent, or
externally precipitated.
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Ownership and Firm Size Influences upon Executive Change
Average annual CEO turnover varies by size of firm and more prominently,
organizational form. The strength of the governance framework unique to the
geographical location and ownership structure of firms may influence rates of CEO
turnover among entities. Comte and Mihal (1990) indicated that within the second half of
a US entity sample dated 1945-1984, a 37 % increase in CEO turnover was present (p.
48), documenting greater frequency of replacement incidence in more recent decades.
Increasingly, this evidence specifies that CEO replacement rates, particularly forced
replacement rates, are comparatively more prevalent among US firms in recent decades.
In a recent study, Defond and Hung (2004) affirmed:
...recent research asserts that an essential feature of good corporate governance is
strong investor protection, where investor protection is defined as the extent of the
laws that protect investors’ rights and the strength of the legal institutions that
facilitate law enforcement...strong law enforcement institutions significantly
improve the association between CEO turnover and poor performance, whereas
extensive investor protection laws do not. (pp. 269-270)
Accordingly, the scope of relevant mechanisms subjecting executive officers to
reprisal in the event of deficient performance is augmented to include legal obligations,
particularly in the context of ethical transgressions. Within environments where
corruption and expropriation risks influence financial outcomes, an executive has
“limited ability to affect firm performance” (Defond & Hung, 2004, p. 275). Thus,
differentiation of transparency and permissive internal control environments may
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dissuade investor confidence in less stringently controlled capital markets, and reflect the
risk perception of market participants. Mere CEO change portends limited prospects in
transformation of deficient governance, given an environment with minimally effective
law enforcement. “Because good corporate governance reduces the risk of managers
expropriating shareholder wealth (through theft, shirking, or simple mismanagement),
shareholders have greater confidence investing in such markets” (p. 276). To safeguard
stakeholders’ interests, effective executive succession planning must be predicated by
qualification, and not usurped through ancestral incumbency or “nepotism” (p. 277).
When tested empirically, Defond and Hung (2004) disclosed that “among countries with
strong investor protection, CEO turnover decisions are likely to rely more on stock return
when stock prices are relatively more informative regarding firm performance” (p.278).
This suggests that the perception of a more robust governance structure among market
participants elicits investor confidence by exhibiting greater transparency of strategy and
results.
Operational Performance-Dependent Executive Change
Replacement of a CEO is frequently precipitated by an entity’s deficient
operational performance. “Boards of directors are more assertive of their prerogative of
removing CEOs when there is evidence of ineffective management” (Friedman & Singh,
1989, p. 738). Control mechanisms supported through the organizational structure of an
entity exist to ensure the removal of executives that do not perform well. Directors and
executives remaining in the organization subsequent to CEO turnover and subsequently
display allegiance to the former leader may continue to experience future agency
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challenges from other stakeholders. Huson et al.(2001) asserted: “stockholders rely on
internal and external monitoring mechanisms to help resolve agency problems that arise
from the separation of ownership and control in modern corporations” (p. 2265).
As Chang and Wong (2005) acknowledged, “for CEO turnover to be an effective
corporate control event, CEOs need to be removed in poorly perform[ing] enterprises,
and performance has to improve following their turnover” (p. 8). Paradoxically, these
authors also evidenced that “forced turnovers are not followed by a significant reduction
in the percentage of enterprises experiencing negative earnings” (p. 9). Without a
differentiable change in the diminished performance of an entity, CEO replacement may
not be worthwhile or result in intended organizational and financial changes, while
exposing investors to increased financial risk, observed through changes in financial
metrics pre and post turnover.
Further, Cannella Jr. and Lubatkin (1993) hypothesized that “when an outgoing
CEO has influence with directors, or when directors have committed to an heir apparent
[in a relay succession], performance will be decoupled from the selection decision” (p.
764). Influence and prior performance are integral factors in the consideration of a
replacement; given the prevalence of exceptional performance, an influential candidate
within the sphere of the outgoing CEO has a greater probability of being selected for
succession. In support of this observation, Comte and Mihal (1993) offered the following
optimal cyclic succession: “the founding or central leader is eventually replaced by
prepared executives who are chosen at an age that allows them ten years at the helm and
who leave at a prearranged time” (p. 51). The presence of sustained operational
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performance and acceptable positioning will edify board choice and establish an intended
relay succession which perpetuates current strategic policy. To this Nagar (2004) added:
…the firm decides what responsibilities to delegate to the employee, keeping in
mind the feasible set of performance measures on which incentive contracts can
be written to ensure that the firm can hire the right person for the job (adverse
selection), and this person works hard after being hired (moral hazard). (p. 317)
Waldman, Ramirez, House, and Puranam (2001) confirmed the existence of a
relationship between executive charisma and performance under conditions of
uncertainty. Utilizing strategic management theory as a basis, Waldman et al. queried the
“leadership characteristics” of “transactional leadership” and “charismatic leadership” (p.
134). While transactional leadership is instituted via the assimilation of the current
structure and personnel, establishment of corrective action, and consequent dissemination
of rewards, charismatic leadership is instituted on a behavioral basis, engaging the regard
and loyalty of subordinates to incite motivation and thus strategic action among them,
deemed “collective cohesion” (p. 135), through the development of interpersonal
relationships. In times of environmental turbulence, Waldman et al. hypothesized that
“CEO charismatic leadership will be highly related to an organization’s performance
when the organization’s environment is perceived as uncertain and volatile” (p. 136).
However, Waldman et al. alternatively documented a highly positive relationship
between better performance results in the presence of uncertainty and charismatic
leadership; this implies that the personality and confidence exhibited by the leader has an
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effect upon organizational cohesiveness, a salient component in achieving strategic
outcomes and profitability given the prevalence of environmental turbulence (p. 140).
Externally Precipitated Executive Change
Insightfully, Lee and Milne (1988) conveyed the erosion of competitive
manufacturing among US firms: “the efforts of major corporations were devoted to
generating earnings through mergers and acquisitions, or through lucrative financing
arrangements in debt markets. This trend prevented firms from recognizing the
importance of developing new products and processes” (p. 26). By stifling the potential
enhancement of core competencies through innovation, the leadership incentive to realize
earnings solely through merger and acquisition activity is derived from the myopic
pursuit of unsustainable extraordinary events. “When there is no long-term consistency in
developing and maintaining a company’s philosophy, it is impossible to justify making
decisions on any basis other than financial considerations” (p. 26). Accordingly, leaders
employing an extensive growth by acquisition strategy must eventually tend to further
development of the conglomerated entity, as the sustainability of their own strategic
success is challenged as the pool of potential takeover candidates narrows. In the event of
CEO replacement following a sustained period of acquisition activity, often the
successor’s greatest challenge is the identification of synergies pertinent to varied
divisions, particularly if such development was not addressed by the predecessor. If
investors perceive such CEO replacement as an impediment to realizing expected returns,
volatility may characterize the market price of equity as ownership among shareholders
responsively changes.
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Faleye (2004) explored the “control mechanism for addressing the agency
problems of excessive corporate liquidity” (p. 2041). If the entity experiences a dearth of
positive net present value investment opportunities, this deficiency may resultantly serve
as an indicative antecedent of obligatory strategic change for the benefit of shareholders.
As excess cash is often an attractive characteristic of takeover targets, elevated corporate
liquidity augmented by lack of strategic intent further enhances potential opportunity for
an external strategic change agent to transform the targeted entity.
The issuance of new equity or recapitalization efforts suffuses a signaling effect
upon the market; investors construe the entity’s investment prospects as limited once new
capital is sought to complement the existing capital structure. “As a result,” Hillier, Linn,
and McColgan (2005) espoused: “boards of firms that require additional outside capital
are likely to be more responsive to outside calls for the removal of top management in
return for implicit promises of new funding” (p. 516). Thus, the absence of profitable
investment opportunities from the recapitalization perspective may also precipitate a
stakeholder-desired change in leadership as a consequence of this perception. In context,
this may be demonstrated through a lack or reinvestment, decreasing economic value
added, and decreasing return on assets over time. Myopic behavior may result from the
curtailment of necessary investment required to maximize longer term growth and
profitability, at the sacrifice of contemporaneous profitability.
Finkelstein and Hambrick (as cited in Gray & Cannella Jr., 1997, p. 518),
purported that “the most consistent conclusion in the literature is that firm size accounts
for the greatest proportion of variance in executive compensation level, and that firm
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performance accounts for very little.” Given this observation, it may be conjectured that a
higher level of compensation is implicitly relative to agency risk due to the size of the
firm. Higher levels of compensation have also been associated with greater levels of
entrenchment. In response, Gray and Cannella, Jr. (1997) also observed:
Shareholders manage risk through portfolio diversification.
Executives, however, do not have this option…[they] cannot diversify
their risk because of their close association with the firm. An executive
can only hold a single job, and is unlikely to be risk-neutral with respect to
that job…fixed components [of income] help protect executives from
factors beyond their control, such as poor ex poste outcomes from
strategies that, a priori, appeared promising…firm risk affects personal
risk of the executive when compensation is contingent upon firm-level
outcomes such as profitability or stock price movements. (p. 518-520)

As previously noted, a strategy of growth through continuous acquisition, even in
the context of diversification, is not indefinitely sustainable. Since the acquisition of
capital required to pursue such a strategy may eventually be required to be sourced
externally, a CEO endeavoring to mitigate personal income risk through entity
diversification may elicit negative shareholder response, ironically affecting the
realization of executive remuneration through options and decreasing potential wealth.
Offering further perspective, Daily, Certo, and Dalton (2002) asserted:
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A fundamental principle of agency theory is an acknowledgement
of the propensity of executives to engage in behavior inconsistent with
shareholders’ interests, particularly when the interests of these two parties
diverge. The board of directors serves as a protective mechanism to ensure
that managers are attentive of shareholders’ interest in maximizing the
value of the firm. (p. 8)

Offering clarification of the effects of managerial ownership upon the agency
relationship, Dahya et al. (1998) summarized the observations of Denis, Denis, and Sarin
(as cited in Dahya et al., 1998) by ascertaining: “share ownership levels in excess of 1
percent led to managerial entrenchment in US firms” (p. 1105). These researchers also
documented the presence of abnormal returns and post-earnings-announcement drift
associated with forced turnover; “results suggest that there is a statistically significant
difference in the pre-announcement period abnormal returns for non-routine departures of
executives who own less than 1% (abnormal return = -2.19%)” (p. 1107). Such results are
indicative of the significance of the turnover event, and potential risk resultantly borne by
the firm’s shareholders. Notably, subsequent anticipated improvement may not
materialize despite a requisite change of command. “Non-routine top executive
departures are associated with a further deterioration in firm performance which is more
pronounced in firms where the departing top executive owned a substantial equity stake
in the firm” (p. 1110). Successor performance levels are commonly dependent upon the
receptive quality of the political hierarchy within the firm.
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Cannella Jr. and Lubatkin (1993) reflected: “two performance-related factors to
influence the succession decision: risk, or the uncertainty associated with a firm’s income
stream, and return” (p. 764). Acknowledgement that these factors were likely to affect
turnover correlated with findings of previous studies; however, an emergent underlying
assertion predicated by Cannella Jr. and Lubatkin is the view that the CEO is not
responsible for all decision-making. “Powerful interests in a firm are able to divert blame
for poor performance onto the less powerful” (p. 766); as the senior executive team
composition within a firm is considerably influenced through reassignment of culpability
for suboptimal performance from the CEO to direct reports, the political environment
may noticeably deteriorate, giving rise to dissention and breaches of loyalty.
“External factors such as environmental volatility, resource scarcity, and
financial risk, and internal factors such as characteristics of the board of directors…may
have important effects on the decision to remove the CEO and who will replace him or
her” (Comte & Mihal, 1990, p. 47). A leader significantly challenged by the strategic
management of all contemporaneous aspects affecting the entity will often be
overwhelmed if supported by inadequate managers and directors. Friedman and Singh
(1989) claimed: “the rational adaptation view of organizational change implies that CEO
succession is one way organizations can intentionally align resources to better suit
changing environmental demands” (p. 719). Accordingly, contextual assumptions are that
the succeeding CEO affords a degree of omnipotence, or “abundant discretion” (p. 720),
and that the “most appropriate person for the role so defined [is] then chosen as the new
CEO” (p. 720). If both of these criterions are satisfied, the probability of instituting
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positive organizational change is heightened. However, “CEO succession is a change
that, in itself or as an indication of a more fundamental underlying structural shift, is
substantial enough to result in a deleterious misalignment with a firm’s environment” (p.
721). Thus, it is integral that the firm’s economic and environmental moats are
formidably established to ensure sustainability of strategic intent and to mitigate the risk
of exogenous threats, despite the replacement of the top executive position.
Gordon et al. (2000) surmised a relationship between “industry turbulence and
CEO turnover, as precursors to strategic reorientation” (p. 911). As Gordon et al. also
indicated that “industry turbulence conditions managers’ external attributions for
negative financial performance in influencing strategic reorientation” (p. 911), executives
often attempt to fundamentally shift culpability for lackluster performance to exogenous
origins. Hence, poor operational performance is often deemed a culmination of strategic
turbulence, a “phenomenon…[which is] pervasive, frame-breaking, or difficult to
predict” and concomitantly influences the prevalence of CEO replacement. As such,
deficient performance may reveal the presence of strategic turbulence, given the presence
of a weak governance structure and action inspired by moral turpitude. The nascence of
corporate change may be elicited by “strategic commitment and power
distributions…external stakeholder expectations…industry discontinuities…legal,
political, or technical conditions that affect the basis of competition” (p. 914). The
pervasiveness of these circumstances will affect financial performance to varying
degrees. “Organizational change becomes predicated on the dialectic tension between the
forces of inertia and stability, and those of the need for change” (p. 914). Subsequent to
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any industry or economic dynamic which precipitates organizational response, a
“strategic reorientation” (p. 915) typically occurs; the organization and its leadership
seeks to establish “rules and routines [to] dominate logic and reduce uncertainty” (p.
915). In response, operational stability endures for a period of time, correspondingly
portending future financial stability.
Shen and Cho (2005) assimilated a “theoretical framework of involuntary
executive turnover…paying close attention to the environmental and organizational
context executives face” (p. 843). Concordant to prior research, particularly that of
Gordon, et al., (2000), Shen and Cho (2005) conciliated the emergence of turbulent entity
circumstances which accompany forced ousting of top executives, by indicating the level
of “high-discretion contexts” present within the company (p. 844). An organization
affording the top executive high latitude of objectives allows for “freedom managers have
to pursue personal objectives” whereas, an organization affording the top executive
latitude of actions allows for a “range of strategic options available to managers as they
strive to bring about organizational outcomes demanded by stakeholders” (p. 844).
Constraints and parameters tangential to organizational objectives must be recognized
while developing tactics to address strategic goals, otherwise adverse operational effects
may ensue; for instance, achievement of strategic objectives may be thwarted by a
company’s inability to raise adequate capital to support a novel venture.
Correspondingly, the latitude of action may be low, while the latitude of objectives may
be high. “Latitude of objectives addresses the performance pressure faced by managers,
whereas latitude of actions addresses the range of strategic options available to managers
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as they strive to bring about the performance demanded by stakeholders” (p. 846). These
authors also conjectured that in an environment characterized by low latitude of
objectives and actions, the probability of executive change is higher than differing
counterparts, as “managers in this scenario face strong performance pressures” (pp. 847848). Further, in organizations in which there is high latitude of action, and the CEO has
been particularly responsive, replacement of a CEO by an outsider may prove to be more
volatile or detrimental from an operational performance perspective. Since there is little
strategic change to be garnered by an executive within a low latitude of actions
environment, as processes drive action, outsider replacement is theorized to not affect the
entity’s performance and risk as adversely as a comparable replacement within an
environment exhibiting high latitude of actions. “Because of their high latitude of actions,
managers in this context understand that their decisions have significant impacts on
organizational performance, which, in turn, affects their reputations and values in the
external managerial labor market” (p. 850).
Differing Successions of Executive Change
Successors, Followers, Contenders—and Outsiders
Executive turnover is manifested through three distinct scenarios, as posited by
Shen and Cannella Jr. (2002). Successors may be followers, whose “firm-specific
knowledge and the relatively low risk of adverse selection they pose can help reduce the
disruption of CEO succession” (p. 720); contenders, whose “firm-specific knowledge,
different strategic perspectives, and supportive directors and executives…can not only
help them reduce harmful disruption associated with CEO dismissal, but also enable them
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to formulate and implement appropriate strategic changes in a timely manner” (p. 720);
or outsiders, whose “fresh perspectives and...ability to initiate strategic change” (p. 720)
have the potential to result in auspicious and prompt transformation of the entity. Based
on successor familiarity with the entity, turnover may result in enhanced, sustained, or
erosive operational performance. If the candidate is deficient in “firm-specific
knowledge” (p. 720) in initiating corporate transformation, presumably, the lack of
intimacy and continuity typically augments financial risk to the firm. “In the eyes of
many, good performance implies executive competence” (Cannella Jr., & Hambrick,
1993, p. 738); the competence of an outsider selected to assume the position of CEO is
difficult to ascertain if no prior experience exists on record, particularly if the successor
hails from a different commercial sector. Despite the fact that the successor may engage
in decision making which ameliorates financial results, risk and volatility may be more
pronounced; Cannella Jr. and Lubatkin (1993) revealed that “as the firm’s level of
unsystematic risk increases, so does the likelihood of outsider selection [of a new CEO]”
(p. 784). Stability and sustenance of strategy is increased when turnover is avoided;
however, whether the turnover outcome is necessarily low risk and high return is
contingent upon the CEO’s experience level and whether the replacement is a follower,
contender, or outsider. This observation can be tested for differing performance levels
within selected samples.
Upon contemplating executive departures Young (1998) revealed the following:
“while senior executives may be pushed when firm performance declines, they may also
involuntarily jump in an attempt to preserve the value of their human capital” (p. 1121).
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However, Young acknowledged the incidence of such an event to be less likely given the
prevalence of significant managerial ownership, mirroring the assertions of Friedman and
Singh (1989) and Dahya et al. (1998). Young (1998) also contended that performance
declines subsequent to CEO resignation may be the result of “big-bath accounting
choices by the incoming CEO” (p.1122).
However, postsuccession senior executive turnover, or the replacement of senior
executives with the intent of contributing to strategic change, often occurs following an
interval of diminished performance. Comte and Mihal (2001) documented: “firms
experiencing performance problems may tend to choose outside successors, whereas
firms with good performance would tend to choose insiders” (p. 50). These authors
indicated in a study of Fortune 500 firms from 1945-1984 that 23% of turnover was
attributable to substandard performance; these results were not statistically significant,
however. “Further, the succession context may even significantly moderate the impact of
senior executive turnover attributable to dismissal on firm operational performance”
(Shen & Cannella Jr., 2002, p. 721). Hillier et al.(2005) discovered additional evidence of
turnover and outsider replacement under the pretext of diminished financial performance
among UK firms sampled; “outside CEO succession is more likely following poor stock
price performance and forced CEO turnover” (p. 530). Notably, stock price performance,
or the perception of value placed upon the entity by external market participants is a
driver of turnover frequency; however, the conjecture that poor financial (accounting)
performance precipitates a stock market response resulting in turnover has also been
empirically tested, and will be tested within the context of Collins’s (2001) sample.
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Radical personnel and political dynamics are less likely to affect firm
performance outcomes in the event of a follower succession, as the “follower successors
are usually committed to the retired CEOs' strategies” (Shen & Cannella Jr., 2002, p.
721); thus, a contender’s information asymmetry and informed appraisal of the entity’s
status quo often results in optimal “restructuring…to suit their new strategies” (p. 722)
when required. As Korn (1985) provided statistics on insider promotions through
recounting of survey results, “80 percent of executives are, and will continue to be,
promoted from within” (p. 32), it is interesting to note that Bower’s (2007) more recent
survey revealed that a mere 40 % of entities practice formal succession planning.
Reticence to practice formalized succession planning theoretically bodes additional risk
for the firm. Volatility may be diminished by an heir apparent organizational succession,
as shareholders perceive continuous outcomes with alacrity; in contrast, in the event an
inside successor’s intimacy with firm operations is unknown, shareholders may perceive
the decreased level of a successor’s familiarity as contributing to organizational and
operational upheaval, which in turn may precipitate equity volatility. Dahya et al. (1998)
delineated that “governance variables” critical to seamless succession included
“potentially important determinants in the strategic management literature: whether
replacement executives can be appointed easily (whether the firm has a formal succession
plan in place)…characteristics of the industry… remuneration and value of nonpecuniary benefits to senior management” (p. 1096).
Shareholder perception is influenced by CEO turnover precipitated by ad hoc
events; “successions that result from a CEO’s death or disability tend to meet with
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negative reactions, regardless of the performance context” (Freidman & Singh, 1993, p.
739). As Bower (2007) noted the surprising dearth of succession planning among
prominent public entities, investors thus appear to respond appropriately to potential
volatility within the risk context. Often “an executive search firm will be retained to find
a replacement;” as the timeline of replacement extends approximately “10 months to a
year…before any real action is taken by the CEO” (Auchterlonie, 2003, p. 53). Due to the
successor’s required assimilation with the entity’s status quo, uncertainty augured by an
adverse turnover event bodes additional risk for investors, particularly in the absence of
an enhanced governance framework. Within an enhanced governance framework,
adequate process and strategy documentation facilitates personnel transitions, and
mitigates potential risk of ineffective change conjured by succeeding executives.
Relay and Planned Successions
Relay and planned successions are special cases employing follower successions.
Zhang and Rajagopalan (2004) examined incidences of “relay” CEO successions, in
which successors are specifically groomed by their incumbents prior to assuming their
new office; these authors also contemplated the effects upon stock market perception (p.
483). Non-relay CEO succession defines an event in which the successor emerges from
within the organization, but was not the chosen “heir apparent” (p. 484); hence, a nonrelay succession is a distinctly classified contender succession. “The chance of a
mismatch between a new CEO and a firm should be lower in relay succession than in
other types of succession and, as a consequence, relay succession should have a positive
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impact on post-succession firm performance” (p. 484). A deliberate replacement
sequence enhances firm strategic continuity, “enabl[ing] the firm to better manage
ongoing strategic and industry instability and turn around poor performance…high
strategic instability diminishes the likelihood of relay succession” (p. 485-487). Zhang
and Rajagopalan divulged results which indicated relay succession was positively
correlated to postsuccession firm performance (p<.01), and outside succession was
negatively correlated to postsuccession firm performance (p<.01), (p. 492).
Correspondingly, the interactive effects of postsuccession firm performance and high
postsuccession strategic instability produced a significant slope component (p<.05) under
the prevalence of relay succession, indicating that the strategic effect of relay CEO
successions mitigate firm performance in the presence of high postsuccession strategic
and industry instability for their sample under study (p. 495-496). These results evidence
further the findings of Shen and Cannella Jr. (2002) with respect to the moderation of risk
affecting firm performance under the auspices of strategic continuity.
If a particular CEO’s management style is not miscible with the organization and
its political hierarchy, it may require alteration to conform; in this case the entity may
also experience augmented risk. “Job match theory stresses the importance of the entire
CEO succession process, as opposed to focusing solely on how to motivate or monitor
CEOs once chosen…good matches are characterized by better firm performance than are
bad matches” (Allgood & Farrell, 2003, p. 318). Thus, it is expected that risk outcomes
should markedly differ as a result of personnel change conducted under job match theory,
and further, that “good matches” augur enhanced financial performance; an “advantage of
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studying CEOs is the ability to compare two individuals in the same position with the
same firm” (p. 319).
A “peak in the hazard” of a CEO leaving a position “occurs at approximately five
years of CEO tenure” (Allgood & Farrell, 2003, p. 319), or at the midpoint of average
total CEO tenure of ten years, as documented by Comte and Mihal (2001, p.47). The
hazard is defined as: “an instantaneous probability of transition from one state to another,
when the transition has not already occurred…an executive had not already departed”
(Cannella Jr. & Hambrick, 1993, p. 747). If the hazard of turnover indicates that an
inappropriate job match has occurred, then prior to five years of tenure or immediately
after, risk should be at a nadir, in accordance with the propriety of the match. Upon
analysis of 309 job matches among firms, Allgood and Farrell (2003) ascertained that,
“the likelihood of an inside CEO being a good match after the previous CEO quit is
significantly greater (83%) than the likelihood of an outside CEO being a good match
(67%)” (p. 331). Presumably, the follower/contender successor has strategic intimacy and
information asymmetry with the intended change concurrently transpiring in the
organization, and may adjust the firm’s dynamic course as required to align with
stakeholder expectations. In the event that an initially good match is followed by another
good match, the previous CEO institutes a leadership legacy, in which the strategy of the
firm is perpetuated through constructive staffing and succession planning. This in turn is
surmised to minimize the financial exposure; however, such conjectures remain to be
edified empirically for Collins’s (2001) sample.

54
In their study of CEO succession, Shen and Cannella Jr. (2002) classified the
executive turnover of 228 CEO successions as follower, contender, and outsider contexts
and compared the dynamics in three-year average industry return on assets (ROA) to that
of the entity experiencing personnel change, while controlling for “the entropy measure
of diversification as a control variable. The entropy measure has two components: related
diversification (DR) and unrelated diversification (DU)” (Palepu, 1985, as cited in Shen
& Cannella Jr. 2002, p. 725). Related diversification occurs when diversification
transpires as a consequence of succession, whereas unrelated diversification occurs when
diversification initiatives were formulated prior to a personnel change. The contingency
of financial risk correlating to a change in CEO may be increasingly pervasive if
unrelated diversification is experienced; CEO executive ability thus saliently affects any
outcome under unrelated diversification.
Internal Outsiders versus External Outsiders
Whereas Shen and Cannella Jr. (2002) primarily researched the source of
successors, and Allgood and Farrell (2003) essentially investigated the organizational and
behavioral suitability of successors, Clayton et al. (2005) synthesized situational
reasoning for CEO turnover with the “choice of replacement [type]” (p. 1782); their
approach extended prior research. Given the directors’ or stakeholders’ desired outcomes,
the CEO selection process is more effectively consummated if a chief executive’s
required characteristics are evaluated at or prior to the inception of the selection process;
the desired outcomes edify the commencement of an executive search. Clayton et
al.(2005) ascribed a “strategy hypothesis” as reasoning for “[financial] volatility;” it
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“increases after a turnover…[and is the] result of increased uncertainty about the nature
of the strategy that will be implemented by the new CEO” (p. 1783). This scenario is
surmised to occur subsequent to a forced turnover and outsider replacement. Following
an interpretation of CEO compensation, these authors also indicated: “although some
outside CEOs have an established track record from leading another company, most do
not” (p. 1785). Further, executive skill may lack portability between individuals, despite
transition planning in context. It is hence prohibitively challenging for shareholders to
assess financial effects based upon disclosure of such evidence regarding a CEO’s prior
experience.
Contrastingly, the “ability hypothesis” was ascribed as reasoning for financial
volatility transpiring as “investors gather evidence to evaluate the skill of the new
CEO…investors update their ability estimates and revalue the firm” (Clayton et al., 2005,
p. 1784). Under the ability hypothesis, “firm strategy is not expected to change
significantly” as it is applicable given the succession of an insider (p. 1784). Finally, a
“scapegoat hypothesis” was ascribed as the convergence of turnover and agency theory,
which induces “a credible dismissal threat…in order to ensure optimal exertion of effort
by the CEO…and dismissal occurs when there is poor performance due to chance” (p.
1786). Although it is less likely that performance may be ameliorated by an insider or
outsider successor as exogenous variables influence firm results, dismissal is often
imminent and implemented to appease shareholders and investors.
Cannella Jr. and Lubatkin (1993) perceived that if performance was exceptionally
incommensurate, these factors would precipitate an entity’s board to initiate outside
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successor selection (p. 782); “the dismissal group shows higher levels of unsystematic
risk than the normal retirement group (p<.05)…systematic risk does not differ
significantly among the five disposition categories” as expected. Thus, “low profitability
was a good predictor of outside selection, particularly when sociopolitical forces were
weak” (p. 789). If sociopolitical forces were weak within the organization, potential
vulnerability stemming from lack of managerial “cohesion” (Waldman et al., 2001, p.
135) may result in misalignment toward firm objectives. Khurana (as cited in Bower,
2007) offered additional perspective: “some boards, facing difficult strategic
circumstances in the markets for their company’s products and services, lose faith in the
capabilities of the insiders who produced those lousy results” (p. 13). Despite the
expectation that shareholders seek agency effects to be enhanced following executive
replacement by an outsider, Bower noted from his own study of a decade of executive
replacement results of firms within the S&P 500 that “insiders outperformed
outsiders…especially when the company had had poor prior performance” (p. 12).
Should results of this research effort differ, one may question why a particular entity was
not subject to this type of unsystematic risk, as it is typical that firms sampled from
Collins’s (2001) selection all operate within the same market structure and economic
environment and may be subject to similar governance dynamics.
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Consequences of Executive Change
Changes in Goal Congruence, Agency Effects, and Organizational Inertia
One integral aspect of a follower’s or contender’s triumph in transformational
change may arguably be rooted in “organizational inertia,” which theoretically
contributes to hindrances in the execution of strategy; “for successors who want to
initiate strategic changes, the strong organizational inertia developed during their
predecessors' time in office will increase the difficulty of, or may even prevent,
accomplishing their goals” (Shen & Cannella, Jr., 2002, p. 723). This contention was
amplified by the findings of Gordon et al. (2000), who conveyed that the CEO is
instrumental in overcoming inertia associated with strategic commitment (p. 918). In
addition, Gordon et al. substantiated that lack of “environmental awareness,” and
“external attribution for negative financial performance” (p. 920) also affects executive
and management team recognition of exogenous variables affecting the firm. “A lack of
environmental awareness may result in persistence with the current strategy” (p. 920),
indicating a recalcitrance to acquiesce to the necessity of strategic transformation.
Friedman and Singh (1989, p. 722) specified: “two sets of contingencies [determine] the
efficacy of new CEOs: organizational context (presuccession organizational performance
and organizational size) and event content (initiating force impelling a succession,
disposition of the predecessor, and origin of the new CEO).” The aftermath of a CEO
succession is often perceived by investors as potentially turbulent with respect to
operations.
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The longer CEO tenure is accompanied by organizational inertia, the more
intransigent the entity and its management team will be in accepting and executing novel
strategic tactics. Shen and Cho (2005) indicated: “governance and control mechanisms at
corporate organizations (e.g., ownership structure, board composition, and investor
activism) can have an important effect on the occurrence of involuntary executive
turnover during periods of poor performance” (p. 844). The concomitant existence of an
indulgent governance structure may further prohibit acceptance of organizational change
with the intent of mitigating agency risk. Hermalin and Weisbach (1998, as cited in
Allgood & Farrell, 2000, p. 374) indicated that “the balance of power between the CEO
and other directors that predicts board independence declines over the course of a CEO’s
tenure.” Whereas board independence enhances the custodianship and fiduciary control
of the firm while deterring agency conflicts emanating from a single source, a highly
influential magnate often attracts directors who succumb to the leader’s capricious
pursuit of “costly pet projects and…compensation packages that benefit [them] at the
expense of stockholders” (Allgood & Farrell, 2000, p. 374). The degree to which agency
effects are omnipresent among the CEO and executives within the entity may contribute
to the decreased incidence of stewardship (Coles et al., 2001); “managerial hegemony
theory, which views boards as passive instruments who hold allegiance to the managers
who selected them” (p. 27) may also be prevalent within the firm, giving rise to the
deterioration of directors’ fiduciary control.
To this end, Dahya et al. (1998) observed:
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…the benefits of improved goal congruence should include the reduction
of asymmetries of information, the diminution of moral hazard and a
lessening of the likelihood of adverse selection in policy choice by
managers who also have a vested interest in maximising the share values
of their companies. (p. 1091)

In effect, agency risk should be mitigated in the presence of CEO turnover by the
institution of equitable and incentivizing compensation packages. Supporting this
assertion, Conyon (1998) posited: “the estimated pay-for-performance elasticity
potentially reveals information about the incentives faced by managers to pursue
shareholder interests…the greater the estimated effect, the more congruent are
shareholder and managerial interests” (p. 485). This assertion aligns with agency theory,
as well as the propriety of CEO dismissal pending abysmal financial performance.
Dedman (2003), however, conveyed that due to an acknowledgement of agency effects,
“managers have incentives to ‘entrench’ themselves, making themselves more costly to
dislodge” (p. 33). Lee, Lev, and Yeo (2007) echoed similar assessments given the
presence of organizational complexity: “the scope for moral hazard increases with
organizational complexity, especially in firms with high organizational relatedness,
because direct monitoring by principals is difficult” (p. 297). Organizational cohesiveness
may contribute to malfeasant aspects of collusion prompted through the establishment of
intrafirm operational relationships. “Collusion by agents is typically opportunistic
because it conceals their aversion and diverts organizational resources suboptimally,
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which eventually harms the overall firm performance” (p. 297). Since unique, “firmspecific factors…can consume a large portion of managerial time, thereby changing the
nature of managerial work from proactive to reactive” (Mintzberg, 1973, as cited in
Cannella Jr. & Lubatkin, 1993, p. 775), it is of paramount importance that personnel as
well as initiatives are strategically aligned to create value within the organization, and not
garnered to merely enhance political cohesiveness.
Once a “situational analysis” is performed following a dismissal, and it is
determined that the business has continued viability, corrective strategic planning is
undertaken and an action plan to implement typically developed. “The key to a successful
turnaround is early intervention…action and the organization’s willingness to adapt can
avert a significant restructuring or worse” (Auchterlonie, 2003, pp. 56-57). Subsequently,
the decision to “‘fix, sell, or close’” (Korn, 1985, p. 33) will be addressed in context. In
the instance of a business merger or takeover, contrasting personal dynamics are
applicable. Cannella Jr. and Hambrick (1993) delineated: “acquisitions…disrupt
organizational social standings…the [voluntary] departure of acquired executives is best
understood as an outgrowth of social processes” (p. 733). In cases where “autonomy is
removed, status is removed, and a climate of acrimony prevails” (p. 733), competent
executives are often marginalized and usurped by the institution of a new regime, instead
of being proselytized into an elite group with the intent of advancing knowledge through
strategic advantage. Often, perception by the acquired party and resultant lack of
communication may contribute to the demise of an otherwise potentially advantageous
relationship between an incumbent executive leader and the merged firm’s board.
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Through an analysis of the computer software and furniture industries, Gordon et
al. (2000) substantiated an empirically significant relationship between “CEO turnover…
[and the] increased likelihood of strategic reorientation. CEO turnover (t=1.65, p < .05)
was statistically significant, suggesting that a change in CEO does increase the proclivity
to reorient” (p. 930). Surprisingly, the relationship between “environmental awareness,”
or essentially, recognition of exogenous economic and strategic influences upon the firm,
and poor financial performance was not significant (p=.42), (p. 930). Gordon et al. (2000)
interpreted their results:
…in this final iteration of the hierarchical analysis, the
main effect for both industries is reversed when top management
blames the external environment for poor past performance. This
means that an external attribution for poor performance in the
stable industry increases the probability of strategic reorientation
whereas it decreases the likelihood of reorientation in the turbulent
industry…Total main effects show that firms with CEO turnover
are 12% more likely to have a strategic reorientation, whereas
firms with top management team turnover are 18% less likely to
have a strategic reorientation. (p. 931-32)

Competent, incumbent CEOs often lend precedent support to succeeding
executives promoted from within, especially if the former leader successfully executed
transformational change initiatives, and performance prior to acquisition was
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satisfactorily achieved. Gordon et al. (2000) ascribed this “psychological investment” of
tenured executives as “cognitive commitment” (p. 917). Conversely, within a
performance-deficient firm, succession planning is less likely to occur, particularly in the
event of a pending merger; in that case, succession efforts may not transpire as intended,
due to the nature and typical alacrity of the replacement. Cannella, Jr. and Hambrick
(1993) hypothesized: “the lower the pre-acquisition performance of an acquired firm, the
greater an acquired executive’s propensity to depart” (p. 739); the authors’ expectations
were that performance improves over time as CEO tenure within the merger context is
extended. As new owners perceive that strategic reorientation is required to transform the
firm’s future destiny, the probability of executive removal increases. Additionally,
Cannella Jr. and Hambrick conjectured that “the greater the degree to which autonomy is
removed from the acquired firm, the greater an acquired executive’s propensity to
depart…we expected the effects of the removal of autonomy…to be relatively slow in
appearing…manifesting…in the second and third years” (p. 742). Drawing from a sample
size of 430 merger events dated years 1980-1984, Cannella Jr. and Hambrick reported
that 67% of executives of acquired firms had departed within 48 months of firm
acquisition, with the highest incidence of departure occurring in the second (87
executives) and third (76 executives) years; the model was “highly significant,” with
p=.001 (p. 749). Notably, the authors observed that “ROE (return on equity) was
negatively associated with executive departure through the second year” (p. 749). The
results were statistically significant (with p=.01), and suggested that market reaction to
merger and acquisition activity occur contemporaneously. This implies that
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differentiation of risk as purported by executive change is perceived as similarly
significant by investors. It should also be noted that the effects of decreased ROE
dissipated overall in later periods within the Cannella Jr. and Hambrick sample,
indicating a tempering of future results as tenure increased (p.755). Further, the “in the
first two time periods [essentially the first twelve months], removal of autonomy was
positively associated with departure, as hypothesized” (p. 752).
Whereas Sheikholesami, Wilson, and Selin (1998) advised: “abrupt changes
(forced resignations or dismissals) are a surprise and often involve significant shocks to
earnings” (p. 74), Allgood and Farrell (2000) asserted in clarification: “when there is
greater uncertainty about a new CEO’s ability, the board will be more lenient regarding
poor performance that deviates from the expected level” (p. 374). In context, if the board
is more permissive in their tolerance of deficient CEO performance, this approach
introduces further volatility and risk into financial results. Consider that the efficient
markets hypothesis, through which it is posited that stock prices imbue all relevant
information, is upheld as a theoretical framework supporting equity markets; hence, it is
conjectured that the risk element of earnings variability due to a change in personnel will
be distinctly measurable within the market context as investors sense imminent risk
changes. “The wealth effect associated with an announced change in CEO can be
decomposed into an information effect (the firm’s prospects are worse than previously
believed) and a real effect (the new CEO is expected to improve firm performance)”
(Clayton et al., 2005, p. 1780). Correspondingly, reaction to the information effect has
been shown (Puffer & Weintrop, 1991; Kaplan, 1994; Defond & Hung, 2004) to be more
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salient than the real effect in the short term. It is of worthy note that Clayton et al. (2005)
also discerned: “poor stock performance and higher volatility typically precede a forced
turnover” (p. 1787). These researchers confined sampling to that of poorly performing
entities. However, the extent to which the response of market participants affects equity
pricing when cash flows have been necessarily altered due to risk and return volatility
remains to be tested within Collins’s (2001) sample.
Dynamics in Organizational Interactions
Modifications in board composition and hence political influence may also
accompany the decision to replace an underperforming CEO. “Boards of directors, then,
may be seen as acting as the shareholders’ first line of defence against a potentially selfserving management” (Conyon, 1998, p. 486). They exposited the tenets of Fama (1980,
as cited in Conyon & Florou, 2002, p. 210): “the board is viewed as a market-induced
institution, the ultimate internal monitor of the set of contracts called a firm, whose most
important rule is to scrutinize the highest decision makers within the firm.” In context,
the board is responsible for independent governance aspects of monitoring executive
performance, regardless of political or organizational alignment of individual directors
with the executive team. Prime (2007) fundamentally concurred: “a strong turnoverperformance connection provides evidence of good corporate governance within a firm”
(p. 79).
CEO replacement may also precipitate turnover among board members,
particularly in cases of increased allegiance to the former executive. Farrell and Whidbee
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(2000) observed “an increased likelihood of outside director turnover following forced
CEO succession, especially among those directors that are closely aligned with the
outgoing CEO” (p. 597) According to their findings, in the presence of deficient financial
performance, a higher incidence of equity ownership among directors of firms served
often motivated an executive dismissal decision. Reticence to oust a poorly performing
CEO is less probable with effective incentive alignment among board members. Farrell
and Whidbee (2000) asserted that “removing a poorly performing CEO…is one of the
most observable signals that outside directors can send to shareholders and labor markets
about their effectiveness as directors” (p. 598). Inquiry as to the fulfillment of fiduciary
duty and application of objectivity surfaces: “directors with characteristics associated
with effective monitoring (e.g., independence from the CEO, substantial equity
ownership, and sufficient decision-making expertise to make good replacement
decisions) tend to be rewarded for removing a poorly performing CEO” (p. 599). In
addition to pecuniary benefits, the likelihood of securing future board seats serving other
entities increases for the director based on prior demonstration of successful governance.
Consequently, Farrell and Whidbee (2002) also acknowledged, “CEOs have significant
control over the director selection process, especially if CEOs serve on the board’s
nominating committee…a new CEO is a catalyst for change in board committee
structure” (pp. 49-50).
Organizational Effects distinguished by Replacement Type
As an outsider supplants the former CEO, any current affiliated board members
are typically replaced as well, especially those serving on fiduciary committees (i.e.,
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audit, pension, and nominating). In response to queries regarding the propriety of service,
practitioners have decried that myriad and potentially interlocking governance
obligations instituted by directors be constrained by limiting of the number of board
positions a director may serve. Directors often seek additional board positions to gain
exposure to multiple industries and solidify their reputation. To offer apposite evidence,
these researchers further elaborated: “when directors become busy as a result of obtaining
a new board seat, stock prices tend to drop for the firms in which they are incumbent
directors…boards are inclined to become distracted and monitoring intensity is likely to
suffer” (Fich & Shivdasani, 2006, p. 692). The probability of busy boards to displace a
deficiently performing CEO diminishes as the number of board directorships become
more prevalent among members; busy directors will tend to be indifferent to the necessity
of ousting a CEO, whereas, contrastingly, non-busy boards are more sensitive to this
imperative (p. 716).
If the CEO replaces a company founder, then “the founder may not fully
relinquish control of the firm when the new CEO takes over…[and thus is] unable to run
the firm as he or she wishes” (Allgood & Farrell, 2003, p. 333). CEO tenure may be
prolonged if boards are permissive “in the face of poor performance because [CEOs]
have coped successfully with contingencies posed by their environments or strategies in
the past” (Comte & Mihal, 2001, p. 50). In this case, previous performance rather than
current achievement is utilized as litmus for continuing tenure. Coles et al. (2001)
documented the findings of Miller: “the relationship between CEO tenure and firm
performance is curvilinear, with the impact on performance increasing to a point and then
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becoming negative as the CEO becomes rigid and less likely to engage in environmental
monitoring and adaptation” (Miller, as cited in Coles et al., 2001, p. 29). An expectation
may exist among board members that an incumbent CEO has the ability to ameliorate
future operational outcomes despite more current unsustained performance; directors may
conclude that maintenance of the status quo is the best option. From an accounting metric
perspective, this conjecture is further substantiated by the findings of Coles et al. (2001)
who observed: “significant and negative interaction of CEO tenure and board
composition and MVA…indicate that when insiders dominate the board and the CEO has
been in the office a long time, market performance declines” (p. 41). Hence, Andrews
(2001), subsequent to an observation of Gillette and Xerox, alternatively advocated,
“if…companies…are seeking improved performance, the course is clear: Hire an outsider
and clear away any obstacles to change” (p. 14).
Friedman and Singh (1989) suggested that the degree of obligatory strategic
change may determine the effect of executive successor, based on stockholder
expectations:
…results suggest that customary successions are neither adaptive
nor disruptive but are best explained by a random transformation
view of organizational change: leaders assuming power in the
modal succession event do not seem to matter in determining the
fortunes of large corporations…stockholders see new CEOs as able
to affect strategic change, but only when the firms they lead are in
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need of redirection and when the accession to power represents
alterations in management practice and corporate policy. (p. 739)

Contrastingly, outsiders do not garner the perspective nor the political influence
required to entrench themselves with alacrity, which often hinders the execution of novel
strategic initiatives. Auchterlonie (2003) noted that there exists a “’knee-jerk’ tendency to
replace CEOs of distressed or underperforming companies that, in many cases, are no
more capable of fixing the underlying problems causing the distress than their
predecessors” (p. 52). Allgood and Farrell (2000) also posited, “outside hires are unlikely
to have influenced the composition of the board before their hire, suggesting it may take
several years for them to become entrenched”; the operative duration of tenure required
to achieve entrenchment, per their results, was three years (p. 374-376). Hillier et al.
(2005) explicated further by indicating that political influence is not promptly garnered
by newly appointed outsiders: “External succession is damaging to the incentives of
lower management, and therefore, external candidates must display superior potential to
that of the available internal talent pool” (p. 530). This indicates that if a post-succession
turnover occurs within a fleeting interval following the prior replacement, the outsider
successor may have not been able to influence outcomes and build organizational
cohesiveness quickly enough to placate the performance expectations of stakeholders,
particularly investors and directors.
In a seminal work, Friedman and Singh (1989) conceded:
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CEO succession, therefore, may result in two kinds of disruption.
It can destroy the fit between an organization and its environment
because, as a structural change, a succession event results in an
organization’s selection out of its population (a radical ecological
view). Or it can disrupt internal authority relations, breaking up the
unity or command and disrobing work patterns (a bureaucratic
theory view). Both kinds of disruption may lead to performance
decrements and increase the likelihood of organizational death. (p.
721)
Financial Performance and Risk Indications of Executive Change
Effects of the Risk Environment upon Entity Context
Academicians have conducted myriad analyses in order to investigate the
relationship between past financial performance and CEO turnover; however,
convergence and resultant consistency fail to dominate conveyed outcomes. Huson et al.
(2001) insightfully premised: “[CEO turnover] has long-term implications for a firm’s
investment, operating, and financing decisions” (p. 2266). As previously stated, strategic
change is often requisite as a new executive attains position, and has the potential to
inflict a more pronounced level of risk upon the entity. Although Conyon (1998)
acknowledged, “low company profits may be attributable to adverse demand shocks or
increases in industry or market costs rather than malfeasance by the agent” (p. 487), it is
the responsibility of the entity’s CEO and board to ensure deliverance of expected
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financial results according to forecasted projections despite current instability. Financial
performance is the ultimate litmus capable of gauging the executives’ and directors’
ability to mitigate risk and augment value within the context of the entity. Mere dismissal
of endogenous and exogenous sources of risk currently suffusing financial detriment
upon the entity as insurmountable is evocative of executive complacency, entrenchment,
and reticence to innovatively realign the entity’s strategic position. Conyon espoused: “a
boardroom culture which eschews frankness in favour of politeness and courtesy may be
a proximate cause in the failure of the corporate control mechanism” (p. 490).
Subsequent to completion of an analysis of equity volatility following 872 CEO
changes occurring from 1979 through 1995, Clayton et al. (2005) evidenced that “the
most significant increase [in volatility] is associated with forced turnover” (p. 1781). The
forced post-turnover mean standard deviation of returns was 43.2%, as compared to the
full sample mean standard deviation of 30.7%, and the voluntary turnover mean standard
deviation of 28.7% (p. 1792). Auchterlonie (2003) offered: “involuntary successions in
2002 increased by more than 70% in 2001…with 39% of 2002’s global CEO departures
being forced, performance-based change,” (p. 53).
Kaplan commenced studies of the financial performance given the incidence of
CEO turnover in Japan (1994) and Germany (1995). Notably, within these cultures,
corporate governance structures differ from that of the United States and are more
“relationship-oriented” (Kaplan, 1995, p. 23), contingent upon associations with financial
institutions and groups of “large shareholders.” Board-level decision-making is viewed as
more collaborative, particularly among German firms, as there are typically two
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governing boards for each public entity—a supervisory board and a management board—
deemed “the codetermination system” (p. 26). Financial performance is attributable to the
actions of the entire management board. Hence, “turnover of the management board in
German companies increases significantly with poor stock performance and with
earnings losses” (Kaplan, 1995, p. 24). This possible replacement of the entire team
contrasts significantly with actions often initiated in US firms, in which CEO turnover is
typically not accompanied by complete managerial team replacement, excluding the
consequences of takeover activity. Managerial ownership among German firms also
contrasts with that of US entities; as such, “German banks typically act as custodians for
the shares of stock corporations held by small shareholders” (p. 28).
Increased Governance Risk through Earnings Manipulation
Detzler and Machuga (2002) amplified Kaplan’s (1994) findings on the incidence
of turnover among firms subject to the prevalence of earnings management. Asserting the
potential manifestation of four separate hypotheses regarding earnings management
during the interval circumscribing the turnover event, these authors revealed that “mutual
interests between incoming and outgoing presidents...to portray a triumphant transition”
(p. 343) are often addressed to ensure continuity of strategic intent between the newly
appointed and outgoing leaders. By expanding tests of the horizon, cover-up, and big bath
theories suggested by Murphy and Zimmerman (1993, as cited in Detzler & Machuga,
2002) with the addition of the coaching hypothesis, Detzler and Machuga elucidated that
“corporate culture and management succession practices cause managers to face different
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incentives to manage earnings in these situations” (p. 344). Horizon theory “suggests that
departing CEOs approaching a known retirement date will attempt to increase earnings
during their last years at the expense of future earnings...motivations for increasing
earnings may be pecuniary” (p. 344); this situation is more prevalent in the case of
routine turnovers. Conversely, cover-up theory suggests the concealment of “poor
performance in order to avoid disciplinary action” (p. 345); thus earnings manipulation is
theorized to be more prevalent given the incidence of forced turnover. Big bath theory
“applies to incoming CEOs who attempt to decrease earnings in the transition year in
order to report improved earnings in the following year” (p. 345); hence, the incidence of
the big bath accounting approach is also surmised to be more prevalent given forced
turnover.
The coaching hypothesis, “suggest[ing] that both departing and incoming
presidents have incentives to smooth earnings during a routine transition” (Detzler &
Machuga, 2002, p. 346) was also derived. The incidence of earnings management in this
case may subdue and impede the pronounced and detectable sensitivity of otherwise
differentiated results due to manipulated financial metrics. Further, risk perception of
shareholders participating in the market may be affected by the application of such
practices, to the extent that distorted financial disclosures lead investors to anticipate
spurious results. In turn, the authors offered the following conjecture: “since non-routine
turnovers are typically unanticipated, it is possible that departing presidents have been
managing earnings to cover up poor performance for several years before they are
terminated” (p. 365). In contrast to Collins’s (2001) selected sample, inclusion in which
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was predicated by fifteen years of extraordinary financial results, it is unlikely that
material earnings management could be sustained for a lengthened period of time without
being detected through manifestation of cash flows.
Whereas Detzler and Machuga detected the incidence of earnings management
through the examination of trends in depreciation, research and development,
extraordinary gains and losses, and accounting accrual dynamics, Lee et al. (2007)
confined their examination exclusively to accrual dynamics, citing discretionary accrual
changes as a proxy for earnings management. “The likelihood of organizational fraud is
likely to be positively associated with organizational complexity because of monitoring
difficulties and greater information asymmetry” (p. 296).
Upon investigation of the effect of changing discretionary accruals from financial
results within CEOs retirement years, Reitanga and Tearney (2003) provided additional
edification of the prevalence of the horizon theory, termed ‘short horizon theory’ (p.
255). The resultant augmentation of income is spurred by appealing and reciprocative
increases in bonus remuneration to the executive in the final years of service.
Additionally, “institutional investors are interested in short-run performance…[which]
can exacerbate earnings management behavior” (p. 257); this observation of myopic
behavior was also noted by Rappaport (2005). Reitanga and Tearney (2003) found
significant “evidence of earnings management” (p. 255) through the analysis of multiyear ascending accrual growth prior to retirements, and descending accrual release upon
the executive separation from the entity; they specifically touted the decoupling of the
performance effect and turnover effect within their sample by including only normal
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retirements. Although the results of Reitenga and Tearney overall did not reveal
significant relationships between earnings management through discretionary accruals in
the last and fourth years leading to CEO retirement, there was a positive association
noted between the variables. In contrast, analysis of the second and third year results
prior to departure did reveal a significant relationship between discretionary accruals and
retirement (p. 270). To the extent that discretionary accrual adjustments are not material,
the subsequent effect upon risk is liminal, if at all detectable.
Lee et al. (2007) also provided evidence of a positive association between
earnings management and “organizational relatedness...a high proportion of outside
directors and high institutional equity ownership have less pronounced earnings
management...[this] suggests an interaction between corporate governance and
organizational relatedness” (p. 293). By recounting the incidence of ethical transgressions
among financial executives, Lee et al. conjectured that the pervasiveness of collusion
within a “multi-person and cross-division [situation]...raises the fundamental question...of
how is it possible to get a large and diverse group of top-level employees to participate in
sustained fraud,” requiring, “‘commonality of purpose’” (p. 294).
With respect to earnings restatements and risk prevalence, ineffective governance
has to date had a relatively minimal effect on investor reaction within a portfolio context,
and a marginal effect upon turnover frequency of other board members overall.
Marciukaityte and Varma (2007) educed: “firms experiencing large-loss restatements...do
not have significantly different composition of boards and audit committees than other
restating firms” (p. 31). The principals’ control of the entity’s agent should be
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enforceable; if the fiduciary relationship is violated, it becomes the obligation of the
board members to act on behalf of the shareholders and rectify any turbid actions on the
part of a CEO or ineffective fellow committee members.
Solely, Marciukaityte (2005) documented a positive association between
managerial optimism and the magnitude of discretionary accruals, suggesting that “highgrowth firms derive a substantial part of their value from highly uncertain growth
opportunities, making it harder for investors to appraise the high-growth firms and easier
for managers of these firms to mislead investors” (p. 6). Results garnered from a sample
of firm financials dated 1988 to 2001 revealed the presence of significantly differing
levels of discretionary accruals (p<.01) based on the method of financing major projects,
i.e., debt, equity, and retained earnings, with “reliance on external equity
financing...negative and significant at the 1 percent level” (pp. 14-15). Generalizing
these results, high-growth firms, such as the firms in Collins’s sample, may be less
subject to earnings manipulation and more subject to managerial optimism with respect to
forecasting future earnings. Equity issuance, despite its signaling effect, may be the
financing methodology of choice if management’s projected results are more aleatory
than anticipated. More pronounced levels of risk would then result in more highly priced
financing for the firm. Considerable financial impact may be experienced if the firm’s
hurdle rate must be adjusted by one to two percent in response to personnel change
(Clayton et al., 2005, p. 1782).
Defond and Hung (2004) commented upon the “convergence of international
corporate governance systems toward a best-practices set of governance rules...regulators
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who wish to improve corporate governance may find it more beneficial to expend
resources on strengthening law enforcement institutions rather than on adopting
additional laws” (p. 274). Without adequate governance addressing the presence of
financial management impropriety, transparency and market efficiency are thwarted. A
reallocation of resources may be necessary to properly align recognition of malfeasant
management activity, and enhance transparency. A significant amount of institutional
ownership of a firm’s equity may delimit oversight and external influence from passive
investors. Nagar (2004) provided both a rationalization and a caveat, indicating: “if
turnover is indeed performance related...[it is] suggested that a change in management
should be accompanied by an increase in performance” (p. 315).
Suitability of Finance and Accounting Performance Benchmarks
Results of Shen and Cannella, Jr.’s (2002) sociopolitical organizational
experiment indicated that the “interactive effects of successor type and postsuccession
senior executive turnover on firm ROA” (p. 727) were positively related in the case of
contender successors and negatively related in the case of outsider successors, with the
slope of the outsider contenders being far more pronounced. These results implicate that
erosive financial effects result from outsider CEO succession paralleled with senior
executive turnover, and negatively and significantly impact return on assets (ROA) for
the sample. Also, these results are consistent with the findings of Allgood and Farrell
(2000), who revealed that “performance measures are negatively related to the likelihood
of forced turnover…when measuring performance using ROA, 53 percent of the forced
turnovers in the sample are in the bottom quartile” the “effect of firm performance
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is…negative and significant” (p. 386). Conyon (1998) similarly echoed reciprocity
between dismissal and performance in documenting outcomes: “the marginal effect of a
performance change on the turnover likelihood is about 8 [percent]” (p. 503). In a
subsequent study, Conyon joined Florou (2002) and opined: “there is an inverse and
robust relation between the probability of a top management dismissal and firm
performance: senior managers are fired for poor performance” (p. 210). Whether
diminished results were sustained subsequent to a forced leadership change, or
ameliorated temporarily resulting in eventual recidivism of financial failure, remains to
be compared within this analysis of Collins’s (2001) sample. Rappaport (2005) presaged:
“failure to meet earnings targets is seen as a sign of managerial weakness and, if
repeated, can lead to a career-threatening dismissal... managers must develop and
effectively execute strategies that maximize the company’s long-term cash flow
potential” (p. 69).
Since myriad financial ratios and inputs to equity valuation are saliently
influenced by measures of income, it is conjectured that risk indicators such as beta, or
the covariance of the equity return versus the market return divided by the variance of the
market return, will also be negatively impacted by CEO succession and senior executive
team reciprocative dynamics. Presumably, the lack of continuity at numerous supporting
levels, excluding the top of the organizational hierarchy, portends operational instability
which renders financial risk, until synergy transpires among the senior management team
members and the new CEO. The introduction of “incentive contracting…contingent pay
and…ownership stakes…[will result in] close alignment between managers’ and outside
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shareholders’ interests” (Coles et al., 2001, p. 28). Specific linkage to define the metric
utilized to designate performance may drive the CEO to attain the incentive
complementarily or detrimentally; it is critical to ensure that metrics are selected with
consideration to potential agency conflicts.
Shen and Cannella Jr. (2002) conferred that one of the limitations of their study
was the inability to apply outcomes to financial market performance (p. 729); literature is
somewhat void of analytics which may be subtended through the examination of the
significance of risk factors, and the metrics which specifically augur variation. Although
the literature includes limited comparisons of financial metrics given changes in
leadership, research to date has specifically addressed sample sizes across the entire
range of equities within the US market. A dearth of literature exists addressing the
analysis of risk-relative financial effects of leadership turnover within companies deemed
exceptional prior to the leader’s departure.
“Turnover is negatively related to prior year stock returns” (Anderson, Bates,
Bizjak & Lemmon, 2000, p. 13), which suggests that risk is determinable through
observation of beta. If turnover is negatively related to prior year stock returns, then the
last year of tenure may prove to inculcate the poorest financial performance of a CEO’s
tenure among sampled firms. This is consistent with match theory phenomenon, as
presented by Allgood and Farrell (2003). In an earlier study, Allgood and Farrell (2000)
also provided evidence that “the mean stock return of firms with new outside CEOs is
more than 20 percent…the variation around this mean is enormous with a standard
deviation of 264.5 percent” (p. 389). This analysis was based upon a sample which
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excluded financial institutions and public utilities. In acquiescence they offered: “the
hiring of an outside CEO is a risky decision with the potential for high returns…the mean
and the standard deviation of the stock diminish with tenure” (p. 389). Since stock returns
are the primary input for the beta, this documented magnitude of change should result in
a pronounced variation in beta for equities affected by outsider CEO turnover; this
provides edification for an approach to risk measurement through an analysis of
investment returns, with the assumption that the semi-strong form of the efficient market
hypothesis holds in sample context.
Researchers also conferred the limited miscibility of accounting and finance
performance scalars. Allgood and Farrell (2000) observed a dichotomy between
accounting and finance metrics; they asserted: “accounting measures are better predictors
of management changes than are stock returns” (p. 390). Hambrick and Cannella Jr.
(1993) further clarified and advocated the use of time-series accounting metrics:
“accounting-based performance measures have well-known limitations, but three-year
averages are thought to yield generally robust indications of corporate economic
performance” (p. 745). In testing the replicability and extant generalizability of this
assertion, one may consider the varying degrees of informational transparency of
accounting data across capital markets.
In contrast to accounting data, which exhibits the historical result of previous
decisions, stock return data is thought to instantaneously exhibit high variation in the
event that the expected effect of CEO change among market participants is an increase in
equity risk, which may subsequently be diversified away. Rappaport (2005) summarized
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this view by conferring: “earnings are relevant to valuation to the extent that they help
investors and analysts estimate the magnitude, timing, and uncertainty of future cash
flows”; he also remarked that “earnings are an amalgam of facts (realized cash flows) and
assumptions about future outcomes (accruals)” (p. 66). Commenting on suitability,
Appleyard (1996) also noted, “central to the success of a piece of work involving the
interpretation of evidence from the capital market is that market efficiency holds and that
we have a robust model of asset pricing” (p. 287); the underlying assumption remains
that fundamental analysis is a robust input of asset pricing models.
Conyon and Florou (2002) advocated the utilization of both market returns and
accounting metrics to comprehensively assess the performance of CEOs within their
selected sample. As strong proponents of the efficient markets hypothesis, they asserted:
“in an efficient market…stock prices anticipate the future benefits of the possibility of
CEO dismissal and therefore tend to increase as the capital market becomes aware of new
avenues for management improvement” (p. 214). Notably, they also offered,
“accounting-based measures, on the other hand, are more stable and not vulnerable to
speculative or exogenous shocks (although a counter argument could be made that
accounting-based measures are endogenous and susceptible to managerial manipulation)”
(p. 215). They revealed a significant relationship (p≤ .001) between forced turnovers and
performance of both stock returns and return on assets for their UK sample from 19901998; “the data reveale[d] no association between non-forced departures and firm
performance” (p. 218). Dahya et al. (2002) also “employ[ed] both accounting earnings
and stock returns to measure corporate performance” (p. 465) through the utilization of
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return on assets (ROA) and industry adjusted stock returns, as differentiated from the
methodology of Conyon and Florou, who documented abnormal returns circumscribing
the announcement date of CEO departure. The test employed by Dahya et. al. (2002)
does not distinguish realized returns from the variation stemming from the reaction and
perception of risk by market participants at the turnover announcement date.
Accounting information is, in practice, subject to manipulation. In particular,
“executives of poorly performing firms have a greater incentive to make discretionary
accounting choices to increase earnings than executives of good performing firms”
(Detzler & Machuga, 2002, p. 368). However, since the efficient markets hypothesis was
established under the premise that equity values are impounded with current relevant
information, market prices should thus adjust to perceived risk more promptly than
historical accounting information exhibits. Dutta and Richelstein (2005) observed: “one
might expect that as market information becomes less precise, an optimal performance
measure puts less weight on current stock price and instead relies more heavily on
accounting measurements and future cash flows” (p. 1071). Market movements are
based on anticipated risk of CEO actions as perceived by stockholders, while accounting
information conveys the results of CEO actions executed, as interpreted through the
framework of generally accepted accounting principles. However, it is necessary to relate
potential limitations of disseminated information, as Allgood and Farrell (2000)
purported. Graham et al. (2005) acclaimed a related sentiment by asserting:
…companies voluntarily disclose information to facilitate ‘clarity’ and
‘understanding’ to investors. Executives believe that lack of clarity, or a
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reputation for not consistently providing precise and accurate information,
can lead to under-pricing of a firm’s stock…accounting earnings matter
more to managers than cash flows for financial reporting purposes, which
contrasts with the emphasis on cash flows found in the finance literature.
(p. 2)
These researchers substantiated the perspective of surveyed CFOs, and the
ascription of Lev (2001, as cited in Graham et al., 2005, p. 31): “GAAP-based financial
reporting ignores intangible assets such as ‘people, processes, and brand position.’” To
the extent that a chief executive is considered an intangible asset, expertise is not valued
per se within a financial statement, but the strategic financial ramifications of executive
decision-making have contemporaneous cash flow and earnings implications.
Overarchingly, “results indicate[d] that CFOs believe that earnings, not cash flows, are
the key metric considered by outsiders” (p. 4), and although fundamentally, earnings are
related to cash flows, a distinct difference in shareholder perception exists among finance
executives.
As equity valuation models are chiefly derived from expected cash flows,
convergence between stock price and accounting data theoretically transpires when the
firm’s accrual income closely equates to its cash flow from operations. A time series
analysis of accounting metrics identifies trends which provide information useful in the
determination of financial outcomes of operations by identifying sustainable cash flows;
this is the nature of the predictive value of accounting information. Coles et al. (2001)
elicited these potential effects by delimiting the generalizability of their assessment of
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EVA® and MVA, since CEO-implemented performance change is ostensible through an
extended time series interval in comparing a minimum of two data points, three years
apart. Defond and Hung (2004) generalized findings of their studies of both financial and
accounting related metrics by indicating: “CEO turnover is negatively related to stock
price performance when prices are more informative and negatively related to earnings
when stock prices are less informative and earnings are more informative” (p. 272). To
the extent that an accurate infusion of the expected results given CEO turnover occurs in
the context of an efficient market, CEO turnover is negatively related to stock prices. As
a heuristic anticipation of market reaction, Nagar (2004) asserted: “other firms can
capitalize on a distressed firm by hiring its talented managers, and investors can turn
bearish in anticipation of these managers’ resignations. These effects will also manifest
as a negative association between stock price and turnover” (p. 316).
Dutta and Reichelstein (2005, pp. 1069-70) conceded: “to provide incentives for
senior managers, firms rely on a range of performance indicators based on accounting
data and external market information….inclusion of the ‘forward-looking’ stock price in
the manager’s performance measure is one way to generate investment incentives.” This
conjecture implicitly assumes that the efficient market hypothesis holds, and the market
is at least semi-strong form efficient. By observing that “the role of stock prices can be
thought of as a form of intertemporal relative performance evaluation in which current
price serves as a benchmark for evaluating the manager’s future performance” (p. 1070),
the underlying assumption further requires the continuity of strategic purpose.
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Additionally, a chosen robust metric must be sensitive enough to differentiate pricing
dynamics relative to such changes. Detzler and Machuga (2002) deferred:
…since firms that undergo non-routine turnovers typically have
poor performance, it is especially important to control for firm
performance to isolate changes in discretionary financial variables
that are caused by changes in firm performance from those caused
by management manipulation. (p. 365)

Key financial metrics which detail the financial outcomes of operational
investment and marketing endeavors are critical to monitor through CEO transitions.
While market value added (MVA) is designated as “‘the definitive measure of corporate
success’” (Stern Stewart, 1996, as cited in Coles et al., 2001, p. 33), there is also evidence
that economic value added (EVA®) is a salient indicator of a firm’s utilization of assets,
and ability of the CEO and executive team to generate shareholder returns from asset
expenditures, adjusted by the cost of investment. Coles et al. (2001) disclosed results
which “indicate[d] a strong relationship between industry EVA® (or MVA) and
performance” (p. 39). Not only did these authors report a significant positive relationship
between EVA® and combined leadership structure, they also ascertained a “negative
relationship between the proportion of outside directors on the board, and CEO salary
sensitivity with MVA” (p. 39). Firm and industry EVA® were both correlated with
MVA, at a level of .436 (p. 40).
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Şabac (2007) provided further evidence of managerial tenure and performance
assessment; “the CEO’s power is based on perceived ability, which in turn is based on
observed past performance” (p. 849). The concept of CEO retention until retirement is
conducive to the strategic performance continuum; the moral hazard of turnover is thus
reduced and risk mitigated. Increased risk is also dependent upon the switching costs of
the agent’s subsequent renegotiation at the transpiration of turnover. Şabac construed:
“the general solution to the agency problem allows for considering a variety of
performance measurement systems, in particular, negatively auto-correlated accountingbased performance measures, and highlights the different implications of using different
performance measurement systems” (p. 850).
It is integral, from an operational as well as an agency incentive perspective, for
boards of directors to align performance metrics of organizations with those designating
the overall acceptability of CEO success. Puffer and Weintrop (1991) ascribed: “to the
extent that a performance measure reflects the board’s heuristic of differences from
expectations it should be an effective predictor of CEO turnover” (p. 1). Accordingly,
they employed a number of financial and accounting metrics to establish linkage from
performance to turnover, and established an underlying assumption that analysts’
forecasts could be utilized as a proxy for board expectations of performance, “because
much of the information analysts work with comes from executive officers of the firm
who are members of the board of directors or advisors to the board” (p. 2). Stock price is
often utilized as an exemplary metric, ubiquitously forming the basis of additional
compensation schemes designed to incentivize the agent to perform; it may be predicted
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with substantial accuracy by financial analysts. Arguably, systematic “exogenous factors”
may also unpredictably affect stock prices (p. 3). Therefore, a set of metrics which
provide a more comprehensive CEO performance litmus may be more effective in
assessing results over the long term, and should be instituted to develop “compensation
contracts...used to align the interests of the two parties” (p. 5). Despite their extensive
inclusion of independent variables (i.e., unexpected earnings per share, cumulative
abnormal returns, return on assets, return on equity, etc.), Puffer and Weintrop failed
initially to discover a significant relationship between any of the chosen performance
variables and CEO turnover (p. 10). However, in further development of a more
parsimonious model based upon the changes in expected EPS and market share, Puffer
and Weintrop recounted the significance of a negative relationship (p<.10) between CEO
turnover and the EPS comparison versus analyst forecasts and decline in market share (p.
13). The authors contended: “measures of differences between actual EPS and financial
analysts’ expectations, which served as a proxy for the board’s expectations, was
significant, whereas measures based on mechanical algorithms—changes in accounting
ratios...were not significant” (p. 15).
Within two studies, Farrell and Whidbee (2000, 2002) prescribed a significant
relationship between accounting performance and CEO turnover, in contrast to a
significant relationship between stock returns and CEO turnover. Fich and Shivdasani
(2006) denoted through an observation of US firms: “underperforming the industry by
50% in the prior year increases the probability of forced CEO turnover by 4.36
percentage points” (p. 714). Consistent with this assertion, Graham et al. (2005, p. 12)
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reflected: “managers believe that meeting benchmarks conveys future growth prospects
to investors…in sum, the dominant reasons to meet or beat earnings benchmarks relate to
stock prices” otherwise, an “information risk premium” (p. 25) may be expected by
investors. Achieving benchmarks invariably signals future predictability to investors,
which is critical from a valuation perspective; for this reason, “CFOs equate the idea of
smooth earnings with the desire to avoid negative earnings surprises (relative to earnings
targets)” (p. 25). As previously asserted, the burden of achieving forecasted results along
with pervasive informational asymmetry and a weak governance structure may present
the opportunity for an executive to engage in earnings manipulation.
Friedman and Singh (1989) conjectured:
…if a rational selection process has occurred, an appropriate
change in strategic direction is signaled. In such cases…the
greatest potential for adaptiveness and hence, a positive
stockholder reaction is likely…stockholder reaction to inside
successors is likely to be positive under conditions of good
performance. (p. 725)

The outcome of their empirical tests revealed significant (p<.01) results for the
interaction between variables representing performance and cumulative abnormal returns,
as well as an inverse relationship to turnover (Friedman & Singh,1989, p. 734). However,
outcomes were contrary to their original hypothesis “origin [of the successor] is not a
significant predictor of stockholder reaction in any of the regression models shown” (p.
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738). “Results of this study support the notion that stockholder reactions to successions
are heterogenous,” (p. 738); these findings indicate ambivalent or latent reactions among
shareholders to corporate control events, which is typical of results of event studies.
Utilizing “a matched sample of ‘non change’ firms (control group)” as compared
to firms experiencing CEO change, Sheikholesami, Wilson, and Selin (1998, pp. 73-74)
disclosed the existence of a “marginally” significant relationship (p<.08 for all variables)
between time horizon and change versus non change firms and analyst forecast accuracy.
Disclosure of the event led to appropriate analytical “attention directing” which provided
greater scrutiny of fundamentals fueling equity pricing given news dissemination; results
“indicate[d] that the forecast precision has improved more for CEO change firms than for
control firms” (p. 74).
Stathopoulos, Espenlaub, and Walker (2005) stratified samples given financial
results of UK firms into highly performing, mid-performing, and poorly performing, and
attested to a truncated tenure for CEOs within the poorly performing sub-sample; “CEOs
of poorly performing firms are significantly more likely to be dismissed...[these are]
companies that have experienced a performance ‘shock’” (pp. 89-92). Results of their
study were conjectured to have been impacted by the adoption of the Cadbury
Committee’s advisement on governance (i.e., dichotomizing the role of CEO and Board
Chair among UK entities). “The turnover more than triples after bad abnormal
performance…this corresponds to an increase of 8 percent in the occurrence of CEO
turnover in poor performers in year t + 1” (p. 102) or nearly eight times the rate of good
and mid performers. Stathopoulos et al. (2005) also disclosed that among entities
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represented in their three stratified samples, with respect to compensation, “the CEOs of
poorly performing companies are better-off than their counterparts in the well performing
firms” (p. 103). These authors also suggested that the primary governance mechanism
within the UK sample was CEO removal rather than overall compensation decline, and
CEOs are “well protected under their current contract (even in extreme cases of poor
corporate performance)” (p. 104). Young (1998) echoed similar theoretical tenets:
“turnover frequency may reflect the fact that measures short of outright dismissal (e.g.,
pay adjustments, early retirement, etc.) are the preferred method for correcting
performance problems in the corporate sector” (p. 1125).
Summary
Chapter 2 contained the breadth of research on CEO turnover. Such executive
replacements occur through the normal course of retirements and resignations, however,
these events may also be precipitated by a continuous exhibition of poor operational and
financial performance. As Clayton et al. (2005) ascertained: “a change in executive
leadership is a significant event in the life of a firm” (p. 1779). Assuredly, through
differing applications of leadership styles and strategies, a change in executive personnel
has the potential to exert pronounced operational impact upon a firm. In recounting the
results of prior studies of CEO succession, the circumstances precipitating replacement as
well as the source (internal or external) of successor may augur an equally significant
impact upon financial outcomes. Within Collins’s (2001) sample, significant results of
volatility tests within the time-series selected for observation will represent a departure
from and an enhancement to the original sampling objectives and methodology. As such,
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the litmus an entity’s board applies to justify the replacement decision and the source of
the successor may vary according to political and organizational structure, governance
structure, and ownership structure. Further, agency effects due to entrenchment may
become prevalent as an entity’s board seeks to unseat a deficiently performing executive.
The degree of organizational inertia often predicates the board’s proclivity to act in the
event of a requisite executive replacement.
Financial metrics provide appropriate data regarding performance; the board
utilizes metrics derived from accounting and financial markets regarding executive
achievement. To perform an analysis of the differentiated results given a change in
executive within an extraordinarily performing entity, both accounting and finance
metrics are useful to gauge the propriety of reaction among investors given the
dissemination of accounting information regarding the firm.
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Chapter 3: Research Method
Introduction
Through the application of a quantitative ex-post facto research design, statistics
indicative of the incidence of CEO turnover, as well as accounting performance and risk
analysis, were analyzed in order to complete tests of significance for five separately
identified metrics. As the sample was indicative of that contained within a foundational
piece of management literature, a prior analysis of the data existed (Collins, 2001).
Financial data for relevant years under study were collected and analyzed to reveal
whether significant statistical differences exists distinguishing financial performance
outcomes prior to and post the qualifying CEO replacement event, which served as a
nonmanipulated variable. Data was obtained from publicly available sources, including
Moody’s Industrial Manual and its modern electronic successor,
www.mergentonline.com, as well as the United States Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC) online database. Spreadsheet software programs as well as statistical
software programs were utilized to complete the required data analysis. Findings are
presented in both numeric and graphical formats, as appropriate. These unique tests
conducted and documented herein provide an extended framework for evaluating the
significance of the main effects of executive turnover upon high performing firms in the
financial context.
Description of the Research Design
To assess whether optimal financial performance was affected given chief
executive turnover, a series of financial metrics was compared through a time-series
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analysis of relevant intervals prior and subsequent to the replacement event. As derived
from the literature, risk-related fundamental financial metrics which capture volatility
impounded within current stock prices and historic accounting returns which capture the
internal performance of firms are often employed as a statistically testable source of
variability in accordance with a change in CEO. These metrics were designated to serve
as proxies for operational implementation of transformational strategic change by the
CEO, stockholder reaction to the CEO turnover event announcement, and overall risk to
the firm through observed reaction to and measured perception of market participants
prior to and post a qualifying event.
The quantitative ex-post facto experimental design elements were modeled after
the volatility event tests of Clayton et al. (2005): “a majority of [authors] perform a
volatility event study based on a comparison of the variability of equity price changes
before and after the event to determine the volatility impact of the event” (p. 1793). To
address fiscal linkage to the manifestation of transformational leadership, accountingbased metrics were comparatively employed at the time-series interval advocated by
Clayton et al. (2005, p. 1802): “from the fiscal year prior to the turnover (t-1) to the
second fiscal year after the turnover year (t+2).” Return on equity, as utilized by Cannella
Jr. and Lubatkin (1993, p. 773), was employed as a proxy for transformational leadership,
by calculating “income before extraordinary items and discontinued operations as
reported during the fiscal year prior to the year of succession,” as noted within the
analysis of Clayton et al. (2005). The time-series of the initial metric was identical within
these two studies. However, whereas Cannella Jr. and Lubatkin (1993) proceeded to
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employ a comparison of entity results versus industry average designated by Standard
Industry Code (SIC), Clayton et al. utilized entity metrics for successive time-series as
indicated.
Controlling for performance limited the influence of other factors during the
initial period of selection; however, through continued longitudinal analysis,
differentiable performance occurring as a result of CEO replacement has the potential to
transpire in a continuum, edifying the effects of governance and strategic continuity.
These tests were thus based on temporal precedence of turnover prior to the observable
erosion of financial performance. Since the outcomes sought within this analytical
context were driven by past events, an ex-post facto design was suitably employed. “Expost facto designs provide an alternative means by which a researcher can investigate the
extent to which specific independent variables…may possibly affect the dependent
variable(s) of interest” (Leedy & Ormrod, 2005, p. 232). This is a basic approach applied
in financial research, particularly in event studies, as variables cannot be manipulated for
the sole purpose of experimentation in research.
A weakness of the ex-post facto design is inherent as “the experimenter cannot
control for confounding variables that may provide alternative explanations for any group
differences that are observed” (Leedy & Ormrod, 2005, p. 232). However, financial
statements are more revealing by design and generally authentic and transparent in
recounting the monetary outcomes of operational decision making within the firm
context. Particularly, there is a consistent convergence of unqualified audit opinions and
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an absence of material restatements among the sampled entities for the periods under
investigation.
This was a pretest / posttest multiple baseline design; the differing time-series
under investigation constituted experiences as indicated through transpiration of the
turnover event. In the case of experimentation in other social research areas, conclusions
of cause and effect are limited in application. Conversely, related conclusions regarding
factors leading to the turnover event and significance of the data were drawn through an
observation of the underlying financial data, due to its revealing nature.
Hence, the choice of inclusion for multiple financial metrics was initiated to elicit
research responses which aid in the assertion of relationships between accounting based
performance metrics, market based risk measures, and strategic change. The observed
magnitude of return on assets and Tobin’s q indicated whether asset utilization and
external stockholder response were aligned as the replacement event occurred.
To determine the turnover year(s) applicable to CEO and firm, the Forbes Survey
of CEO Compensation (http://www.forbes.com/2004/04/21/04ceoland .html) was used
and compared across annual time-series intervals. The Mergent Online Database, http://0www.mergentonline.com.helin.uri.edu/compsearch.asp, was also utilized as a source for
financial and CEO information, as applicable.
Population and Sample
The population under study was that of entities experiencing a chief executive
officer replacement which Collins (2001) identified within his analysis; presence or
condition of CEO replacement represented not a treatment but a nonmanipulated
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independent variable which delimited the sample under study to the annual financial
results of those entities experiencing such a change in personnel prior to and post the
replacement event. Conjecture that the fiscal effectiveness of strategic changes
implemented by a replaced CEO were presaged to be detectable through a time-series
financial analysis of accounting metrics and market measures of risk delimits this study
to publicly held enterprises for which market information may be acquired through
conventional access. Equity prices of companies are affected by the general reaction of
market participants, as defined by investors who are shareholders or market makers
within the securities market context.
The grid below summarizes the population from which the sample was drawn.
Collins (2001, p.7) identified a “transition point” in firm performance for the eleven
entities outlined in his analysis which indicated the inception of exceptional results. The
original years of Collins’s analysis are distinguished by an asterisk; the financial
performance and CEO replacement events of these entities were scrutinized commencing
at the inception of the transition point and concluding with the fiscal performance of
2008, published through SEC reporting in 2009 and indicated in the grid by an arrow. For
firms which were subsequently acquired since Collins’s text was published, in particular,
Gillette, data analysis was limited to that obtainable through public records disseminated
prior to delisting.

Table 1
Population and Sample

Financial Reporting Year
64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 Total
Firm Name
Abbott Laboratories

* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > >

35

Circuit City

* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * > > > > > > > > > > >

27

Fannie Mae

* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * > > > > > > > > >

25

Gillette
Kimberly Clark

* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * > > > > > > > > >

25

* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > >

37

* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > >

36

* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > >

34

* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > >

45

* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > >

36

Walgreen's

* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > >

34

Wells Fargo

* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * > > > > > > > > > >

26

Kroger
Nucor Steel
Philip Morris (Altria)
Pitney Bowes

Total Firm Years

1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 4 5 7 7 7 7 7 8 8 9 10 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 10 10 10 10 360

* = Collins' identified exceptional financial growth years

> = research years extended to examine financial results of CEO change
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The firms included in the sampling frame were: Abbott Laboratories; Circuit City;
Federal National Mortgage Association, or Fannie Mae; Gillette, now merged with
Proctor and Gamble; Kimberly-Clark; Kroger Foods; Nucor Steel; Philip Morris
Company, now Altria; Pitney Bowes Company; Walgreen Company; and Wells Fargo
(Collins, 2001). The financial results of high performance years as purported by Collins
for each firm were examined beginning with each applicable interval, differing by firm.
Since much of the research addressing CEO replacements to date was conducted
within the syntax of stratified financial performance sampling, such results would be
generalizable to the relevant population of firms within the market from which the data
was derived. Distinguishing the chosen sample as those entities profiled in Collins’s
(2001) text limits the population to those eleven entities which were highly performing
both operationally and financially, as underscored within the ascribed limitations,
generalizability of results of this study may be limited. Collins’s assertions of prevailing
excellence in leadership among the companies within the sample allowed for tests of
sustainability of strategic outcomes achieved under an individual’s tenure.
Selection of this particular sample delimited the influence of some exogenous or
systematic market variables, as it was by definition a nonprobability purposive sample.
The sample was a census in which every member of the population is analyzed for
inclusion given the presence of a qualifying event. Since the firms in Collins’s (2001)
sample were all high performing, most strategies were sustainable and most leaders were
effective in combating or mastering the effects of economic and environmental forces
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affecting the firm; this was pervasive during the tenure of the CEOs profiled within the
text. Hence, the chosen census was characteristically differentiated from prior research
samples which considered the entire population of the market in that high performance,
strategic continuity, and presence of a CEO leadership legacy were all relevant among
the entire tested population. Whereas prior studies, most notably, Clayton et al. (2005)
utilized a sample of entities subject to CEO turnover, but did not feature stratification of
the heterogeneous sample according to realized financial performance, the intent in
utilizing Collins’s (2001) sample for the study was to determine the degree of change in
accounting and financial performance which resulted from a change in leadership among
exceptionally performing firms. Further rationale was that results of this study are
potentially generalizable specifically to exceptionally performing firms; contrastingly,
samples derived from a larger population include the performance of poorly performing
firms, which may not be generalizable to highly performing firms. The probability of
CEO turnover and the choice of successor type, whether insider, follower, or outsider,
have both been correlated to firm financial performance by a myriad of researchers
(Farrell & Whidbee, 2005; Fich & Shivdasani, 2006; et al.). An intimate understanding
of the propriety of strategic personnel fit in the turnover circumstance assists in the
development of appropriate succession planning strategies for a continuum of firm
financial performance.
Instrumentation
Initially, the published balance sheets, statements of income, and selected stock
data applicable to each firm for the 360 reporting years ascribed in the above grid were
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recorded manually within an Excel spreadsheet format for years prior to 1994, and
obtained from an online data base for years subsequent to 1994. The data collection
exercise was performed to facilitate calculation of Tobin’s q and beta financial metrics as
well as the return on assets, economic value added, and market value added accounting
metrics applicable to the historical population. As a condition of testing, metrics of the
aforementioned companies comprising the sampling frame were compared pre-and-post
to the conditional change of CEO replacement; these metrics served as the independent
variables under investigation; the CEO replacement event serves as the nonmanipulated
dependent variable. The test of Hypothesis 1 specifically entailed the experimentation of
the annual probability rate of CEO replacement for Collins’s (2001) sample of firms
versus that was also entailed in the research of Comte and Mihal (1990), which addressed
the historical rate of CEO turnover for US public firms during the years 1945 through
1984. The tests of Hypotheses 2 and 3 entailed a pre-and-post CEO replacement timeseries analysis of the exogenous financial metrics Tobin’s q and beta. The tests of
Hypotheses 4, 5, and 6 entailed a pre-and-post CEO replacement time-series analysis of
the endogenous accounting metrics return on assets or ROA, economic value added or
EVA®, and the hybrid market value added or MVA, respectively. As EVA® and MVA
are absolute measures of firm performance, the annual financial statement outcomes must
be inflation adjusted for these items. The source for US inflation adjustment employed is
available at http://data.bls.gov/cgi-bin/cpicalc.pl. The test of Hypothesis 7 entailed an
analysis of variance, testing interactions between the variables of the financial and
accounting metrics ascribed. Accordingly, a test of multicollinearity was performed in the
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form of an F-test to determine the existing level of interrelatedness among these
dependent variables. Comparison of financial and accounting metrics as ascribed served
as the instrumentation of the experiments. Parametric tests of statistical significance, as
entailed in the hypotheses, were conducted subsequent to the sampling and calculation of
the relevant interval of CEO tenure as documented in Collins’s (2001) volume.
Data Collection Procedures
All financial data utilized within this study was derived from publicly available
resources. Interpretive background and analysis of the personal qualities of the CEO
under study for any particular firm was garnered from Collins’s (2001) summary of
highly performing entities, or factual data from the firm’s annual financial reporting filed
with the Securities and Exchange Commission of the United States, or the SEC. As
previously designated, the time-series of financial results within Collins’s sample differ
by firm, according to the inception of the period of high performance in which the firm
earned returns which significantly exceeded the general market return for the same
interval. With the earliest year of Collins’s analysis being 1964 and the latest being 1999,
the earliest time frame of results was not readily available electronically through the SEC
electronic resource database known as EDGAR. Principal sources of financial data prior
to 1994 were annual entries within Moody’s Industrial Manual, an investor resource of
compiled annual financial data. Data for financial statements published within the last 15
years was also harvested from the Mergent Online database, http://0www.mergentonline.com.helin.uri.edu/compsearch.asp, a successor of Moody’s through
which financial data in worksheet format and extensive commentary for investor and
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academic analysis are available. Certain of these financial statement elements, as
mentioned, were adjusted for inflation. Relative measures of financial statement data
utilizing dollarized measures in all ratio inputs did not require conversion; however, as
certain ratios and metrics included a dollarized financial statement element in a single
input, this element required conversion to a reference point in time to ensure relative
comparison. To facilitate this exercise, the Bureau of Labor Statistics website was
utilized to convert relevant measures: http://data.bls.gov/cgi-bin/cpicalc.pl. The relevant
elements were converted into 2008 US dollars. Following the calculation of all relevant
test metrics, the data was identified for inclusion within the sample. The data was
compiled and analysis completed within a spreadsheet format (Microsoft Excel) or
statistical package as appropriate.
Data Analysis
The time-series under investigation varied according to the applicable interval as
indicated in Collins’s (2001) study. To adequately assess differing financial performance
levels for the firms’ time-series under comparison, the approach of Clayton et al. (2005,
p. 1794), utilizing standard deviations calculated in accordance with a five-year period: at
(t-2), (t-1), (t), (t+1), (t+2), and (t+3) was employed. This represented a longitudinal
analysis of annualized financial results, the most comprehensive of which spans a period
exceeding four decades. As Clayton et al. also tested the volatility of financial results of
other intervals circumscribing the event date based on a stratified sample of CEO
replacement type, it will be informative to develop the same interval for investigation,
pending data availability. In general, nearly all CEOs within the population under study
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were sourced from within the firm. Tests of significance were conducted for each
individual firm. The regression derived from the set of five control variables, accounting
and finance metrics Tobin’s q, beta, ROA, EVA®, and MVA, were observed for
robustness, as entailed by the correlation coefficient, given a test for multicollinearity.
Within this analysis of variance application, the difference in the five metrics pre-andpost turnover served as independent variables. The observed p-values for each of the
variables were utilized to assert inferences regarding the robustness of the resultant
statistical model. In the event of an indication of multicollinearity, systematic
improvements to the model were suggested in order to robustly enhance its predictive
value.
Significance of volatility was tested through the employment of a standard
parametric F-test for the ratio of variances, derived from sample standard deviations of
each applicable finance or accounting metric of the sample squared. The time-series
interval advocated by Clayton et al. (2005, p. 1794) required standard deviations to be
calculated in accordance with a five-year period: at (t-2), (t-1), (t), (t+1), (t+2),and (t+3);
“volatility is calculated as the standard deviation of returns over the event year” (p.
1795). Volatility in the applicable capital asset pricing model (or CAPM) over the same
time period capturing was indirectly tested through the employment of the F-test for beta.
Note that the CAPM is employed as the covariance of the equity return against the
market return divided by the variance of the market return (Sharpe, 1972, p. 93). Tobin’s
q, a measure of the total market value of the firm divided by total asset value of the firm,
is a metric that has not yet been applied in research to discern and identify the risk
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content of a CEO replacement event; however, it is a formidable litmus utilized to
characterize stockholder value perception in many other financial contexts. Directional
consistency was expected to occur across a time-series analysis between the beta metric
and the Tobin’s q metric, representing convergence of the stockholder perception of
enterprise asset value. This assertion was commented upon pending the completion of
Hypotheses tests 2 and 3, and indicated in Chapter 5. The efficient markets hypothesis, or
the extant impounding of monetary implications of extant events affecting the entity,
whether internal or exogenous, was also indirectly tested. Further, the robustness of beta,
or the covariance of the entity's stock price versus the variance of the market, was
addressed and tested to determine if this metric was sensitive to stock price movements
which result due to a change in executive leadership.
The EVA® metric is more conducive to differentiating risk to the firm, as it
captures the cost-of-capital and the change in the cost of capital relative to a change in
leadership. As EVA® is a managerially oriented metric, its complement, MVA, is
market-oriented metric. Hence, it is useful to calculate and compare both measures of
value added, addressing the intrinsic addition of value and the extrinsic perception of
added value. Coles et al. (2001) purported:
The EVA® measure, which contains a weighted average cost of capital, explicitly
controls for the riskiness of the firm. The MVA measure only accounts for the
actual accumulated value of the firm, but the risk factor borne by investors to
obtain this value is not explicitly reflected in the MVA measure. (p. 43)
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A qualitative commentary of the factors influencing the performance of each firm
given a CEO turnover event was undertaken following the data analysis. Given
contemporaneous and precipitous market declines experienced in the 2008 reporting year
for many public firms, it was integral to interpret statistical findings if CEO change
occurred during the reporting year. Although Collins’s (2001) analytical classification
technique warranted investigation as certain firms within his prior sample were no longer
going concerns, it was revealing to perform financial analysis and differentiate factors
which precipitated significant value erosion among these firms, and introduce techniques
which enhance or refute prior approaches. Qualitative aspects and quantitative financial
trends were reviewed and compared intra and inter firm for factors influencing risk
differentiation as identified in the literature review. These descriptive and revealing
qualitative aspects ascribed financial results by providing ancillary explanations which
asserted reasons for the direction of data influence. This paralleled the technique of
Clayton et al. (2005) in which “alternative explanations for volatility changes” (p. 1787)
were sought through research technique. Potential aspects of governance which
precipitate executive turnover, including agency effects and hierarchical firm structure,
were identified in the literature review and may be qualitatively related as explanations
for trends and significance discovered through data analysis.
Summary
A test of financial performance outcomes of strategic continuity, given the
presence of CEO replacement, was conducted in order to provide evidence for and
operationalize an assertion regarding the research question: given a change in chief

105
executive within a highly performing firm, can strategic continuity of financial results be
sustained subsequent to departure? The relative frequency of CEO changes among highly
performing firms within Collins’s (2001) sample are compared to the results of Comte
and Mihal’s (1990) 80 randomly selected sample of Fortune 500 firms spanning the years
1945-1984.
The financial performance of all eleven firms in Collins’s (2001) seminal work
were reviewed for the years of coverage of Collins’s research, and extended to the
reporting year of dissemination, 2007. Level of significance of change in financial and
accounting metrics Tobin’s q, beta, ROA, EVA®, and MVA, was determined and
presented, as well as a test of interaction of all metrics, serving as independent variables
within a binary logistic regression. Qualitative commentary as well as interpretations,
convergences to, and divergences from Collins’s assertions and observations is presented
in both statistical and graphical format where appropriate.
The data collection process for this research effort has been approved by the
Institutional Review Board of Walden University, approval # 06-29-09-0305190.

.
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Chapter 4: Results
Introduction
This chapter contains the statistical results of hypothesis testing conducted on the
financial ratios for the sample of firms as detailed in Collins’s (2001) analysis and
extended time-series, given the presence of chief executive replacement events. The
incidence rate of chief executive turnover as compared to prior studies and tested in
Hypothesis 1 is statistically analyzed for significance through the application of a
studentized t test. The establishment of a leadership legacy by the incumbent chief
executive hinges upon the presence of volatility in financial metrics as compared to a
successor. Thus, F tests that provide indication of the statistical significance of the
variance of the metrics asserted within the hypothesis tests are conducted in conjunction
with hypotheses 2 through 6. The significance of each of five ratios as independent
variables in a predictor equation of chief executive turnover (prior versus post event
comparison) is presented in support of Hypothesis 7.
To provide an additional point of comparison to that of the sampled time-series (t2), (t-1), (t), (t+1), (t+2), and (t+3), which aligned with the prior research approach taken
by Clayton et al. (2005), an F-test of the volatility of financial ratios is also conducted for
the time-series representing the entire tenure of the chief executive officer, in comparison
to the performance of that of the successor executive. This additional comparison departs
from the Clayton et al. study and provides edification as to whether a traditional event
study approach yield results similar to that of a longitudinal study of expanded length,
which would presumably demonstrate tempered results, as conjectured a priori. An
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expanded interval exhibiting less volatility results in differentiation from typical event
studies in which investor trading precipitates increased volatility as the event date
transpires, during an interval immediately circumscribing the event date.
Contents of this chapter are presented thus: a data description within which the
resources utilized in the procurement of data are enumerated; tests of hypothesis: Ratio
Analysis, within which the results of a Studentized t test and F tests performed to
examine volatility among financial metrics by firm for hypotheses 1 through 6 are
enumerated; and Test of Hypothesis: Regression, within which the results of a regression
analysis performed to examine the significance of independent variables (i.e., ratios
tested in hypotheses 2 through 6) to the dependent variable, pre-and-post CEO turnover.
The chapter concludes with a brief Summary
Data Description
The primary source of financial data for the analyses conducted herein was the
electronic successor of Moody’s Industrial Manual, Mergent Online. It is noted that
Collins’s (2009) team also utilized Moody’s reporting to develop a quantitative analysis
of firms under review; hence, sources of data essentially align. Further reliable support
for notable events or recognized trends providing support to observations was garnered
from the sample firms’ US Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) annual 10K
filings; generally, electronic filings were procured through the Mergent Online portal
which provides electronic access to EDGAR, the SEC’s Electronic Data Gathering,
Analysis, and Retrieval System. A firm’s management’s discussion and analysis included
in SEC reporting, as well as notes to the financial statements provide insight with respect
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to past or contemporaneous material or strategic events. Each firm’s balance sheet,
income statement, and daily equity prices were extracted from the aforementioned
website in a spreadsheet format for the maximum retrievable annual reporting time frame
of 15 years. For most firms, this retrieval began with the reporting year 2008 and
concluded with the reporting year 1994. The exception to this was the analysis of Gillette,
as it had been procured by another entity after 2004. To the extent that Collins’s (2001)
analytical interval extended further into the chronological past, the data were obtained
from the firm’s earliest obtainable SEC 10K reporting first, then complemented with
earlier required data from Moody’s Industrial or Financial Services Manual, as
applicable. All calculations of relevant data comprising empirical and fundamental
analyses were originated from the data retrieved; if the ratio under examination was
available for retrieval directly from the Mergent Online website, it was recalculated in
order that, should it be subject to further analysis on separate componentized
fundamentals, analyses would reveal trends integral to further conclusions.
In order to support the calculation of dollars of relevant weighted average cost of
capital required to complete the computation of EVA®, an Excel spreadsheet was
retrieved from www.stern.nyu.edu/~adamodar/pc/ wacccalc.xls (Damodaran, n.d.). The
reconciliation of the weighted average of debt issues outstanding by dollar amount,
maturity, and applicable interest rate were conducted through the review of each firm’s
10K debt disclosures or Moody’s Industrial or Bank & Finance Manual, as applicable. In
addition, the beta of each firm’s equity was calculated from the derived covariance of two
years of stock price movements versus the market. In the event that the stock price
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movements were not retrievable from Mergent Online, the subsequent period’s beta
calculation was utilized for the calculation of the weighted average cost of capital and the
statistical calculation required to test Hypothesis 3. In certain cases in which stock price
movements could not be determined, the test of beta for that event was excluded.
As modeled after the research of Clayton et al. (2005), the delimited sample was
utilized for the hypothesis testing. It was drawn from the population of 360 firm years
which includes ratios calculated for the entire sample and extracted from the time-series
interval in accordance with a five-year period: at (t-2), (t-1), (t), (t+1), (t+2),and (t+3). In
addition, due to the heightened sensitivity of the F-test employed for statistical analysis
when samples are limited in size, F-tests of ratios were also conducted for an expanded
interval which began with the year following the turnover as tenure began; this was
compared to the performance interval for the entire tenure of the CEO successor for
hypothesis tests two through seven.
Test of Hypotheses: Ratio Analysis
1. Hypothesis 1: Measurement of CEO change rate within Collins’ sample,
an indicator of the stability of firms within the sample.
Hø: There will be no significant difference in the rate of CEO
change evident in the time-series analysis of the entities within
Collins’ sample for the period t=15, as compared to a multiyear
sample within the literature spanning a time frame representative
of Collins’ sample.
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Ha: There will be a significant difference in the rate of CEO
change evident in the time-series analysis of the entities within
Collins’s sample for the period t=15, as compared to a multiyear
sample within the literature spanning a time frame representative
of Collins’s entities.
Comte and Mihal (1990) documented executive turnover events for four decades,
a time-series which extended from 1945 through 1984. The randomly selected sample
originated from Fortune 500 firms, and was further dichotomized into two twenty year
subsamples, the second of which spanned the years 1965 through 1984. This body of
research based on the named decades most closely aligned with the fifteen year spans of
observation performed by Collins (2001) for the relevant census, the earliest and latest of
which began in 1964 and 1984, respectively. Comte and Mihal (1990) denoted firms
comprising the sample displayed higher, similar, and lower turnover rates for the second
two decades under observation; data provided within a frequency histogram of their
findings was expressed as a percentage frequency. The average CEO turnover across all
of the 80 firms sampled in these classes was 9 % for the years 1965 through 1984 (p. 48).
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Table 2
Descriptive Statistics: CEO Turnover for Collins’s (2001) and extended samples

Firm Name

Initial
Year

15 yr
freq

%
freq

Final
Year
Total
Total
extended sample % Total sample
sample
freq
freq
years

Abbott Laboratories

74

1

6.67

08

3

8.57

Circuit City

82

1

6.67

08

3

11.11

35
27

Fannie Mae

84

2

13.33

08

4

16.00

25

Gillette

80

1

6.67

04

3

12.00

25

Kimberly Clark

72

0

0.00

08

2

5.41

37

Kroger

73

1

6.67

08

3

8.33

36

Nucor Steel

75

0

0.00

08

3

8.82

34

Philip Morris (Altria)

64

1

6.67

08

6

13.33

45

Pitney Bowes

73

1

6.67

08

3

8.33

36

Walgreen's

75

0

0.00

08

4

11.76

34

Wells Fargo

83

1

6.67

08

3

11.54

26

37

10.28

360

Total CEO Turnover Events
Standard Deviations

9

5.45
4.02

2.92

The table above displays the descriptive statistical calculation of the mean CEO
turnover for Collins’s (2001) sample, and the extended sample as ascribed within Table
1, denoting 360 firm reporting years. During that time, the mean frequency turnover
percentage was 5.45 %. To statistically compare this to Comte and Mihal’s (1990)
sample, as the variance of that sample is not known, a t-test was conducted to determine
whether the mean as calculated above is significantly different than the mean value of 9
% as reported.
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Figure 1. CEO Turnover Frequency.
The Hypothesis 1 test is thus indicated as:
Hø: µ = 9%.
Ha: µ ≠ 9%.
The sample t-statistic is defined as follows:

=

. Hypothesis testing

will primarily be completed at the 95% confidence level. The critical value of the tstatistic at 10 degrees of freedom and an assumed 95% confidence level for a two-tailed
test is ±2.228.
Calculation of the t-statistic for the initial 15 year sample indicated by Collins
(2001) yields a value of -2.929. Hence, the null hypothesis may be rejected in favor of the
alternative at the 95% level of confidence, that the mean CEO turnover rate occurring
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within Collins’s 15 year sample statistically is significantly different from that of Comte
and Mihal’s (1990) sample.
Calculation of the t-statistic at the 95% confidence level for the extended sample
continued through 2008 (or until acquisition or liquidation as applicable by firm) yields a
value of 1.454. Hence, the null hypothesis may not be rejected in favor of the alternative
at the 95% level of confidence. The mean CEO turnover rate occurring among Collins’s
(2001) highly performing firms extended sample is not statistically different from that of
Comte and Mihal’s (1990) sample. An extension of the sample to include more recent
experience does not statistically differentiate the mean CEO turnover of highly
performing firms from the results reported by Comte and Mihal at the 95% confidence
level. In addition, the results of the test of Hypothesis 1 for the extended sample further
support the finding present in the research of Comte and Mihal, that the mean CEO
turnover rate continued to increase as time progressed and the interval was expanded.
Hypothesis 2: Measurement of stockholder reaction to CEO change, intrafirm.
Hø: There will be no significant stockholder reaction to CEO
change evident in the time-series analysis of the Tobin’s q metric
for entities within Collins’s sample for the period t-2 and the
period t+3, where t represents the year of CEO change.
Ha: There will be a significant stockholder reaction to CEO
change evident in the time-series analysis of the Tobin’s q metric
for entities within Collins’s sample for the period t-2 and the
period t+3, where t represents the year of CEO change.
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Tobin’s q may be employed as a determinant of investor perception of market
value of assets. To the extent that a point value for market price at the balance sheet date
is correlated with the general trend in the direction of market price, then price will have
revealing valuation qualities, although price may be significantly differentiated from
book. Clayton et al. (2005) empirically tested the statistical significance of volatility of
the Tobin’s q metric for firms experiencing CEO turnover as compared to their sector (p.
1797).
Results of the test of Hypothesis 2 were mixed; a statistical test of volatility as
measured through an F-test of variance revealed that stockholder reaction is fairly
sensitive, in some instances, to the event as measured within the interval confined
immediately prior and subsequent to the CEO change. Thus, metrics were computed at
the interval when the departing executive’s impact on financial performance is
conjectured to be influential, i.e., t-2 representing the year of the turnover event less two
years, and conversely, inconsequential, i.e., t+3. If turnover occurred subsequent to 2006,
a completed pair of observations could not be drawn; hence, for events so affected, the
observation was excluded from the analysis. The number of turnover events affected by
this exclusion is eight. Additionally, if the sampled intervals representing the entire CEO
tenure resulted in a single year between events subsequent to the turnover, the F-test for
the event was undefined, for the degrees of freedom in the denominator amounted to
zero. As certain events also resulted in degrees of freedom of zero in the numerator, these
were also excluded. The number of events affected by either of these potential anomalies
was eight.
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Table 3 below details the results of hypothesis testing for the Tobin’s q metric for
Collins’s (2001) interval extended for each firm through fiscal 2008 for the time frame
indicated by Clayton et al. (2005). In addition the extended interval over the entire tenure
for which the metric prior and subsequent to each turnover was measured from the
inception of Collins’s (2001) analysis through fiscal 2008. For turnover events within
Collins’s (2001) extended time-series of eleven firms through 2008 utilizing the Clayton
et al. (2005) t-2 vs t+3 sampling, the test of variance of the Tobin’s q metric yielded a
statistically significant F-test at the 95% confidence level for three of the pre-versus-post
CEO turnover events of the total sample of 29 turnovers emerging from the financial
history of Collins’s (2001) eleven selected firms. These were: Kimberly Clark, 2003;
Kroger, 1989; and Walgreen Company, 2005. This statistical result implies that for
approximately 10.34 % of the CEO turnover events sampled, shareholders were sensitive
to the potential change in market value of the firm which coincided with a succinct
interval circumscribing the event; shareholders promptly reacted to the perceived change
in market value, despite a brief comparison interval.
In contrast to the results provided through the modeled application of the Clayton
et al. (2005) interval, the expanded interval documenting results of the entire tenure of the
chief executive supported the conjecture that shareholder sensitivity, as measured through
the Tobin’s q metric, more prevalently yielded a statistically significant F-test at the 95%
confidence level. Over a prolonged time-series which encompassed the CEO’s entire
tenure, shareholders were thus more highly sensitive to a total of nine, or 31.04 %, of
turnover events, which were: Fannie Mae, 1989 and 1998; Gillette, 1990 and 1999;
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Kimberly Clark, 2003; Kroger, 1977 and 2003; Philip Morris, 2002; and Wells Fargo
2001. Statistically significant results at the 95% confidence level are designated by the
double asterisk included to the left of the F-test result.
Table 3
F-Tests: Tobin’s q for Collins’s (2001) and extended samples

Firm Name

Turnover
Year

Tobin's Q t-2 vs. t+3
F-test of
F-critical
variance
α = .05

Firm Name

Turnover
Year

Tobin's Q full tenure
F-test of
F-critical
variance
α = .05

Abbott Laboratories

1978

61.18

199.50

Abbott Laboratories

1978

7.43

8.81

Abbott Laboratories

1989

13.34

199.50

Abbott Laboratories

1989

1.18

3.29

Abbott Laboratories

1998

1.62

199.50

Abbott Laboratories

1998

3.10

3.68

Circuit City

1987

1.80

199.50

Circuit City

1987

1.36

3.59

Circuit City

2000

8.05

18.51

Circuit City

2000

1.09

3.36

Fannie Mae

1989

2.22

199.50

Circuit City

2005

2.73

224.60

Fannie Mae

1998

5.55

18.51

Fannie Mae

1989

9.02 **

Fannie Mae

2005

1.65

18.51

Fannie Mae

1998

17.25 **

Gillette

1990

14.83

18.51

Fannie Mae

2005

Gillette

1999

8.02

18.51

Gillette

1990

3.61 **

3.29

Gillette

2001

7.36

199.50

Gillette

1999

40.50 **

6.04

Kimberly Clark

1991

2.20

199.50

Kimberly Clark

1991

Kimberly Clark

2003

21.04 **

18.51

Kimberly Clark

2003

10.22 **

5.96

Kroger

1977

12.73

199.50

Kroger

1977

205.67 **

8.79

Kroger

1989

24.99 **

18.51

Kroger

1989

1.50

Kroger

2003

6.60

18.51

Kroger

2003

9.35 **

Nucor Steel

1995

5.51

18.51

Nucor Steel

1995

1.97

19.45

Nucor Steel

1999

1.63

18.51

Nucor Steel

1999

1.76

19.35

Nucor Steel

2000

2.2584

199.50

Nucor Steel

2000

2.41

8.89

Philip Morris (Altria)

1978

26.92

199.50

Philip Morris (Altria)

1978

1.68

8.71

Philip Morris (Altria)

1983

12.91

199.50

Philip Morris (Altria)

1983

1.32

4.35

Philip Morris (Altria)

1992

2.75

18.51

Philip Morris (Altria)

1992

1.76

3.73

Philip Morris (Altria)

2002

2.49

199.50

Philip Morris (Altria)

2002

4.99 **

4.39

Pitney Bowes

1983

37.94

199.50

Pitney Bowes

1983

2.87

3.10

Pitney Bowes

1996

2.21

199.50

Pitney Bowes

1996

1.05

2.90

Walgreen's

1998

2.38

18.51

Walgreen's

1998

4.29

19.45

Walgreen's

2005

3,179.72 **

199.50

Walgreen's

2002

9.71

19.00

Wells Fargo

1995

9.75

199.50

Wells Fargo

1995

1.34

5.93

Wells Fargo

2001

5.91

18.51

Wells Fargo

2001

1.86

1.59

14.04 **

6.26
4.88
19.30

2.41

2.91
5.91

6.39

**significant at 5% level

Hypothesis 3: Measurement of financial market risk relative to CEO change,
intrafirm, as a proxy for volatility.
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Hø: There will be no significant change in the magnitude of
financial risk relative to CEO change evident in the time-series
analysis of beta for entities within Collins’s sample for the period
t-2 and the period t+3, where t represents the year of CEO change.
Ha: There will be a significant change in the magnitude of
financial risk relative to CEO change evident in the time-series
analysis of beta for entities within Collins’s sample for the period
t-2 and the period t+3, where t represents the year of CEO change.
Table 4 below reveals the significance of the F-test of variance for the beta metric
for the intervals specifically surrounding three CEO turnover events for Kroger, Pitney
Bowes, and Wells Fargo. These results implicate that for financial risk as indexed
through the beta metric defined as

, for approximately 88% of

turnover events, stock price volatility was not measurably statistically distinguished by
significance as compared through observation of the variance, pre-versus-post turnover.
Overall, this result is not consistent with the expectations of and outcomes present within
many event studies. Typically, the results of event studies align with outcomes consistent
through applications of the theory behind the semi-strong form of the efficient markets
hypothesis, that news concerning the firm that reaches the market precipitates valuation
reassessments of their own holdings by investors as well as managers of larger holdings
on behalf of investors.
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Table 4
F-Tests: Beta for Collins’s (2001) and extended samples

Firm Name

Turnover
Year

β t-2 vs. t+3
F-critical
F-test of
variance
α = .05

Firm Name

β full tenure
F-critical
Turnover F-test of
Year
variance
α = .05

Abbott Laboratories

1989

10.73

199.50

Abbott Laboratories

1989

2.52

3.29

Abbott Laboratories

1998

130.13

199.50

Abbott Laboratories

1998

2.26

3.68

Circuit City

2000

1.40

18.51

Circuit City

1999

1.11

5.93

Fannie Mae

1989

1.19

18.51

Circuit City

2005

5.65

224.60

Fannie Mae

1998

1.93

199.50

Fannie Mae

1989

7.43

Fannie Mae

2005

11.22

199.50

Fannie Mae

1998

2.76

Gillette

1990

7.75

199.50

Fannie Mae

2005

21.18

Gillette

1999

10.39

18.51

Gillette

1990

1.09

**

4.12

**

5.79

Gillette

2001

2.56

199.50

Gillette

1999

5.38

1991

4.40

199.50

Kimberly Clark

1991

30.72

**

2.41

Kimberly Clark

2003

1.27

18.51

Kimberly Clark

2003

51.61

**

5.96

Kroger

1989

19.86

18.51

Kroger

1989

20.55

**

2.91

Kroger

2003

1.60

199.50

Kroger

2003

3.58

Nucor Steel

1995

41.47

199.50

Nucor Steel

1995

1.78

19.45

Nucor Steel

1999

3.42

18.51

Nucor Steel

1999

6.72

19.35

6.04

Nucor Steel

2000

7.01

199.50

Nucor Steel

2000

5.78

8.89

1978

5.65

199.50

Philip Morris (Altria)

1978

2.92

3.41

Philip Morris (Altria)

1983

10.90

199.50

Philip Morris (Altria)

1983

1.98

1992

1.57

18.51

Philip Morris (Altria)

1992

4.64

Philip Morris (Altria)

2002

53.60

199.50

Philip Morris (Altria)

2002

1.75

3.73

1996

71.72

Pitney Bowes

1996

5.52

**

3.10

1998

35.41

199.50

Walgreen's

1998

3.52

**

3.44

Walgreen's

2005

87.14

199.50

Walgreen's

2002

2.37

1995

40.94

2001

11.24

**

**

4.95

Pitney Bowes

Wells Fargo

18.51

**

4.35
**

Walgreen's

Wells Fargo

**

**

5.91

Philip Morris (Altria)
Philip Morris (Altria)

**

3.29

Kimberly Clark

**

**

3.97

**

19.00

18.51

Wells Fargo

1995

1.05

5.93

18.51

Wells Fargo

2001

4.55

6.39

**significant at 5% level

Contrastingly, in observation of the time-series which extended through the entire
tenure of the executive, nearly treble the amount of turnover events or 32% of events
under scrutiny resulted in significant volatility in stock price through observation of the
variance of the beta metric, pre-versus-post turnover. Fannie Mae (1989 and 2005),
Kimberly Clark (1991 and 2003, or all events within this firm’s time-series), Kroger
(1989), Philip Morris (Altria) (1992), Pitney Bowes (1996), and Walgreen Company
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(1998) all experienced significant changes in stock price volatility as measured through
beta for the interval extending throughout tenure.
Hypothesis 4: Measurement of differences in accounting ratio analysis
(return on assets) relative to CEO change, intrafirm, as a proxy for execution
of strategic change.
Hø: There will be no significant change in the magnitude of
accounting performance relative to CEO change evident in the
time-series analysis of return on assets (ROA) for entities within
Collins’s sample for the period t-2 and the period t+3, where t
represents the year of CEO change.
Ha: There will be a significant change in the magnitude of
accounting performance relative to CEO change evident in the
time-series analysis of return on assets (ROA) for entities within
Collins’s sample for the period t-2 and the period t+3, where t
represents the year of CEO change.
Return on assets, or ROA, is typically employed as a litmus for the efficacy of
managerial operations and strategy measured through accrual net income in relation to
the general utilization of all firm resources. It should be noted that in comparison to
financial market-based metrics, ROA is a historical assessment of performance. Changes
in performance are materialized through the dynamic realization of accrual based income
for the firm, and are based on US GAAP financial reporting for firms in this analysis.
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The occurrence of statistically significant variation in pre-versus-post turnover
ROA for firms in Collins’s (2001) sample for the interval t - 2 vs t + 3 is eight of 29
events, or 27.6% of all events expressed as an incidence rate. In terms of directional
change for those events which are statistically significant, Abbott Laboratories (1978),
Gillette (1990), Pitney Bowes (1996), and Wells Fargo (1995) all experienced increases
in performance when viewed chronologically with respect to the time-series return on
assets for the shortened interval.
Table 5
F-Tests: ROA for Collins’s (2001) and extended samples

Firm Name
Abbott Laboratories
Abbott Laboratories

Turnover
Year
1978
1989

ROA t-2 vs. t+3
F-critical
F-test of
variance
α = .05
72.59 **
9.20

Firm Name

Turnover
Year

ROA full tenure
F-critical
F-test of
variance
α = .05

18.51

Abbott Laboratories

1978

2.38

18.51

Abbott Laboratories

1989

19.69

8.81
**

3.68

Abbott Laboratories

1998

397.56 **

199.50

Abbott Laboratories

1998

97.83

**

3.68

Circuit City

1987

150.97

199.50

Circuit City

1986

3.72

**

3.59

Circuit City

2000

39.31

199.50

Circuit City

1999

1.55

5.93

Fannie Mae

1989

7.26

18.51

Circuit City

2005

4.20

7.71

Fannie Mae

1998

7,608.76 **

199.50

Fannie Mae

1989

6.63

Fannie Mae

2005

331.95 **

199.50

Fannie Mae

1998

1.89

Gillette

1990

163.02 **

Gillette

1999

2.28

199.50

Fannie Mae

2005

1,072.14

199.50

Gillette

1990

1.62

Gillette

2001

8.13

18.51

Kimberly Clark

1991

118.64

199.50

Kimberly Clark

2003

5,460.52 **

199.50

Kroger

1977

2.44

18.51

**

4.12
3.97

**

5.79
3.68

Gillette

1999

6.29

**

3.63

Kimberly Clark

1991

5.11

**

2.41

Kimberly Clark

2003

75.24

**

5.96

Kroger

1977

9.11

**

8.79

Kroger

1989

7.71

18.51

Kroger

1989

2.11

2.91

Kroger

2003

71.21

199.50

Kroger

2003

1.09

3.11

Nucor Steel

1995

13.27

199.50

Nucor Steel

1995

14.21

Nucor Steel

1999

5.89

199.50

Nucor Steel

1999

83.26

**
**

Nucor Steel

2000

1.07

199.50

Nucor Steel

2000

29.33

Philip Morris (Altria)

1978

0.40

199.50

Philip Morris (Altria)

1978

4.34

19.45
19.35
8.89
8.71

Philip Morris (Altria)

1983

3.42

199.50

Philip Morris (Altria)

1983

6.84

8.89

Philip Morris (Altria)

1992

5.63

18.51

Philip Morris (Altria)

1992

2.92

3.73

Philip Morris (Altria)

2002

5.35

18.51

Philip Morris (Altria)

2002

12.23

**

4.39

Pitney Bowes

1983

5.05

18.51

Pitney Bowes

1983

3.37

**

2.90

Pitney Bowes

1996

21.56 **

Walgreen's

1998

23.78

Walgreen's

2005

Wells Fargo

1995

Wells Fargo

2001

**significant at 5% level

35.66
316.68 **
16.54

18.51
199.50

Pitney Bowes

1996

1.32

3.10

Walgreen's

1998

17.43

19.45
19.00

199.50

Walgreen's

2002

3.33

199.5000

Wells Fargo

1995

2.81

Wells Fargo

2001

12.61

18.51

5.93
**

6.39
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Abbott Laboratories (1998), as well as Fannie Mae (1998 and 2005) also realized
significant directional declines in ROA performance for the periods under scrutiny.
Fannie Mae performance in particular supported the true degradation in performance
which occurred after aberrant financial reporting was discovered through a study
completed by the OFHEO (2004). Kimberly Clark (2003) experienced significant
volatility in general which did not, upon observation, delineate directional change in a
particular trend as compared to predecessor term results.
With respect to the comparison of the full tenure intervals pre-and-post turnover,
the incidence rate of significance of variance nearly doubles in comparison to the events
measured through the interval surrounding the event date, as 14 of the 29 of the turnover
events, or 48.3%, are characterized by salient differences in ROA performance. An
ascending direction of change in ROA is noted through observation of chronological
succession for Abbott Laboratories (1989), Kroger (1977), Nucor Steel (1999-2000),
Philip Morris/Altria (2002), Pitney Bowes (1983) and Wells Fargo (2001). Contrastingly,
five of these same firms also experienced overall comparative declines in ROA
performance; affected thus were Abbott Laboratories (1998), Circuit City (1986), Fannie
Mae (1989 and 2005), Gillette (1999), and Kimberly Clark (1991). The lengthened timeseries interval pertaining to entire tenure also results in a significance of variance for
Kimberly Clark (2003); however, as noted with respect to the shortened interval
surrounding the event date, there is no particular trend in an overall direction of change,
and as such, the comparison for this firm yielded aleatory results.
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Hypothesis 5: Measuring differences in accounting ratio analysis (economic
value added) relative to CEO change, intrafirm, as a proxy for execution of
strategic change.
Hø: There will be no significant change in the magnitude of
accounting performance relative to CEO change evident in the
time-series analysis of economic value added (EVA®) for entities
within Collins’s sample for the period t-2 and the period t+3,
where t represents the year of CEO change.
Ha: There will be a significant change in the magnitude of
accounting performance relative to CEO change evident in the
time-series analysis of economic value added (EVA®) for entities
within Collins’s sample for the period t-2 and the period t+3,
where t represents the year of CEO change.
EVA® has been more prevalently utilized in the last decade as a performance,
compensation, and investment appropriation litmus since the total cost of capital
structure is considered. The metric itself has been devised based on the sustainability of
operating profit in excess of financing costs and tax expenses for a given firm. As
defined in Chapter 1, the calculation of total net operating profit after tax less the total
dollar amount of cost of capital simulates the deduction of all financing costs, including
not only interest but equity costs from earnings, even if no dividends were disbursed.
Coles, McWilliams, and Sen (2001) opined that “EVA® also can be adapted to measure
and evaluate many different internal corporate activities, including divisional
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Table 6
F-Tests: EVA® for Collins’s (2001) and extended samples

Firm Name

Turnover
Year

EVA® t2 vs. t+3
F-test of
variance

F-critical
α = .05

Firm Name

EVA® full
tenure
Turnover F-test of
Year
variance

F-critical
α = .05

Abbott Laboratories

1978

36.71

199.50

Abbott Laboratories

1978

11.62 **

8.81

Abbott Laboratories

1989

23.03

199.50

Abbott Laboratories

1989

5.86 **

3.29

Abbott Laboratories

1998

1.07

18.51

Abbott Laboratories

1998

4.40 **

3.68

Circuit City

1987

222.10 **

199.50

Circuit City

1986

0.41

3.59

Circuit City

2000

159.60

199.50

Circuit City

1999

1.45

3.36

Fannie Mae

1989

23.89 **

18.51

Circuit City

2005

144.35

224.60

Fannie Mae

1998

35.05

199.50

Fannie Mae

1989

4.57 **

4.12

Fannie Mae

2005

3.66

199.50

Fannie Mae

1998

6.38 **

3.97

Gillette

1990

21.00

199.50

Fannie Mae

2005

8.64 **

5.79

Gillette

1999

9.26

18.51

Gillette

1990

366.67 **

3.29

Gillette

2001

1.13

18.51

Gillette

1999

3.39

6.04

Kimberly Clark

1991

1.13

199.50

Kimberly Clark

1991

4.47 **

2.41

3.46

5.96

Kimberly Clark

2003

1.52

199.50

Kimberly Clark

2003

Kroger

1977

18.29

18.51

Kroger

1977

13.83 **

8.79

Kroger

1989

10.47

18.51

Kroger

1989

5.76 **

2.91

Kroger

2003

8.24

199.50

Kroger

2003

3.57 **

Nucor Steel

1995

12.73

18.51

Nucor Steel

1995

9.42

Nucor Steel

1999

6.90

199.50

Nucor Steel

1999

94.62 **

19.35

Nucor Steel

2000

2.58

199.50

Nucor Steel

2000

28.05 **

8.89

Philip Morris (Altria)

1978

16.43

199.50

Philip Morris (Altria)

1978

2.32

3.41

Philip Morris (Altria)

1983

199.50

Philip Morris (Altria)

1983

3.04

8.89

Philip Morris (Altria)

1992

1.78

18.51

Philip Morris (Altria)

1992

6.99 **

3.73

Philip Morris (Altria)

2002

5.23

199.50

Philip Morris (Altria)

2002

1.88

4.95

Pitney Bowes

1983

1.30

199.50

Pitney Bowes

1983

2.30

3.10

Pitney Bowes

1996

2.16

199.50

Pitney Bowes

1996

1.20

3.10

Walgreen's

1998

1.98

199.50

Walgreen's

1998

5.62 **

Walgreen's

2005

39.56

199.50

Walgreen's

2002

4.01

Wells Fargo

1995

256.24 **

199.50

Wells Fargo

1995

20.59 **

3.20

Wells Fargo

2001

1.97

18.51

Wells Fargo

2001

14.49 **

6.39

991.78 **

3.11
19.45

3.44
19.00

**significant at 5% level

performance, project performance, and managerial performance…[and] use yearly
EVA® to evaluate and compensate managers” (pp. 33-34). As such it has been heralded
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as a superior “short-term [performance] measure” (p. 47). Coles, Williams, and Sen also
corroborated with the Stern Stewart regression analysis conducted which revealed that
“EVA® is the single best predictor of standardized MVA (with an R-squared of 0.50)”
(p. 33). Subsequent to acknowledging limitations of the impact between CEO tenure and
EVA®, Coles, McWilliams, and Sen extended further documentation of their own
empirical evidence which indicated that there was a “positive relationship of EVA®, an
accounting measure of performance to combined leadership structure” (p. 43).
Economic value added® experience for the firms under study is calculated based
on a conversion of the reporting year accounting based disclosures of net operating profit
after tax less the weighted average cost of capital to 2008 inflation adjusted US dollars.
Results are characterized by a statistically significant F-test of variance for four of 29 of
the t - 2 versus t + 3 intervals surrounding the events, which constituted 13.8% of the
CEO turnover events under study. The results evidenced in Table 6 above indicate that
statistically significant, increasing variability in EVA® was more prevalent as the timeseries of CEO tenure under observation was lengthened. In consideration of the CEO’s
full tenure, the likelihood of significant variance with respect to this accounting metric
was over four times versus the interval immediately surrounding the turnover event.
Hence, for 17 of 29 occurrences, or 58.6% of extended tenure events, statistically
significant variability of EVA® was noted.
In terms of individual firm impact, it is notable that Abbott Laboratories, Fannie
Mae, Kroger, and Wells Fargo all experienced significant volatility in EVA® for every
CEO turnover event noted for the entire extended periods under observation for these
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firms, which were between 25 and 36 years; Abbott Laboratories, Fannie Mae, and
Kroger experienced three successions each, and Wells Fargo experienced two.
Hypothesis 6: Measuring differences in accounting ratio analysis (market
value added) relative to CEO change, intrafirm, as a proxy for increases in
stockholder value.
Hø: There will be no significant change in the magnitude of
accounting performance relative to CEO change evident in the
time-series analysis of market value added (MVA) for entities
within Collins’s sample for the period t-2 and the period t+3,
where t represents the year of CEO change.
Ha: There will be a significant change in the magnitude of
accounting performance relative to CEO change evident in the
time-series analysis of market value added (MVA) for entities
within Collins’s sample for the period t-2 and the period t+3,
where t represents the year of CEO change.
Coles, McWilliams, and Sen (2001) posited: “MVA focuses on a long-range
perspective of performance…the measure of performance focused on investors. It
captures the extent of wealth created for the shareholders over a given period of time” (p.
47). It must be acknowledged that disparate time-series performance may be reflected
through the observation of EVA® as a contemporaneous interpretation of the culmination
of efforts of a CEO to sustain and increase firm market value, while MVA may be
viewed as a longitudinal analysis of the market’s perception of the value of the firm’s
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capital. Although these two metrics differ from the perspective of accounting versus
market based measures, these both warrant concurrent observation in the contrast of short
term versus long term performance, although not convergent. Employing an effective
performance litmus may elucidate the effect of agency theory, stewardship, and
governance in the retention and sustenance of market value by the agent(s) on behalf of
shareholders (p. 25). It should be noted that, similar to the approach of Clayton et al.
(2005), Coles et al. (2001) utilized a five year interval to observe the occurrence of
statistically significant changes in EVA® and MVA, and defended by acknowledging,
“we examine a five-year time period to allow for compensation, ownership, and
governance structure to have a material effect on both of our performance measures” (p.
36). Empirical evidence from event studies (e.g., Coles et al., 2001) indicated that
changes in EVA® and MVA are sensitized to such changes in operational approaches
and the organizational structure of the entity.
As evidenced in the left panel of Table 7 below, the incidence rate of statistical
significance of the variance of MVA is minimal among the sampled firms for the timeseries interval t-2 vs. t +3 surrounding the CEO turnover event date. Four of twenty-nine
events affecting four different firms are associated with significant volatility in market
value added pre-versus-post CEO change; the firms affected were Abbott Laboratories,
Gillette, Kroger, and Wells Fargo. Although the incidence rate is lower for significant
volatility of Tobin’s q and beta for the same interval, one event, the Kroger CEO turnover
of 1989, resulted in significant volatility in relation to both of these market metrics as
well as MVA. The Wells Fargo turnover event of 1995 was characterized by significant
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variances pre-and-post turnover in beta and MVA, as well as EVA® and ROA. Hence,
metrics which are sensitive market indicators of investor behavior had some likelihood of
concurrent statistical significance among some of the firms sampled.
This observation may be extended to the results of the entire tenure of the CEO as
related to turnover, presented in the right panel of Table 7. A concerted inspection of the
incidence rate of significance of variance pre-and-post comparison revealed sixteen of
twenty-nine events were statistically significant at the 5% level. Of the sixteen events
which exhibited statistical significance, two events for Fannie Mae (1989 and 1998), two
events for Gillette (1990 and 1999) and one event each for Kimberly Clark (2003),
Kroger (1977), and Wells Fargo (2001) exhibited statistical significance of variance
concomitantly for both Tobin’s q and MVA. All three equity market-related metrics—
Tobin’s q, beta, and MVA— of both Fannie Mae (1989) and Kimberly Clark (2003)
events exhibited statistical significance of variance.
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Table 7
F-Tests: MVA for Collins’s (2001) and extended samples

Turnover
Year

Firm Name

MVA t-2
vs. t+3
F-test of
variance
516.76 **

F-critical
α = .05

Firm Name

MVA full
tenure
Turnover F-test of
Year
variance

F-critical
α = .05

Abbott Laboratories

1978

199.50

Abbott Laboratories

1978

23.07 **

8.81

Abbott Laboratories

1989

47.26

199.50

Abbott Laboratories

1989

7.49 **

3.29

Abbott Laboratories

1998

2.96

199.50

Abbott Laboratories

1998

1.03

3.68

Circuit City

1987

3.94

18.51

Circuit City

1986

Circuit City

2000

4.78

18.51

Circuit City

1999

1.73

5.93

Fannie Mae

1989

67.44

199.50

Circuit City

2005

3.69

224.60

Fannie Mae

1998

0.03

18.51

Fannie Mae

1989

13.12 **

6.09

Fannie Mae

2005

2.55

199.50

Fannie Mae

1998

6.43 **

3.97

Gillette

1990

0.97

18.51

Fannie Mae

2005

4.26

5.79

Gillette

1999

14.97

18.51

Gillette

1990

41.66 **

3.29

Gillette

2001

51.00 **

18.51

Gillette

1999

50.27 **

6.04

Kimberly Clark

1991

1.47

18.51

Kimberly Clark

1991

9.51 **

2.41

Kimberly Clark

2003

7.35

18.51

Kimberly Clark

2003

9.76 **

5.96

Kroger

1977

1.19

199.50

Kroger

1977

222.34 **

8.79

Kroger

1989

18.51

Kroger

1989

2.43

Kroger

2003

1.60

18.51

Kroger

2003

1.22

5.91

Nucor Steel

1995

6.12

18.51

Nucor Steel

1995

1.80

19.45

Nucor Steel

1999

1.12

199.50

Nucor Steel

1999

19.66 **

19.35

Nucor Steel

2000

1.33

199.50

Nucor Steel

2000

29.39 **

8.89

Philip Morris (Altria)

1978

2.13

18.51

Philip Morris (Altria)

1978

15.07 **

8.71

Philip Morris (Altria)

1983

3.11

199.50

Philip Morris (Altria)

1983

792.08 **

8.89

Philip Morris (Altria)

1992

2.59

18.51

Philip Morris (Altria)

1992

2.41

3.44

Philip Morris (Altria)

2002

109.17

199.50

Philip Morris (Altria)

2002

2.18

4.39

Pitney Bowes

1983

167.83

199.50

Pitney Bowes

1983

Pitney Bowes

1996

1.05

199.50

Pitney Bowes

1996

1.11

Walgreen's

1998

1.68

199.50

Walgreen's

1998

3.16

3.44

Walgreen's

2005

12.46

199.50

Walgreen's

2002

1.35

19.00

Wells Fargo

1995

320,510.84 **

199.50

Wells Fargo

1995

7.13 **

3.20

Wells Fargo

2001

10.72

18.51

Wells Fargo

2001

9.23 **

6.39

24.98 **

44.70 **

81.67 **

**significant at 5% level

Test of Hypothesis: Regression
Hypothesis 7: Measuring interactions between variables relative to CEO
change.

3.59

2.91

3.10
2.90
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Hø: There will be no significant interactions between the variables
listed above relative to CEO change evident in a time-series
analysis of terms for entities within Collins’s sample for the period
t-2 and the period t+3, where t represents the year of CEO change.
Ha: There will be significant interactions between the variables
listed above relative to CEO change evident in a time-series
analysis of terms for entities within Collins’s sample for the period
t-2 and the period t+3, where t represents the year of CEO change.
Table 8
Regressions: for Collins’s (2001) and extended samples by firm, interval t-2 vs. t+3
Firm Name

Constant p-value

Abbott Laboratories

(41.7933)

Circuit City

(1,163.9100)

Fannie Mae
Gillette

0.17 +

Tobin's Q p-value
4.4680

0.14 +

Beta p-value
27.9333
(458.7870)

0.18 +
0.98

ROA

p-value

EVA® p-value

MVA p-value

(21.1217)

0.74

4.60E-06

0.20 +

4.00E-07

0.26

(1,396.4000)

0.98

-2.41E-03

0.98

5.16E-04

0.98

0.98

954.4110

0.98

46.6861

0.17 +

(44.6730)

0.16 +

(5.6010)

0.18 +

244.6660

0.82

-1.00E-05

0.15 +

1.00E-07

0.29

5.6806

0.65

(1.7976)

0.78

(3.6641)

0.58

12.5652

0.56

-2.00E-07

0.87

0.00E+00

0.72

Kimberly Clark

474.8210

1.00

(262.2190)

1.00

(121.4870)

1.00

378.4050

1.00

-1.40E-04

1.00

5.00E-06

1.00

Kroger

(336.8870)

0.99

(346.3570)

0.99

428.6520

0.98

6,272.9000

0.98

-7.21E-04

0.98

1.26E-05

0.99

Nucor Steel

58.2939

0.99

104.6590

0.99

(85.0816)

0.98

(764.3730)

0.99

0.00E+00

1.00

0.00E+00

1.00

Philip Morris (Altria)

(4.5563)

0.43

(1.0291)

0.69

1.2784

0.59

60.6728

0.11 +

-2.00E-07

0.46

0.00E+00

0.91

Pitney Bowes

(247.2210)

0.99

136.2970

0.99

63.9221

1.00

(54.4928)

0.99

5.11E-05

0.99

-5.00E-06

1.00

Walgreen's

697.1660

0.99

79.3287

0.99

(196.5200)

0.99

(6,490.3000)

0.99

3.70E-05

1.00

-3.70E-05

1.00

Wells Fargo

(111.5270)

0.33

102.4540

0.33

21.8014

0.35

(220.7600)

0.86

1.80E-06

0.54

5.00E-07

0.39

significant at: ** 5% level, * 10% level, + 20% level

Results of a binary logistic regression conducted across all independent variables
(i.e., the designated financial ratios and metrics) attributed to pre-versus-post turnover
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(expressed as a qualitative dependent variable) are displayed in Table 8 for the interval t2 versus t+3 surrounding the turnover event. A binary logistic regression as a statistical
method is characterized by two modalities, or potential outcomes, representing the
qualitative dependent variable, which in this case were pre-and-post succession events. A
separate regression analysis was conducted for each firm; firm coefficients and the pvalues relative to significance for the analysis for each firm are provided in Table 8
above. In addition, the significance of each coefficient is designated at the 5, 10, and 20%
levels, as additional pertinent information. Observation was made for the potential
presence of multicollinearity or exhibition of high correlation among the independent
variables of the regression for the intervals immediately surrounding the succession
events, and no events fulfilling the criteria were noted. The results of the extended tenure
sample firms were also screened for multicollinearity, with no observed emergent issues.
As a result, the potential for multicollinearity among the independent variables was fairly
low.
Results were generally of minimal significance, however, of the sampled firms,
the experience of Abbott Laboratories and Fannie Mae displayed lower levels of
significance for most individual independent variables considered; significance was noted
at the twenty percent level for Tobin’s q, beta, and EVA®. Of the independent variables
noted within the Philip Morris analysis, ROA was significant at the twenty percent level
as well. These outcomes indicate that pre-and-post performance event metrics for these
firms displayed statistically significant changes in market and accounting based metrics
as shown for the firms in question.
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Table 9
Regressions: for Collins’s (2001) and extended samples by firm, full tenure

Firm Name

Constant p-value

Tobin's Q p-value

Beta p-value

ROA p-value

EVA®

p-value

MVA

p-value

Abbott Laboratories

(2.2300)

0.71

(0.1388)

0.86

1.5813

0.73

(2.9678)

0.86

9.00E-07

0.49

1.00E-07

0.31

Circuit City

(0.4407)

0.73

(0.0887)

0.92

0.9881

0.37

(12.0473)

0.32

1.20E-06

0.46

2.00E-07

0.52

Fannie Mae

2.6818

0.67

(2.9448)

0.58

(0.8732)

0.42

76.1926

0.53

-2.00E-07

0.09

Gillette

(4.4318)

0.05

0.4814

0.70

1.4379

0.36

10.9458

0.55

4.00E-07

0.21

**

*

0.00E+00

0.15 +

1.00E-07

0.09 *

Kimberly Clark

(1.4125)

0.75

(2.6962)

0.30

3.8646

0.39

(17.5220)

0.28

1.00E-06

0.25

3.00E-07

0.07 *

Kroger

0.1011

0.96

(0.7941)

0.54

0.1186

0.90

5.3463

0.78

-4.00E-07

0.62

1.00E-07

0.54

Nucor Steel

12.7039

0.09

4.2949

0.31

(90.1250)

0.04

0.00E+00

0.28

0.00E+00

0.03 **

Philip Morris (Altria)

(1.1498)

0.62

(0.4592)

0.72

(0.0000)

0.11

(0.0000)

0.48

0.00E+00

0.18 +

*
+

(11.4737)

0.04

(1.2106)

0.20

**

**
+

Pitney Bowes

(6.9758)

0.14

1.1383

0.67

2.1559

0.43

10.3808

0.62

2.20E-06

0.47

5.00E-07

0.05 **

Walgreen's

(260.4370)

0.99

(18.4324)

0.99

169.0270

0.99

63.3103

1.00

2.78E-05

1.00

8.00E-06

0.99

Wells Fargo

(9.3073)

0.63

1.1848

0.94

0.8286

0.83

254.3540

0.35

3.00E-07

0.48

1.00E-07

0.29

significant at: ** 5% level, * 10% level, + 20% level

The p-values for two of eleven firms were statistically significant at the five
percent level for a limited amount of the independent variables under observation. Of
these two firms, from an individual firm perspective, Nucor Steel experienced statistical
significance among three independent variables (Tobin’s q, ROA, and MVA) at the five
percent level. Pitney Bowes’s results exhibited statistical significance for the independent
variable MVA at the five percent level. Philip Morris (Altria) experienced statistical
significance at the twenty percent level for ROA and MVA. Gillette and Kimberly Clark
also experienced statistical significance at the ten percent level for MVA, while Fannie
Mae experienced statistical significance at the ten percent level for EVA® and at the
twenty percent level for MVA.
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Summary
Collins (2009) explained the emergence of unsustainable financial performance
levels among firms selected for his prior (2001) research:
…the principles in Good to Great were derived primarily from
studying specific periods in history when the good-to-great
companies showed a substantial transformation into an era of
superior performance that lasted fifteen years. The research did not
attempt to predict which companies would remain great after their
fifteen-year run. Indeed, as this work shows, even the mightiest of
companies can self-destruct. (2009, p. 4)
As Collins (2009) further acknowledged: “the critical question is: ‘what do we
learn by studying the contrast between success and failure?’” (p. 15). The conjecture that
a CEO has the ability to direct an organization through “frame-breaking,” transformation
(Gordon, et al., 2000) requires significant financial flexibility.
It may be stated that a leadership legacy is defined as sustained financial
performance or non-significance of statistical assessment of risk as measured through the
observation of variances of financial metrics related to past performance and market
perception. From the results of analytical testing presented, as summarized through
Hypothesis 6, a leadership legacy so defined was attained by approximately half of the
executives of highly performing firms. Hence, Collins’s (2001) original litmus of Level
5 Leadership present in highly performing firms was indicative of a sustained presence of
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long-term firm performance, despite disclaimers Collins (2009) offered in a subsequent
analysis.
Table 10
Compiled Results of significance of Hypothesis Tests 2-6, for Collins’s (2001) and
extended samples by firm, interval and full tenure

Firm Name

Tobin's q Beta ROA t- EVA® MVA
Turnover t-2 vs. t-2 vs. 2 vs. t-2 vs. t-2 vs.
t+3
t+3 t+3 t+3 t+3
Year

Abbott Laboratories

1978

Abbott Laboratories

1989

Abbott Laboratories

1998

Circuit City

1987

Circuit City

2000

Fannie Mae

1989

Circuit City

2005

Fannie Mae

1998

**

Fannie Mae

1989

**

Fannie Mae

2005

**

Fannie Mae

1998

**

Gillette

1990

**

Fannie Mae

2005

Gillette

1999

Gillette

1990

**

Gillette

2001

Gillette

1999

**

Kimberly Clark

1991

Kimberly Clark

1991

Kimberly Clark

2003

Kroger

1977

Kroger

1989

Kroger

2003

Nucor Steel

**

**

Firm Name

Tobin's q Beta ROA EVA® MVA
Turnover full
full
full
full
full
Year tenure tenure tenure tenure tenure

**
**
**

**
**

1978

**

**

Abbott Laboratories

1989

**

**

**

Abbott Laboratories

1998

**

**

Circuit City

1986

**

Circuit City

1999
**
**

**
**

**

**

**

**

**

**
**

**

**

**

**

**

**
**

**

Kimberly Clark

2003

**

1977

**

Kroger

1989

Kroger

2003

1995

Nucor Steel

1995

Nucor Steel

1999

Nucor Steel

1999

**

**

Nucor Steel

2000

Nucor Steel

2000

**

**

Philip Morris (Altria)

1978

Philip Morris (Altria)

1978

**

**

**

**

1983

Philip Morris (Altria)

1983

Philip Morris (Altria)

1992

Philip Morris (Altria)

2002

Philip Morris (Altria)

2002

Pitney Bowes

1983

Pitney Bowes

1983

Pitney Bowes

1996

Pitney Bowes

1996

**

Walgreen's

1998

Walgreen's

1998

**

Walgreen's

2005

Walgreen's

2002

Wells Fargo

1995

Wells Fargo

2001

**
**

**

**

**

Wells Fargo

1995

Wells Fargo

2001

**
**
**

1992

**

**
**

**

Philip Morris (Altria)

**

**
**

Philip Morris (Altria)

**significant at 5% level

**

**

**

Kroger
**

**

Abbott Laboratories

**
**
**

**
**
**

**

**
**

**

**

**

**

**
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The results of testing for Hypotheses 2 through 6 are shown in Table 10 above in
the left hand side of the panel. Considering the contemporaneous incidence rate of
significance for the variance of financial metrics of three or more of the five financial
metrics tested, evidence suggests the lack of a leadership legacy among the sampled
firms surrounding the succession. Kroger (1989) and Wells Fargo (1995) exhibited
variances in three and four metrics, respectively, which were statistically significant.
These firms were not able to mitigate financial performance risk in the short term given
the succession event. However, for the majority of firms, a leadership legacy in terms of
financial performance was sustainable over the interval, and the interval surrounding the
event date was not characterized by pervasive volatility and risk as observable through
financial metrics.
In contrast, an observation of right panel details the incidence rate of significance
of variance for five financial metrics, given the full tenure of the CEO. Twelve of twenty
nine events resulted in a majority of statistically significant results. From these outcomes
it was observed that approximately 41% of the firms experienced results which were not
indicative of the establishment of a leadership legacy. Measurable financial risk was
observable through the variance in metrics. Further, in consideration of the affected
entities, certain firms experienced significant variances in terms of volatility of financial
metrics for the entire tenure and each succession event in the history of the sampled
interval. These firms were Fannie Mae, Gillette, and Kimberly Clark. Despite the
replacement of the top executive position, it is integral that the firm’s economic and
environmental moats are established to ensure sustainability of strategic intent. If this is
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effectively accomplished, significant volatility emergent due to financial risk may
potentially be mitigated.
There is evidence that, for firms demonstrating volatile financial performance,
sustainability of the firm through the development of a robust and fortuitous operational
and financial structure to mitigate risk may be particularly challenging. Volatility of
earnings is a deterrent to capital accumulation which potentially nullifies the future
ability of the entity to seize opportunity for growth. Certainly, with two of the said firms
experiencing acquisition (Gillette) and near failure (Circuit City), research outcomes
herein support the culmination of such exogenous events within financial markets.
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Chapter 5: Discussion, Conclusions, and Recommendations
Summary
The objective of determining an indication of sustainability of financial
performance was addressed through an empirical study reported in chapter 4. Conjectured
to potentially emerge through the observation of a time-series of financial metrics was an
absence of significant financial volatility as executive succession occurred among a
census of highly performing firms first identified by Collins (2001). Performance bereft
of significant financial volatility was hypothesized to be an indicator of the establishment
of a leadership legacy. An executive succession characterized by a leadership legacy was
hypothesized to not give rise to significant financial risk from strategic instability, as
evidenced through statistically significant changes in financial metrics. Risk mitigation
gives rise to effectively planned growth, realization of opportunity, return on capital,
stability of value proposition for shareholders, and concomitant sustainability of the
entity.
Collins’s (2001) original assertion held that the sampled companies of his study
initially demonstrated sustained high performance from both a financial and operational
perspective. The query herein sought to demonstrate whether the integral factors
underlying the assertion of sustainability of performance, primarily during and after
leadership succession, were associated with augmented risk for the firm. The hypotheses
were tested through a statistical investigation of concurrent financial performance related
to asset management and efficiency, market risk, market perception of firm value, and
economic value of the firm.
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This study yielded mixed results, that financial performance over the time-series
beyond the years originally sampled by Collins (2001) was sustainable for certain of the
firms within the census, and unsustainable for others. Of the eleven firms originally
identified as highly performing firms by Collins, three (i.e., Circuit City, Fannie Mae, and
Gillette) were liquidated, acquired, or affected by substantial financial restatements.
However, a closer investigation of financial metrics herein either provided evidence
which indicated certain challenges due to heightened volatility, or supported earnings
persistence through observation of minimal volatility. As an example, though Philip
Morris/Altria experienced prominent operational and legal challenges to its fundamental
product offerings, but sustained performance throughout the period under scrutiny, with
barely observable change in overall risk. This firm was able to mitigate environmental
risk despite the influence of ‘frame-breaking’ change to its constituency and operations.
Conclusions
There is notable evidence that sustainability of firm financial performance among
highly performing firms may be threatened by the emergence of financial risk, despite a
concerted effort toward a controlled relay succession approach to CEO turnover. This
level of financial risk is more pervasively evident in consideration of the time-series of
the entire tenure of the CEOs under study than in consideration of an interval surrounding
the event date. Of 29 succession events sampled among the firms in Collins’s (2001)
original analysis, approximately 41.4% resulted in a statistically significant variance for
three or more of the tested market and financial measures of Tobin’s q, beta, ROA,
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EVA®, and MVA. The prevalence of this statistical significance is an indication of
financial risk, and not indicative of the establishment of a leadership legacy.
Discussion of Hypothesis 1
Hypothesis 1 featured a conjecture addressing the incidence rate of chief
executive turnover for the sample under investigation. Contemplating the statistical
outcomes of Hypothesis 1, the incidence rate of succession events within the fifteen year
period sample initiated by Collins (2001) of 4.02 % was significantly different from the
incidence rate of approximately nine percent noted by Comte and Mihal (1990) in their
time-series analysis extending from 1945 through 1984. These results implied that there
was greater leadership stability in terms of CEO tenure during the periods that Collins
(2001) observed for the analysis completed within Good to Great as compared to the
generalized population of publicly held firms empirically tested within Comte and
Mihal’s (1990) research. In contrast, no statistical significance was noted for the
alternative hypothesis of differentiating the incidence rate of chief executive turnover for
the extended full tenure sample of 10.28 % from that derived from Comte and Mihal’s
incidence rate of nine percent.
These results may also be uniquely interpreted in the context of the source of
successors, and whether these executives hailed from inside or outside the company (see
also Comte & Mihal,1990; Cannella Jr. & Lubatkin, 1993; Collins, 2001; Clayton et al.,
2005; Bower, 2007). Comte and Mihal (1990) presented empirical research detailing that,
of the number of successions occurring across 41 selected firms, the selection rate of
insiders as successors was 96 % (p. 49). Collins (2001) confirmed that “in our previous
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research, over 90 percent of the CEOs that led companies from good to great came from
inside” (p. 95), and further indicated that for an extended review of highly-performing
sample firms through 1998, the selection rate of outsiders as successors was 4.76 %,
which implies that the complement of 95.24 % of successors were insiders. Hence, the
sampled entities more prevalently selected insiders as successors to the CEO position.
Further, Collins suggested that a “search for a disciplined executive with a bias for
selecting a proven performer from the inside” (p. 90) is a formidable practice which may
allow the company to “reverse a downward spiral” (p. 90). Notably, the result also
contrasts with the observations of Allgood and Farrell (2000), who predicated the mean
percentage of outsider sourced successors within “a sample of 760 firms with 7,402 CEO
years between 1980 and 1993” (p. 378) was 26.7 % of all turnovers. This result generally
supported the incidence of “relay successions” (Zhang & Rajagopalan, 2004, p. 483) in
which the predecessor CEO supports the transition process to seamlessly indoctrinate the
successor CEO for future service. Although evidence reviewed for each firm was not
detailed to confirm this, succession planning in general incorporates this approach, as
also implicated by Bower (2007).
Leadership and governance researchers (e.g., Dahya, Lonie, & Power, 1998) have
opined the potential conflicts of interest present if the CEO is also simultaneously
permitted to hold the position of Chairman of the Board. Within the sampled history of
the eleven entities comprising the census for the study herein, it was observed that for
88.6 % of the 360 firm years under observation, CEOs concomitantly held the position of
Chairman of the Board. Debatably, the entity within the sample that was most
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pervasively affected by governance inquiries and resultant financial restatements was
Fannie Mae. For approximately four percent of the entire interval under study for Fannie
Mae, or one single firm year of the sampled interval, the CEO position was not held by
the same individual who assumed the Chairman of the Board position.
Discussion of Hypothesis 2
Regarding Hypothesis 2, the magnitude of stockholder reaction was measured
through observation of the Tobin’s q metric for the sample under investigation during the
time-series interval t-2 and the period t+3 where t represents the year of CEO change.
The test was also performed for the entire tenure of the CEO in addition to the interval
circumscribing the succession event. Of 29 succession events observed across 11 firms in
the sample for the time-series interval surrounding the succession event, a statistically
significant variance as measured through application of an F-test for the Tobin’s q metric
at the 95% confidence level was ascertained for three occurrences or 10.34 % of the
succession events sampled. Of the 29 succession events observed across the eleven firms
in the sample for the time-series interval extending throughout the entire tenure of the
executive, nine occurrences or 31.04 % of events demonstrated a statistically significant
variance.
As Conyon and Florou (2002) hypothesized: “in an efficient market...stock prices
anticipate the future benefits of the possibility of CEO dismissal and therefore tend to
increase as the capital market becomes aware of new avenues for management
improvement” (p. 214). In addition, they asserted that “accounting-based measures…are
more stable and not vulnerable to speculative of exogenous shocks” (p. 214) as
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accounting information is based on historical financial reporting and actual results rather
than the heuristic conjecture of investors. Therefore, reaction among market participants,
i.e., investors, aligns with the tenets asserted through the efficient markets hypothesis.
The results of Conyon and Florou’s observation of the correlation between stock prices
and non-forced turnover for the period 1991-1993 and 1994-1997 yielded non-significant
results for the initial interval and significant results for the latter interval (p. 220). There
is marginal evidence through the observation of the results of the F-tests of significance
of the Tobin’s q metric that the brief interval surrounding the event may be too succinct
in certain instances for investors to form an opinion of the outcome of the event.
However, it is acknowledged that the frequency of observation of statistically significant
reaction among investors increases by treble in consideration of the entire period of
tenure for predecessor versus successor. This general result provided further evidence of
whether the perceived equity valuation on the part of investors, through observation of
the conversions of accrual income and realization of cash flows, supports a post facto
observation following the initial assessment. The evidence derived supported updates in
assessments by market participants in periods beyond the initial succession event.
Whether these perceptible assessments of investors were warranted and pervasive
was further edified through the observation of the statistical significance of the variance
of other accounting metrics. Such information is espoused to be impounded in the
informational content of the stock price as the event (in this case CEO turnover)
transpires, through application of the efficient markets hypothesis. However, investors
must be perceptive enough to discern the financial impact of the event in the immediate
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for the full inflection to be realized through the stock price. Whether the majority of
investors are able to perform such assessments given the present level of GAAP
disclosure with appropriate perspicuity has been the subject of debate among those
advocates of the existence of post-earnings-announcement drift and similar market
anomalies (e.g., Brown, 1999).
Discussion of Hypothesis 3
Results for market based metrics herein (i.e., Tobin’s q, beta, and MVA), provide
a measure of confirmative evidence on the part of investors to discern the long term
effects of succession events given prolonged tenure, in comparison to the initial and
fundamental perception of market participants for the initial t-2 / t+3 interval surrounding
the event. Researchers have indicated the observance of limited perception of market
participants through the pursuit of empirical research on event studies, particularly with
respect to post-earnings-announcement drift (Jegadeesh & Livnat, 2006). In addition the
contrary outcome, that investors are highly perceptive in their assessments, and their
responses accurate however, potentially tardy, has also been observed (Brown, 1999).
Given these conflicting observations, it may be noted that with respect to the variances
within the initial interval surrounding the succession event, the reactions of market
investors resulted in significant changes in beta for three events of 29 events sampled. Of
those three events, two (i.e., Kroger, 1989 and Pitney Bowes, 1996) resulted in sustained
beta volatility when comparing the variance of the beta recorded during the entire tenure
of the successor to that of the former.
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In consideration of the comparison for events and the entire interval of CEO
tenure pre to post turnover for the Collins (2001) firm sample, the frequency of statistical
significance of pre-vs-post beta comparison was eight of 24, or 33.33 % of turnover
events. Clayton et al. (2005) indicated that volatility was higher for the time-series
interval immediately surrounding the event, “the 2-year period following a turnover” (p.
1791), and decreased thereafter. This would presumably be attributable to the
pervasiveness and occurrence of transformational change following the event, which
tends toward stability (i.e., mean reversion) as tenure increases. However, given
consideration of the results of the entire tenure for the census of Collins (2001) firms, the
results for highly performing firms contradicted these findings. The occurrence of more
statistically significant volatility as measured by beta was more pervasive as the tenure
interval was lengthened.
The study of Clayton et al. (2005) included the financial results of all firms that
experienced chief executive turnover as indicated in the Forbes Annual Survey of
Compensation from 1979 through 1995. Evidenced were equity “volatility changes from
pre to post event” which were “statistically significant” (p. 1791). The results of the more
limited census of Collins’s sample for the same interval implicated that, unlike the array
of firms sampled by Clayton et al. (2005), the selected firms of Collins’s (2001) research
exhibited less equity volatility within the interval surrounding the turnover event. Merely
three of 24 events, or 12.5 % of turnover events, resulted in statistically significant preto-post comparisons with respect to changes in beta; this outcome is not dominant.
Hence, although operationalized differently than the study of Clayton et al. (2005),
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analysis of an interval more confined to firms comprising Collins’s (2001) sample
demonstrated that investors were less likely to ascertain a change in firm value to
potentially correlate with the occurrence of CEO turnover.
Notably, the statistical non-significance for the beta metric among the firms may
have been limited by the accessibility to stock prices for certain of the events. However,
this is less likely to be a contributing factor to the t-2 / t+3 interval comparison in contrast
to the entire tenure comparison. Dynamics noted with respect to beta revealed varying
levels of performance-related risk for different firms at various times. At best, beta is an
archival rather than a contemporaneous or prospective indicator of observable risk.
However, in most analytical contexts it is utilized as a valuation tool (e.g., cost of capital,
etc.).
Clayton et al. (2005) asserted: “in an efficient market, the volatility we observe
should be associated with new information being incorporated into prices” (p. 1800).
Hence, any significant volatility observed through the recognition of variance in the beta
metric for an extended sample may be interpreted as the effect of semi-strong form
market participants reacting not to the turnover event, but to the sustained performance of
one chief executive versus another, as measured through stock prices realized during the
executives’ entire tenure. This would implicate that stock price and tendency of the firm’s
equity returns to mirror general market returns during a particular CEO’s tenure was
significantly more (or less) volatile than the predecessor.
The importance of observing results emerging from the expansion of the interval
also allows for consideration of the effect of entrenchment as opined by Allgood and
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Farrell (2000): “when there is greater uncertainty about a new CEO’s ability, [the board]
will be more lenient regarding poor performance that deviates from the expected level”
(p. 374). Investors, as well as boards, were more likely to similarly apply this
performance litmus. Investor perception of firm value and market risk demonstrated
through the observation of Tobin’s q and beta were more often significantly different in
terms of variance for pre-and-post turnover comparisons given an observation of the
entire tenure of the executive. Allgood and Farrell (2000) also noted the prevalence of
entrenchment increases with the source of successor and length of tenure. As educed
previously, the rate of insider succession among the firms under Collins’s (2001) research
was over 96 %, which would correspond with a higher level of entrenchment among
sampled firm CEOs.
Discussion of Hypothesis 4
The results of Hypothesis 4 eminently contrasted with those of prior researchers
who also utilized the return on assets ratio as a performance litmus. Allgood and Farrell
(2003) focalized a research effort upon comparison of pre-to-post turnover ROA for firms
sampled form the Forbes Annual Survey of Executive Compensation for the “period
1981-93” (p. 324), and summarily noted: “the average ROA of the previous CEO is about
the same as the average ROA of the current CEO” (p. 327). Allgood and Farrell also
acquiesced that “ROA has a negative and significant effect on the probability of forced
turnover for new and old [outside hire] CEOs” (p. 388). However, they conceded that
relative performance of inside hires is inversely related to ROA (p. 387). Farrell also
collaborated with Whidbee (2000) and reported no mean difference in average ROA for
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forced versus non-forced CEO turnovers for 66 matched sample firms from the period
1982-1992 (p. 604).
Huson, Parrino, and Starks (2001) observed financial reporting relating to an
expanded interval of turnover events reported in the same Forbes Annual Survey of
Executive Compensation source, for the period 1971-94 (p. 2284). These researchers
evidenced that ROA, as defined by the ratio of EBIT to “beginning of period book assets
less the median value…for all firms in the same two-digit Standard Industry
Classification,” was significant as an indicator of the “performance-turnover relation” (p.
2284) and varied inversely with ROA (p. 2286). However, other ROA independent
variables noted of stratified samples indicative of six year subperiod observation
intervals, as well as the change in ROA, were not statistically significant. Results were
mixed when a second regression model, “turnover outcome”, was developed which
dichotomized data between voluntary and forced turnovers. For the interval 1977-1982,
statistical significance was shown to exist characterizing the inverse relationship between
ROA and the change in ROA for forced turnovers (p. 2288). Although operationalized
from differently within this study, the incidence of variation as compared to prior ROA
experience was significant for a majority of turnover events, for full tenure intervals of
firms within Collins’ (2001) sample. The data provided an indication that ROA
performance variation was statistically significant for approximately half of the events.
However, the direction of the performance subsequent to change was fairly mixed as, of
14 statistically significant events within the sample, seven resulted in significantly
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improved performance, six resulted in significantly deteriorated performance, and one
resulted in mixed performance overall.
Shen and Cannella Jr. (2002) espoused that “financial event studies have
generally used market indicators to examine immediate investor reactions to succession
announcements rather than actual cash flows generated by the firms over the first two or
three years of the new CEOs’ tenures” (p. 719). As investors react with fervor to firm
circumstances perceived as salient events and estimate changes in cash flows resulting
from these dynamics, forecasting accuracy is questionable. Post-earnings-announcement
drift and other market anomalies have been documented in various event studies as
researchers have noted that investors are often inaccurate in their projections which lead
to market reactions through purchase and sale of equities (Mendenhall, 2002). Clayton et
al. (2005) acknowledged similar effects in response to CEO turnover and inferred a
regression model to estimate the significance of the independent variables of quarterly
earnings on the dependent variable CAR, or cumulative abnormal returns, given the
presence of CEO turnover. Shen and Cannella Jr. (2002) empirically tested accounting
metrics as determinants to measure the impact of CEO successors on firm performance.
They developed a regression model featuring post-succession ROA as a dependent
variable, and conveyed that pre-succession firm ROA was a positive, statistically
significant factor relative to post-succession ROA (p. 726). The results in Table 5
concorded with these findings, as the most prominent statistically significant outcome
was increased and positive variance as compared to pre-succession performance.
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Discussion of Hypothesis 5
As EVA® is an accounting measure of incremental value achieved within a
particular reporting period based on the accrual method of measuring GAAP income for
the firms under study, any potential manipulation in accounting policies may influence
the magnitude of calculated EVA®. Among firms employing EVA® as the basis of
incentive compensation, the potential for management manipulation of accrual based
income should be considered from a behavioral perspective as a potential source of
volatility.
In recounting the results offered in Table 6, statistical F-tests of the variance of
EVA® for the intervals surrounding the event demonstrated a lesser incidence rate of
significance than extended full tenure intervals of CEOs for firms in the sample. The
probability of statistically significant volatility increased more than four times, from four
of 29 events, or 13.8 %, to 17 of 29 events, or 58.6 %, in comparison of the two sets of
intervals for sampled firms. Since EVA® is derived from accrual-based GAAP income
measures and the applicable weighted average cost of capital, factors contributing to
variation may include attrition in operating earnings as well as capital structure changes.
Earnings management or increased levels of compensation as the CEO’s tenure lengthens
may also be contributing factors.
With respect to the relevance of the sample under study, it is notable that among
the results as presented in Table 6, Fannie Mae’s results for full tenure revealed
statistically significant volatility for all three CEO turnover events occurring within the
sample. As Fannie Mae’s record of earnings management had been extensively
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documented in the Office of Federal Housing Enterprise Oversight or OFHEO (2004)
Report, there is potential that the earnings management divulged in 2004 and occurring
prior to that point contributed to the statistically significant difference in EVA® for this
firm.
Earnings management may be a confounding factor in the increased volatility of
EVA®. However, such changes are also attributable to a variant level of net operating
profit after tax as a result of various performance factors affecting the firm’s earnings,
whether exogenous or endogenous. Deliberate strategic change may intentionally
precipitate a positive change in EVA®. For a given firm it may also be attributable to
changes in the total dollar amount of weighted average cost of capital. Coles,
McWilliams, and Sen (2001) postulated:
The EVA® measure, which contains a weighted average cost of
capital, explicitly controls for the riskiness of the firm. The MVA
measure only accounts for the actual accumulated value of the
firm, but the risk factor borne by investors to obtain this value is
not explicitly reflected in the MVA measure. (p. 43)
As weighted average cost of capital is influenced not only by capital structure but
also by the relevant beta assessed at the time of the calculation, volatility and/or an
increasing trend in beta typically would signify an increase in the calculated relevant total
dollar amount of weighted average cost of capital. Six of the eight full tenure
observations which exhibited a statistically significant beta variance also experienced
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statistically significant EVA® variance for the period under scrutiny. Firms affected were
Fannie Mae, Kimberly Clark, Kroger, Philip Morris and Walgreen Company.
Discussion of Hypothesis 6
Although EVA® is essentially derived from accrual-based GAAP financial
reporting (as applicable for these US-based firms through the 2008 reporting year) and a
market based calculation of weighted average cost of capital, in contrast MVA is a litmus
of changes in market value supported primarily by equity price dynamics. For companies
included in the sample, the most material change in the metric for a particular period is
comprised of changes in the market price of total equity financing.
Essentially, the incidence rate of statistical significance of Hypothesis 6 aligned
with the incidence rate of significance of Hypothesis 5. Four of 29 intervals surrounding
the succession events exhibited a statistically significant variance in pre (t-2) versus post
(t+3) EVA® and MVA. For the extended tenure calculation, seven of the eleven firms in
the sample exhibited statistical significance in the variance of EVA® in addition to
statistical significance in the variance of MVA. These occurrences were pervasive as
evidenced in the two far right columns of Table 10. Note that the F-test exhibited
statistical significance for both metrics for the full tenure intervals for 17 events. For four
entities -- Abbott Laboratories, Fannie Mae, Nucor Steel, and Wells Fargo -- the
concurrence of the statistical significance of the variance of both metrics occurred
multiple times.
Convergence of the statistical significance of the results of financial market
metrics and historical accounting metrics in particular is a strong indicator of increased
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perception among investors to assess the effectiveness of the CEO over tenure. In
addition, investors align the negotiable market price of the firm’s capital with a change in
reported income dynamics which affect cash flow. An underlying assumption is that the
informational content of historical financial reporting is effectively utilized in developing
fair market pricing of equity. In order for this to be achieved, financial statements should
primarily be characterized, qualitatively, by the substantiation of relevancy and predictive
value of information, which is integral to the financial calculation of equity value. In the
longer term, investors responded via a market-based reaction measured through
observation of direct price changes in relation to other assets in the market (beta), the
difference between the book value of assets/capital structure and the market value of
same (MVA), and the relationship between the book value of assets and the market price
of equity (Tobin’s q), especially over the full tenure of the executive. Apparently, the
higher level of incidence of statistical significance of the longer tenure intervals for all
five ratios tested implicated that over time, executive performance was more subject to
volatility as tenure increased and the observation intervals expanded. The prominent
increase and convergence in the incidence rate of significance was noted for both
financial (market based) and accounting (historically based) metrics.
Discussion of Hypothesis 7
Subsequent to the observation of the results of Hypothesis 7 presented in Table 8,
a conclusion may be asserted: a stable relationship amid pre-and-post financial and
accounting metrics existed for the sampled firms exhibiting limited statistical significance
in the immediate surrounding interval. This outcome implicates that overarchingly,
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succession events had minimal influence on changes in financial performance for the
firm. The leadership and strategic approaches established by predecessors pervaded,
particularly over the initial interval prior to and following the change in command, t-2 vs.
t+3. Hence, the sampled firms’ leaders were able to navigate and sustain performance
through periods of economic instability. Results similar to those established during the
period of assessment as a high-performing firm by Collins (2001) were essentially
maintained throughout the course of personnel changes in top executive positions, at least
within the interval limited to a five year span surrounding the succession event. These
results were indicative of the establishment of a leadership legacy for the periods
indicated, which was maintained through the leadership transition period. In addition,
these results comported with those of Zhang and Rajagopalan (2004), for which
performance relative pre-and-post to relay succession events evidenced minimal change
and stable yet slightly increased performance in firms experiencing minimal strategic
instability (p. 495). This may be expected for firms experiencing a non-forced turnover
(due to a retirement) of an incumbent who has exhibited Level 5 leadership qualities
(Collins, 2001) during tenure. These results also corroborate with the fact that few of the
CEO turnover events under observation in the sample were forced.
Of the firm variables that were characterized by statistical significance for the
time-series surrounding the successions, seven individual ratio calculations (which
exclude the consideration of the constant) were significant at the 20 % level for three
firms. These were Tobin’s q, beta, and EVA® for Abbott Laboratories and Fannie Mae,
as well as ROA for Philip Morris/Altria. The incidence rate of significance was thus
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greater for market based metrics over the time-series than for accounting metrics. These
occurrences provide evidence of investor perception in the pre-and-post assessments
surrounding the succession event, resulting price changes and volatility in the beta metric
as well as Tobin’s q. Indeed, the semi-strong form of the EMH may be applicable, and
the potential to imbue stock prices with informational content may be noted within this
analysis. The signage of the independent variables was negative for Fannie Mae,
indicating that financial performance was inversely related to the post succession interval.
Thus, there was a tendency for financial performance to decline in the interval subsequent
to succession as compared to the interval prior to succession.
The results of the extended tenure binary logistic regressions conflicted with the
prior results of observations of the intervals immediately surrounding the CEO turnover
events. Given the succinct interval surrounding the turnover, stability in terms of
accounting and financial results was fairly well maintained for the transition period
immediately surrounding the turnover event. As tenure lengthened, the incidence rate of
significance of metrics for pre-and-post succession events throughout the observation
period to the 2008 reporting year became pronounced and frequent. Table 9 presents the
results of regressions for the extended samples by firm for full tenure. Exclusive of the
results of constants, the results of Nucor Steel for Tobin’s q, ROA, and MVA were all
statistically significant at the five percent level. Pitney Bowes also sustained statistical
significance of MVA at the five percent level. The financial reporting of these two firms
was characterized by significantly different pre-and-post succession results in these
designated metrics. In addition, Fannie Mae experienced an EVA® metric significant at
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the ten percent level, as well as MVA significant at the twenty percent level. Philip
Morris/Altria also experienced both ROA and MVA significant at the twenty percent
level. Both Gillette and Kimberly Clark experienced MVA significant at the ten percent
level. Of these ten statistically significant incidences (exclusive of the constant), four
were inversely related to the dependent variable. As an example, Nucor Steel’s Tobin’s q
and ROA were both inversely related to post succession performance; Fannie Mae’s
EVA® was also inversely related to post succession performance.
From these results, there is supportive evidence that the independent variables
considered, financial and accounting ratios and metrics, were significant. These results
also imply that a leadership legacy, long-term, was not established for some of these
firms demonstrating statistical significance for metrics prior and post comparison, as
defined by overall stability of financial and accounting ratios and metrics, or statistically
non-significant levels (i.e., greater than five percent level) of performance pre-and-post
succession. Hence, results are generally mixed, as one firm experiencing bankruptcy
(Circuit City), both exhibited statistical non-significance within the analysis. However,
the analysis of one firm experiencing high financial reporting instability (Fannie Mae)
resulted in statistical significance to an extent for both analyses. Therefore,
approximately half of the leaders of highly performing firms (i.e., six of eleven firms or
54.5 %) overall differentiated long-term performance (either improved or deteriorated)
for some of the metrics at a statistically significant level. However, as stability of risk and
return is to define the establishment of a leadership legacy, approximately 45.5 % of the
leaders of highly performing firms provided statistical evidence of achievement.
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Discussion of Hypotheses Test Results
Hypotheses tests substantiated the increased probability of statistically significant
variation in financial metrics as the time-series under observation encompassed the entire
tenure of the executive. This was in contrast to the probability of statistically significant
variation for the interval espoused by Clayton et al. (2005), which was characterized by a
five year interval immediately circumscribing the succession event. Clayton et al. noted
perceptible and augmented risk within the interval immediately surrounding the
succession of the CEO, consistent with empirical results indicative of event studies.
However, risk noted among the sample specifically limited to firms within Collins’s
(2001) analysis, and tested herein, were not overly indicative of increased risk in
consideration of the census for this same interval. As noted in a regression analysis of
pertinent variables, further inquiry culminated in the observation that approximately 55 %
of firms realized some significant variation in pre-versus-post succession performance
metrics when the time-series under investigation covered the entire tenure of the
executive. Forty-five percent of firms sampled, did not experience significant variation in
pre-versus-post succession financial performance and risk, defined as the presence of a
leadership legacy.
These findings also imply that overall financial riskiness increases more
pervasively as tenure increases. Conversely, Allgood and Farrell (2000) noted diminished
standard deviations in stock returns as tenure increased. Results herein with respect to
volatility of the beta index conflict with this prior finding for sampled firms. In addition,
although Clayton et al. (2005) had a unique perspective in confining the interval under
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study, from the expansion of the interval, a moderating factor did not emerge delimiting
significant statistical change in financial metrics for the sampled firms. This outcome
indicates less sensitivity among investors overall the results for Collins’s (2001) selected
firms as compared to outcomes typically characterized of an empirical event study.
Furthermore, a salient corollary may emerge from the contemplation of these
consequences: as CEO tenure increases, executive approaches to achieving sustained
exceptional financial performance continue to mirror past approaches, and may not fully
address risk as it increases by identifying novel approaches toward mitigation. However,
Puffer and Weintrop (2001) articulated that “inconsistent findings [in empirical research
on turnover events] may be due to insufficient attention to the performance indicators
used by the individuals responsible for CEO turnover decisions, namely, the board of
directors” (p. 1). These findings are miscible as well as explanatory in that there is less
attention directed to indicators of financial performance, sustainability of results, and
mitigating risk as tenure increases. In addition, more pervasive entrenchment,
complacency, compensation levels, and agency effects also play a role in the realization
of a greater increase in financial risk as tenure increases. This consequence substantiates
a general theory of organizational inertia as delineated by Shen and Canella Jr. (2002), as
well as Shen and Cho (2005). A further consequential inference may be deduced:
executive skill defies portability to an extent, and despite the auspice and prescience of
deliberate succession planning, ubiquitous amongst the firms under study (i.e., under the
assumption that nearly all successors were internally sourced), the risk mitigation of an
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aleatory domain of exogenous financial and operational influences is not viable within a
continuum.
Collins (2001) codified a taxonomy, utilizing qualitative and quantitative
assessments, to measure the effectiveness of leaders within the entity. The limitation of
the analysis herein, and indeed Collins’s analyses (2001, 2009) are that such analyses are
demonstrative of a post hoc appraisal. However, greater sensitivity was evidenced
through longer time intervals as experience of the CEO is assessed, particularly with
respect to market-based measures of performance. This finding provides additional
edification that fundamental analysis is an effective indicator of performance; accuracy
translates not only into market based, but also accounting based metrics. Additionally,
echoing the conclusions of Cannella, Jr. and Lubatkin (1993), Allgood and Farrell (2000,
2003), and Bower (2007), Collins (2009) acknowledged the potential source of
comparative change in performance:
…one of the most significant indicators of decline is the relocation
of power into the hands of leaders who fail to comprehend and/or
lack the will to do what must be done—and equally, what must not
be done—to sustain greatness…A domineering leader fails to
develop strong successors (or drives successors away) and thereby
creates a leadership vacuum when he or she steps away…Or
perhaps legendary leaders pick successors less capable in a
subconscious (or maybe even conscious) strategy to increase their
own status by comparison. (pp. 60-61)
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The outcomes of this research endeavor must be carefully interpreted to
acknowledge limitations of generalizability. The highly performing firms as detailed by
Collins (2001) were selected as of a point in time, and acknowledgement of unsustained
performance was offered by Collins (2009) in a future work. However, the evaluative
framework provided in the original selection process (2001) was of robust derivation, and
offered extensive revelations regarding firm performance and effective leadership.
Additional factors are offered for consideration below, which may enhance qualitative
evaluation offered by Collins with respect to Level 5 Leadership; expansion of this
approach to a prosaic and quantitative inclusion of governance and leadership variables
noted through validated empirical instruments may prove instrumental in screening the
future performance of firms and their leaders. Collins (2009) later elaborated on a more
comprehensive approach to developing a litmus of evaluation for leadership, which may
also be complemented by analysis of governance variables.
Recommendations for Future Study
Collins (2001, p. 238) utilized stock returns and other accounting metrics such as
profitability, liquidity, and activity ratios which contributed to a litmus of leadership
performance; had some of the metrics been expanded to include certain market-based
financial metrics, research outcomes may have differed. Within the analysis prescribed,
some of the sampled comparison firms were dismissed due to non-sustainability of
performance (p. 8; pp. 237-238). As the population of years under scrutiny was increased
to extend Collins’s original census, an observed number of firms were not able to sustain
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performance through the extended interval, which included the 2008 financial reporting
year for each firm.
Although some of the pre-and-post interval test results were indicative of
statistical insignificance with respect to the regression analysis conducted, individual
tests of variance yielded a pivotal incidence of tests of significance for extended intervals
as compared to intervals suggested by Clayton et al. (2005) surrounding the CEO
turnover event. This was evidenced through the observation of all five financial metrics
(i.e., Tobin’s q, beta, ROA, EVA®, and MVA) conducted within this study. Certain
qualitative factors have been observed with respect to this analysis, for example, the
incidence of the CEO/Chairman position held by the same individual among the sampled
firms. Other qualitative governance assessments such as those implicated by Anderson et
al. (2000) and DeFond and Hung (2004) – e.g., diversification and investor protection,
respectively – provided further evidence that such qualitative variables may be
effectively considered to enhance the predictability of occurrence between changes in
qualitative governance variables and deteriorating performance, ultimately related to
CEO turnover or dismissal. Suggested is consideration of the inclusion of such variables
among highly performing firms as a benchmark to test performance of firms potentially
exhibiting decline. Coles et al. (2001) pursued a similar model, but confined the
financials under investigation to EVA® and MVA.
Governance Ratings and CEO Turnover
Recommendations for future study include the development of a fundamental
factor model which incorporates governance ratings and the resultant correlation with
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financial performance given executive departure. Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick (2003)
constructed a factor model on the premise of a shareholder-return linked governance
index which was a departure from prior studies as, commonly, the inherent methodology
applied by past authors was that of event studies. Gompers et al. argued that event study
methodology is inappropriately applied in the measurement of governance effectiveness,
especially in corporate takeovers and proxy fights (p. 108). Hence, these authors
“combine[d] a large set of governance provisions into an index which proxies for the
strength of shareholder rights, and then stu[died] the empirical relationship between this
index and corporate performance” (p. 108).
After attributing firm leadership and governance style with a “Democracy” rating
versus a “Dictatorship” rating, which included observations of “compensation
plans…bylaws…charter…cumulative voting…pension parachutes…poison
pill…antigreenmail law” (p. 112) relating to state of incorporation, Gompers et al. (2003)
concluded that portfolios constructed of equities of firms characterized by Democratic
governance ratings outperformed those characterized by Dictatorship ratings by 8.5 % per
year (p. 109). Additionally, the authors conveyed: “by 1999, a one-point difference in the
index was negatively associated with an 11.4 percentage difference in Tobin’s Q…firms
with weak shareholders rights were less profitable…than other firms in their industry,”
(p. 110); they further noted and elucidated this linkage as correlation between “weak
shareholder rights…[and] additional agency costs” (p. 110). None of the firms which
comprised Collins’s (2001) esteemed group of highly performing firms were part of
Gompers’s et al. (2003) Democracy or Dictatorship portfolio.
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The research model proposed by Gompers et al. (2003) may be extended to
incorporate a time-series analysis of similar dynamics with respect to the devised
governance rating system, applied prior and subsequent to an executive turnover event. In
addition, a qualitative dummy variable indicating replacement by an insider or outsider
may also be incorporated to reflect the source perspective of the successor, aligning with
the assertions of Bower (2007). This approach may be applied to the census identified in
Collins’s (2001) original analysis. In turn, a portfolio constructed of various firms’ equity
held during the time-series interval aligning with executive tenure would indicate the
presence of higher of lower stock returns achievable under a particular CEO’s term. As
an extension of the measurement of risk and return relevant during a CEO’s tenure, an
examination of the Sharpe ratio (i.e., the return on the portfolio less the risk free rate
divided by the portfolio standard deviation) of this constructed portfolio will provide a
relative measure of the standard deviation of the return per unit of risk identified. The
greater level of return achieved under each respective CEO given the level of risk may
then be identified. This approach aligns with a development of a return specific
measurement which would incorporate the effect of governance changes as well as the
assertions of Gordon et al. (2000) with respect to strategic organizational change.
An integral portion of features traceable to a successful governance framework
would presumably include whether the presence of an active succession plan exists
within the context of the firm; conceptually, this would support the posits of Bower
(2007): “we are assessing people who have developed an intellectual framework for
thinking successfully about the company’s environment and dealing with that
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environment…a ‘cognitive groove’…” (p. 132). A variable developed to capture the
degree to which a particular succession plan was supportive to an organization may be
one of the qualitative variables integrated into a model which would determine a degree
of sustainability among those firms implementing such plans. Gompers’ et al. (2003)
model included the tracking of “classified board[s]…[and] directors’ duties…” (pp. 147148); this approach did not specifically acknowledge succession planning. Gompers et al.
(2003) did not include an independent dummy variable capturing the effect upon
governance, if any, derived from firms employing CEOs to simultaneously assume the
role of Chairman. Within Collins’s (2001) sample extended through 2008 for all
reporting years as indicated within the census population, across all firms, for
approximately 88.45 % of firm years, the same executive simultaneously occupied both
CEO and Chairman position.
Following the work of Gompers et al. (2003), Bauer, Guenster, and Otter (2004)
analyzed the relationship between governance ratings for European firms, originating
from Deminor (p. 92), net profit margin, and return on equity. Deminor’s governance
ratings include the consideration of “300 different governance criteria per firm” (p. 92).
Utilizing the Deminor governance rating as an independent variable to test its relationship
to other financial variables, Bauer et al. noted a significant relationship between
governance ratings and the Tobin’s q metric for European firms from the years 20002001 (p. 99). The examination of other metrics in addition to the incidence of turnover
linked to such governance variables could enhance predictive value of financial
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performance and assist in the identification and comprehension of factors contributing to
a culmination of the ethical creation of increased shareholder value.
Leadership Assessment Criteria and Qualitative Variables
As an epilogue to prior work, Collins (2009) suggested an improved, indexed
classification schema indicating the robustness of company policy leading to “successcontrast selection criteria” (p. 135). This approach was primarily instituted to determine
intrasector competitor vantage point which differentiated performance from that of peer
firms; SIC codes were utilized to aid classification of diversified firms. The observation
and classification resulted in a “quantitative scoring framework built around six criteria”
(p. 136). These were identified as: “business fit, size fit, age fit, performance divergence,
and greatness test” (pp. 136-138).
The “greatness test” (Collins, 2009, p. 138) was based on continued
“perform[ance] from the contrast-selection year to ten years out” (p. 158). This resulted
in a scoring methodology which, when applied, provided indexed comparability for firm
performance in years subsequent to the development of the original sampling process
employed for the Good to Great (2001) research endeavor. Collins (2009) identified the
need to continue tracking those firms which and leaders who sustained high performance
beyond the original observation period. This effort hence captured the essence of tracking
performance of the highly performing firms in the Good to Great (2001) census,
however, the differentiation in financial results correlating with an executive turnover
were not explored; the comparison was focalized upon financial performance. Hence, the
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schematic approach devised may also be measured pre-and post-turnover to determine
whether there is a statistically significant difference in the results achieved under tenure.
With respect to leader performance, however, Collins (2001) took a qualitative
approach and assessed CEO commitment to an organization through observation of
evidence of a level of “professional will [and] personal humility” (p. 36). Documentation
of these qualitative leader behavioral characteristics of leaders was evidenced through a
blend of field research techniques, primarily interviews, and archival research techniques,
which included observations of news articles. Incorporating a documentable and more
objective assessment of leadership success and/or suitability may be achieved with the
addition of a qualitative leadership index, which would optimally result in the assessment
of a correlation between excellence in firm financial performance and leader commitment
to individuals within an organization. Further, incorporating a governance variable would
provide evidence, within a single discriminant model, of the effectiveness of the leader to
influence qualitative ethical compliance, financial performance outcomes, and leadership
behavior. The incidence of turnover as compared to the level of governance ratings of
ethical organizations combined with leadership behavior surveys and financial
performance may further edify executive effectiveness.
Although Waldman et al. (2001) completed a survey which indicated the
perception of transactional leadership and charisma, and delineated a correlation between
firm financial performance and leadership, the survey instrument was condensed and not
as comprehensive as other validated survey instruments. An assessment model from the
Ohio State scales series such as the Leader Behavior Description Questionnaire (LBDQ)
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devised by Halpin (1957, as cited in Szilagyi & Keller, 1976) may be instrumental in
assessing leader effectiveness within the organization, as well as documenting personal
and behavioral traits. “Two of the dimensions inherent…are leader consideration and
leader initiating structure” (Szilagyi & Keller, 1976, p. 642). LBDQ questionnaires are
typically completed by subordinates and are perception based, resulting in an indexed
score computed on a Likert-type scale. Accuracy of the assessment is enhanced by the
prior demonstrated validity of the instrument as compared to field research methods (e.g.,
interviews, etc.) which may be subject to carrying degrees of validity and result in more
subjective assessments when applied.
A limitation to this approach may be one of privacy. As the effectiveness of
performance and indeed aspects of behavior are often assessed, administered, and
retained through the efforts of the human resources department of an organization, such
information is typically not disseminated. However, such information would edify the
assessments of Collins (2001) with respect to distinguishing Level 5 leader traits.
Consideration of Financial Restatements and CEO Turnover
Consideration of accounting restatements may provide further evidence of leader
ethical behavior, and may be indicative of the effectiveness of the governance structure of
an organization, and the accuracy of the governance rating as pertaining to financial
reporting. The inclusion of a qualitative variable indicating the presence of an accounting
restatement and assessing the strength of the correlation to leadership behavior and
governance rating would provide shareholders with an increased level of information
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with respect to the accuracy of reported performance, the presence of errors in reporting,
whether aberrations or intentional misstatements, and the pre-and-post turnover
performance of CEOs. Hennes, Leone, and Miller (2008) reported that the General
Accounting Office (GAO) database “does not contain a variable that differentiates
between errors and irregularities” (p. 1488); consequently, it is difficult to discern
whether restatements are the result of egregious intent or random error. An examination
conducted by Hennes et al. revealed that, utilizing SEC 8-K filings as support of observed
restatements occurring between 2002 and 2005, 76 % of accounting restatements were
errors in application of GAAP, while 24 % were intentional misstatements (p. 1489).
Hennes et al. further hypothesized that the incidence rate of CEO turnover would be
higher for firms experiencing restatements; upon completing empirical research to
support this conjecture, they imparted that “both CEO and CFO turnover are significantly
more likely if the restatement relates to an irregularity rather than to an error” (p. 1490).
Provided was empirical substantiation of a near 50 % CEO turnover rate within two years
subsequent to an intentional misstatement (p. 1506).
Notably, a sample firm of Collins’s (2001) census, Fannie Mae, experienced an
investigation in 2004 resulting in a significant financial restatement (OHFEO, 2004) and
subsequent CEO turnover within a year of the inception of the investigation and
restatement, although the organization “neither admitted or denied any wrongdoing”
(Collins, 2009, p. 146). Optimally, a correlation may be established between the
incidence rate of restatements, deterioration in financial metrics, leader behavior, and
governance ratings, to predict the incidence of CEO turnover among highly performing

167
firms. Correlation between financial restatements and governance ratings would
optimally be minimal or negative.
Implications for Practice
This research project was endeavored to determine the extent of an applicable
leadership legacy among firms comprising the group of highly performing entities
analyzed in Collins’s (2001) work, as defined by statistical non-significance of the
variance of financial market and accounting based metrics. Although Collins (2001,2009)
presented constructs regarding leadership primarily rooted in content analysis, this study
departed from that approach by operationalizing the observation of financial performance
consequences correlated with executive change through quantitative financial analysis.
Practitioners of financial analysis, particularly managers of investment portfolios
adhering to a particular style, will find this research endeavor informative. Consideration
is typically given to financial performance dynamics which correlate to style strategies
such as value or growth. As executive succession may lead, as demonstrated within, to
statistically significant volatility in beta, rebalancing and/or asset reallocation may be
required as a response tactic. Such corollaries are also true of individual investors
managing their own portfolios.
Volatility of beta, utilized as an input for the calculation of the weighted average
cost of capital, may be incorporated into the assessment of risk with respect to
endeavoring capital investment projects. A risk adjustment may be applied to beta in
order to capture the effect of the probability of CEO succession. Similar considerations
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are also relevant to the employment of EVA® as a decision analysis litmus for capital
investment.
Executives following their predecessors perhaps do not provide focused
consideration to the implications of financial volatility of risk-based market metrics
derived from the stock price at the point of succession, especially if the succession is
forced or unexpected. However, executives should acknowledge the potential effect of
amplified risk, earnings volatility, and heightened cost of capital that may be applicable
as the entity becomes a conduit for unique strategic style dynamics applicable to the firm
given the advent of a successor.
Implications for Social Change
Investors, depending on their personal investment objective, often entrust assets to
entities with the provision that individuals in executive leadership positions will
instinctively spearhead the growth of selected organizations to eventually produce
superior returns. The assurance that the firm will be a maintained as a viable going
concern inherently is built upon this premise. If superior profitability, or profitability in
general, occurs merely for an ephemeral interval, has the CEO identified a sustainable
framework that will likely produce future profitable returns, as investors anticipate?
This research endeavor has revealed that among the firms comprising Collins’s
(2001) analytical framework that were highly performing, the passage of time and
succession of chief executives has been invariably associated with greater return and risk
volatility as measured through both accounting and financial metrics. For each metric
under analysis in Hypotheses 2 through 6, the incidence rate of statistically significant
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volatility was greater for the extended interval of measurement under full tenure than for
the five year interval surrounding the event. The expansion herein of the framework
proposed by Collins enhanced transparency of firm accounting and financial performance
and risk for market participants invested in the firm. Investors are able to ascertain the
incidence of volatility relative to CEO change, and generally associate executive turnover
among highly performing firms with less volatility at the onset of the event, and greater
volatility of financial performance metrics as tenure persists. This finding may be applied
to an investment selection process or portfolio construction strategy. Mitigated or
intercepted volatility through active intervention, rebalancing, and diversification will
affect investors’ realization of expected return. The resultant implication for social
change is the preservation of investor capital; social change implications regarding
preservation of capital are the optimal realignment and redistribution of wealth to
investors who in turn fund other deserving corporate entities, remit appropriate levied
taxes, and hence contribute to the stability of the economy.
Firms’ leaders may seek diversification for the purpose of competitive advantage
or bootstrapping earnings. However, sound financial and investment practice is
frequently exemplified by opposite actions. Seeking orthogonalized diversification does
not necessarily enhance earnings potential for every firm. If diversification occurs for the
sake of earnings enhancement alone rather than strategic change, then it is potentially
more optimally left to investors to develop a personalized portfolio strategy. In addition,
it may imperil the individual shareholder’s strategy of investing based on managerial
progress.
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The efficient market hypothesis applied is predictive in that if a firm is not valued
by the market as a standalone entity, unless there is surety in finding further value that the
management team will extricate through the exploitation of potential synergies, the
diversification sought in the combination of two firms in disparate sectors may be less
than likely optimal. A review of qualitative views which affect perception of external
stakeholders and therefore through the EMH affect market share price—all are drivers of
externally (validated) valuation.
In establishing an investment objective, market participants may utilize a
performance litmus or index with respect to the outcome of a CEO leadership/financial
performance rating in order to select equities for inclusion in a portfolio of their own
construction. The investor criteria for inclusion may be specific based on a tolerance
scale of their own choosing, which would indicate the level of ethical or competent
leadership within the organization. A potential portfolio construction may be tested
through application of the Sharpe ratio, which denotes the level of return associated with
the level of risk; the higher the level of the Sharpe ratio, the greater the return per unit of
risk endeavored.
The problem statement and sample addressed the findings of authors of prior
studies (i.e., Dahya, Lonie, & Power, 2001) who sampled groups which are
heterogeneous in terms of return; the problem of variability of returns as CEO transitions
occur will potentially be solved if the observed approaches and metrics indicative of
superior management performance are modeled. Firms may mirror this performance and
expand upon metrics (with proper consideration afforded to privacy issues). Managerial
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performance disclosures based on the results and suggestions herein may be utilized as a
litmus by investors and creditors, resulting in more equitable resource allocations among
firms vying for capital in global financial markets. The equitable distribution of investorsupplied capital in financial markets is integral to optimal market functioning. Thus, a
social change implication for fair distribution of capital among firms vying for equity
within financial markets is the augmentation of returns for companies that are well
managed, and the resultant return of wealth to the entities’ shareholders. As mentioned,
these shareholders in turn may reinvest in the firm, or seek to provide capital to other
firms, enhancing financial and economic growth for society.
In an equity market characterized by amplified volatility of returns, investor
capital is invariably subject to risk of loss; market participants may accept this risk as a
requisite of investing. However, investor demographics may affect the preference to
maintain a particular tolerance level of risk in order to support the investor’s life cycle.
Although higher levels of volatility may be associated with increased levels of return in
some instances, less predictable returns may significantly impact the safety of investor
capital as well as security of investors’ financial futures. Investors may, in response, be
reticent to provide capital to firms. Pervasive equity volatility also has the potential to
significantly impact domestic economic stability as well as market financial stability
when investor reaction is pronounced. To the extent that corporate executives have the
ability to mitigate short and long term risk as a result of assessments of endogenous and
exogenous effects on the firm and decisively react, such actions bode favorably for
investors seeking returns on capital. It is therefore critical that, from a strategic
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perspective, successor CEOs maintain a continuous focus toward strategy when
warranted and feasible.
The market sensitivity of investor perception of changes in value which align with
equity volatility is evident. Executive succession may augur strategic change, the
outcomes of which are reflected in the amplitude of financial metrics indicative of
performance dynamics. The auspice of firm performance is exemplified through leaders
who maintain a strategic legacy of sustainable performance.
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